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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how organizations try to leverage the experience of major 
information system-related incident (ISRI) to avoid the recurrence of failure and to 
reduce their impacts. Accordingly, the study utilizes a situated learning perspective 
and a practice view to respond to the question “how do IS organizations learn 
from their internal, large Information system-related incidents?”  
Employing a multiple, inductive case study design, the study found that 
organizations adopt a wide range of practices during and after the incident 
handling process. This resulted in articulating five learning modes: 1) learning 
through incident handling, 2) post-incident reflection, 3) transversal learning, 4) 
outsourced learning, and 5) learning through material replacement. Although the 
first two learning modes are documented in other domains, the study shows how 
the characteristics of ISRIs affect the practices associated to these two learning 
modes. Further, the analysis focuses on the other three learning modes that seem 
to be typical of this sector.  
Transversal learning refers to the fact that while some of the learning practices are 
focused on individual incidents, specific learning practices exist which take into 
account multiple adverse events. Outsourced learning indicates that capitalizing 
on the experience of an incident is often carried out through relying on specialized 
providers that handle incidents. Finally, the particular nature of the IS work 
processes and its material basis allow for learning through material replacement. 
The thesis enriches our understanding of the processes whereby organizations 
learn from ISRIs, thus providing contributions to theoretical developments in 
knowledge and learning literature. More specifically, the results of the research 
challenge the established temporal view about when learning process takes place. 
While the existing literature on organizational learning suggests that learning takes 
place either during incident (through incident handling practices) or (right) after 
iv | Page 
 
(through post-incident reflection and learning), the current study suggests that the 
temporal pattern of learning process is not necessarily confined to this established 
dichotomy. The concept of transversal learning indicates the importance of 
looking at learning practices that take place in parallel and with a considerable 
temporal distance from incidents that occur in a proper moment of learning. 
The thesis adds to knowledge literature by foregrounding the importance of the 
materiality regimes underlying the learning process. The idea of learning through 
material replacement shows that the modular, adaptable regime of materiality 
that dominates ISRIs can lead organizations to benefit from their incident 
experience, without necessarily knowing the causes of incidents and their 
potential solutions. 
Finally, the thesis advances our understanding of the role of politics and 
governance of learning from incidents in the IS sector. It does so by highlighting 
the role of neutralization (versus normalization) and dramatization (versus 
rationalization) in the process of learning. The study found that the ignorance of 
influential actors about the technical aspects of the problem could be leveraged by 
learning agents to add to the political pressure needed to drive learning initiatives. 
The study also highlights the critical importance of organizational governance for 
the process of learning. The concept of outsourced learning underscores the 
importance of a learning governance system, which complements the two 
dominant learning governances in the literature –i.e., intra and inter-
organizational learning. This shows that for capitalizing on the experiences of past 
incidents, organizations might avoid performing learning practices, especially 
when they are dealing with a wide range of changing technologies (learning 
abstinence), since the knowledge gained is expected to be obsolete or decrease in 
value through time. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
In facing critical incidents, it is not enough that organizations only recover from 
them. They also need to learn from them to avoid similar incidents in future and 
reduce their impacts. Incidents provide various learning opportunities for 
organizations as sources (e.g., when organizations draw lessons from analyzing 
them) and triggers of learning (e.g., when they force organizations to take actions 
to avoid future incidents). However, incidents can pose serious challenges on 
learning process as part of the learning context (e.g., when the urgency, negative 
valance, and ambiguity of incident challenge learning practices). Recent studies 
have emphasized on the importance of looking at the process through which 
organizations capitalize on their incidents’ experience. These studies call for a 
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deeper examination of the learning process with regards to the specific contextual 
factors related to various types of incidents. This has resulted in specialized studies 
in healthcare and safety incidents, industrial incidents, and natural disasters. 
Literature has shown that information system-related incidents (ISRIs) also have 
their own specific characteristics that can influence learning process. However, the 
review of these studies shows that the focus has been mainly on the lessons that 
organizations (should) develop through formal post-incident analysis practices. 
Still we need to understand how organizational learning process unfolds in the 
specific context of ISRIs. 
Based on a situated learning perspective and by adopting a practice view of 
organizational learning, the study tries to answer, “How do organizations learn 
from their internal, large Information system-related incidents?” Adopting a 
qualitative interpretative approach in four IT organizations (two information 
technology security and two supercomputer organizations), I focus on 15 major 
incidents and explore what the organizations did to learn from those incidents.  
The results of the empirical study shows that the organizations adopt a wide range 
of practices during each incident handling process –i.e., handling incidents through 
ticketing system, doing Triage, and interactions with specialized providers- and 
after that –i.e., post-incident reflections and laboratory incident analysis. It also 
shows that the organizations adopt several practices –i.e., using Wiki systems, 
executing improvement projects, and performing upgrades- helping them to 
leverage the experience of several incidents.  
The analysis of the learning practices resulted in articulating five learning modes: 
(1) learning through incident handling; (2) post-incident reflection; (3) transversal 
learning from incidents (4); outsourced learning; (5) learning through material 
replacement. This adds to the existing literature that mostly focuses on two 
traditional learning modes: learning through post-incident reflection and learning 
  3 | Page 
 
through incident handling practices. Accordingly, the articulation of the new 
learning modes challenges the established temporal view about when learning 
process takes place. It also highlights the importance of materiality regimes 
underlying the learning process, advances our understanding of the politics of 
learning from incidents by highlighting the role of neutralization (versus 
normalization) and dramatization (versus rationalization), and shows the 
importance of considering various governance systems through which learning 
process takes place. 
1.1 The importance of organizational learning (OL) 
from information system-related incidents (ISRIs) 
Organizations increasingly face incidents related to their information systems, for 
instance due to security breaches and breakdowns of technological systems that 
disrupt their normal operations. Organizations are the key targets of such 
damages. For instance, according to the latest survey by Ponemon Institute, the 
average annual cost that cybercrimes posed on organizations like HP, in 2011, was 
around $5.9m, 56 % higher than the previous year (Ponemon Institute, 2013). 
Of course, this is not confined to security incidents. Failures of information 
systems impose considerable financial, reputational, and privacy costs on 
organizations. For example, a simple breakdown of a banking system costs a 
fortune for a major bank like RBS that handles billions of transactions worldwide 
(Lex team, 2012). At the same time regulator authorities urge organizations ““to 
take reasonable care to establish and maintain such systems and controls as are 
appropriate to its business”, and to ensure business continuity” (Lex team, 2012). 
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Surprisingly enough, a large portion of these damages can be prevented easily. For 
example, in a report by The Verizon 2012 Data Breach Investigations, it was 
estimated that out of 855 data breach incidents to US secrete services and 
national security bodies, “97 per cent could have been avoided if simple security 
measures had been in place” (Taylor, 2012). This shows the importance of 
capitalizing on past ISRIs experience to avoid similar incidents in future or at least 
reducing their impacts. It also implies that the challenge often is not identifying 
what should be done; rather the difficulty is how to make sure that the experience 
of past incidents results in actual changes in practices that can prevent future 
incidents. 
Various evidences indicate that learning attempts should not be merely confined 
to technological factors (Nelson, 2007). It is also critical that organizations take 
into consideration factors such as security policies, awareness programs, 
employees training, and motivational factors (Anderson & Moore, 2006). In other 
words, organizations need to learn from their experiences on both technical and 
organizational factors to become more immune and more prepared to deal with 
future incidents. This need heightens regarding the increasing number, 
heterogeneity, and severity of IT incidents (Ponemon, 2009; Ponemon, 2010). 
1.2 The challenges of OL from ISRIs 
Literature on organizational learning from incidents (Beck & Plowman, 2009; 
Carroll & Fahlbruch, 2011; March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991; March & Olsen, 1975; 
Rerup, 2009) has documented a wide range of barriers that organizations face 
when they engage in the learning process (D. Smith & Elliott, 2007). These include, 
for example, barriers due to cognitive limitations of organizations (Levitt & March, 
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1995), structural barriers and rigidities (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000), and political challenges (Elliott, Smith, & McGuinnes, 2000; Smith & 
Elliott, 2007; Stern, 2002). 
In general, past experience can result in improvements. This has been 
demonstrated in studies on learning curve in various sectors (Argote & Epple, 
1990; Epple, Argote, & Devadas, 1991; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Lapre, A. S. 
Mukherjee, & Wassenhove, 2000). However, recent studies on learning from 
incidents have shown that learning from experience can be different when it is 
through routine, normal experiences, compared with significant, unexpected 
incidents (Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009; Lampel, Shamsie, & 
Shapira, 2009; Rerup, 2009; Starbuck, 2009). In the latter situation, there are 
strong elements of cognitive mismatch between established schemas and 
evidences, high level of shock that attracts attentions, and often low frequency 
that reduces the chance of multiple trial and error practices. Hence, the conclusion 
is that learning from major incidents is different from learning from daily, routine 
ones (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Lampel et al., 2009). The focus of this study is 
merely on learning from major incidents.  
In addition, previous studies have argued that organizations learn differently from 
successful events versus negative incidents (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). That is 
because the negative valence of incidents provides different psycho-political 
conditions for actors that can influence their collective reactions to incident 
experience (Cyert & March, 1963; Starbuck, 1983). This study only focuses on 
major negative incidents. 
Literature suggests that organizations can learn from their major incidents by 
reflecting on incidents right after handling them, through a systematic analysis of 
the causes of incidents, drawing lessons on how future incidents can be prevented 
or managed effectively, and incorporating those lessons into organizational 
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routines and structures and culture (Carroll & Fahlbruch, 2011). Another different 
approach frames learning as a process that is situated in daily activities of 
organizational actors (Lave & Wagenr, 1991). In the context of learning from 
incidents, this view implies that learning emerges out of the engagement of actors 
in the very incident handling practices (Butler & Gray, 2006).  
Building on these views, studies on learning from incidents have shown that the 
characteristics of incidents, such as their ambiguity, negative content, urgency, 
and revealing nature influence the learning process. For example, Haunschild & 
Sullivan (2002) show that organizations with a heterogeneous profile are more 
likely to learn from more complex incidents than simple events. In addition, some 
studies have documented evidences that the urgency of incidents, though might 
trigger the learning process, can also make organizations engage in a superficial, 
incomplete learning process, mostly to protect themselves against external 
pressure, rather than improving their defects that caused the incident (Elliott, 
2009). 
In addition to generalist literature, several studies have specialized in terms of 
specific incidents that inspire learning process. For instance, numerous studies on 
healthcare and safety incidents (Carroll & Edmondson, 2002; Nicolini, Powell, 
Conville, & Martinez-Solano, 2008; Rivard, Rosen, & Carroll, 2006), industrial 
incidents (Carroll & Hatakenaka, 2001; Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakeneka, 2002; 
Carroll, 1995; Carroll & Fahlbruch, 2011), and natural disasters (Jasanoff, 1994; 
Parker, Stern, Paglia, & Brown, 2009) have articulated the challenges that 
organizations face in their learning process. The assumption of these studies is 
that the characteristics of incidents and the context in which they often occur 
influence the learning process. This has led to more specific and contextualized 
understanding of learning process and its nuances in each specific context.  
  7 | Page 
 
Following this line of reasoning, the argument of this study is that ISRIs possess 
specific characteristics that have significant bearings on learning process. ISRIs are 
rooted in a wide range of interconnected technologies. This technical nature of 
ISRIs implies that diverse, specialized actors be involved in learning process (Loch, 
Carr, & Warkentin, 1992). These technologies also change frequently, which 
constantly faces organizations with emergent incidents (Egan, 2007). This requires 
further learning attempts by organizations to deal with new incidents and 
challenges on the applicability of past experiences in facing future incidents 
(Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). 
However, the review of literature (chapter 2) shows that although information 
systems (IS) literature recognizes abovementioned characteristics, it does not 
contextualize learning process with regards to them. In fact, the specialization has 
revolved around what specific lessons organizations can learn from various 
categories of ISRIs. When it comes to learning process, the literature is quite 
generalist. The studies mostly refer to general learning processes such as post-
incident reflection. Some empirical studies have questioned such a narrow, 
prescriptive view of learning from incidents by showing that organizations have 
limited chances to learn only through post-incident reflection (Gwillim, Dovey, & 
Wieder, 2005; Kasi, Keil, Mathiassen, & Pedersen, 2008). 
What remains underexplored is how do the characteristics of ISRIs might affect the 
process of learning from them? Do organizations apply the same learning practices 
in the context of ISRIs, as they do in other types of incidents such as natural 
incident? Do ISRIs make organizations perform traditional learning practices such 
as post-incident reflection differently? Do organizations avoid some expected 
learning practices such as root-cause analysis that are well established in other 
contexts such as healthcare?  
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1.3 Research aims and expected contributions 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the process through which organizations 
learn from their ISRIs. More specifically, I am interested in a contextual 
understanding of organizational learning process with regards to the 
characteristics of ISRIs. The goal is to openly explore the practices that 
organizations adopt to leverage their ISRIs experiences to enhance their 
capabilities for avoiding similar incidents in future and reducing their impacts.  
The study seeks to articulate learning practices that are relevant in the context of 
ISRIs and examine how the characteristics of ISRIs might lead organizations to 
adopt them. It is expected that new learning modes be articulated that reflect the 
specific characteristics of ISRIs and their context. This, in turn, results in two 
specific contributions to the literature on organizational learning. First, it shows to 
what extent the traditional learning processes are relevant in the context of ISRIs. 
For instance, do organizations go through systematic root-cause analysis when 
they try to learn from their ISRIs? This helps specifying the boundaries of learning 
theories by examining whether they are relevant in the specific context of ISRIs or 
not.  
Second, by capturing openly the practices that organizations apply for their 
learning purposes and by identifying new practices and articulating them into new 
learning modes, the study examines the relations between the learning practices 
and the contextual factors, especially the characteristics of ISRIs. Accordingly, the 
study tries to articulate insights about how the specific characteristics of ISRIs 
might qualify different learning practices, compared with other domains. This 
allows identifying some contextual factors (such as the temporality of technology 
and incidents, the specific underlying materiality regime that is present in ISRIs, 
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and the overall governance system through which ISRIs are handled) that warrant 
theorizing for understanding the learning process. 
1.4 The structure of Thesis 
The next chapter reviews literature to develop the conceptual framework for the 
study. I review literature to examine how previous studies have understood the 
process of learning from ISRIs. The result of this review suggests an overall 
framework that links the characteristics of ISRIs to OL process. 
Chapter 3 describes the process of an empirical multiple case study design for 
understanding the process through which organizations learn from their ISRIs. 
After describing the research question, the overall research approach and design, 
the chapter reports data collection and data analysis processes. This is followed by 
describing the empirical settings of the study. 
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the practices that the studied organizations adopted to 
avoid similar incidents in future or reduce their impacts. Chapter 4 focuses on 
practices related to a single incident (single-incident learning), both during and 
after incident handling. Chapter 5, reports practices that the organizations took in 
relation to multiple incidents (multi-incident learning). 
Chapter 6 articulates five learning modes based on the practices observed in the 
organizations. In addition to two learning modes that are articulated in the 
literature (learning through incident handling practices, and post-incident 
reflection), the chapter focuses on analyzing three new learning modes that are 
less developed in the literature (transversal learning, outsourced learning, and 
learning through material replacement). I examine how the characteristics of ISRIs 
shape the way in which each learning mode unfolds. 
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In chapter 7, I discuss how the three new learning modes contribute to our 
understanding of 1) the temporal patterns of learning process, 2) the politics of 
learning from incidents 3) socio-materiality of learning process, 4) the governance 
of OL process, and 5) the organizational aspects of OL process. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and contributions of the research, highlights 
the limitations of research, suggests some lines for future studies, and comments 
on implications for practice. 
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Chapter 2: Background Literature 
In this chapter, I first define organizational learning (OL) and its four dimensions 
(content, process, outcome, and context), information system-related incident 
(ISRI) and its characteristics, and four conceptual relations between OL and ISRIS 
(trigger, source, context, and trigger). Based on this conceptual framework, I 
review literature on information systems (IS), incident management, and general 
management to examine how previous works have studied OL from ISRIs. The 
analysis of the literature shows insufficient attention is given to OL process with 
regards to the characteristics of ISRIs. Accordingly, I develop an overall framework 
for addressing this gap. 
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2.1 Definitions 
Understanding organizational learning (OL) from information system-related 
incidents (ISRIs) requires defining organizational learning, its various dimensions, 
and the way the study operationalizes this concept. Second, it is critical to define 
information system-related incidents and their characteristics. Third, it is 
important to elaborate what it means when we talk about OL from ISRIs. Box 2.1 
summarizes the definitions used in the study. 
Box 2.1: Definitions used in the study 
Information System-related Incident (ISRI): “An unplanned interruption to an IT service 
or reduction in the quality of an IT service” (ITIL, 2012): 46). 
Organizational Learning (OL): “A cognitive, discursive, and material process through 
which an organization and its members aim to expand their existing capabilities” (Nicolini 
et al., 2008; Nicolini, Mengis, & Swan, 2011). 
OL‎ “from”‎ ISRIs:‎ ISRIs can act as sources of drawing learning content, as triggers of 
learning process, as the context in which learning process takes place, and as the targets 
of learning when the aim is avoiding incidents or reducing their impacts (D. Smith & 
Elliott, 2007). 
2.1.1 Organizational Learning (OL) 
OL refers to the cognitive, discursive, and material process through which an 
organization and its members aim to expand their existing capabilities (Nicolini et 
al., 2008; Nicolini et al., 2011). Therefore, OL does not necessarily imply a rational, 
deliberate process. In fact, OL is often emergent (Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 
2003; Orlikowski, 2002) and situated (Lave & Wagenr, 1991; Orlikowski, 1996) and 
it may not produce immediate and visible changes (Weick & Westley, 1996). This 
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definition is broad enough that allows capturing various related works in the 
literature.  
Following the literature on OL, I distinguish between four dimensions: content, 
process, context, and outcome (Naot, Lipshitz, & Popper, 2004). The content of OL 
refers to the specific lessons and solutions that are suggested. It answers the 
question about what is (going to be) learned? (Naot et al., 2004). Learning content 
often refers to what is intended to be learned (in an ex-ante analysis), and can be 
of a technical, managerial, or cultural nature (Carroll 1998). For instance, 
organizations might think about defining a new organizational procedure in their 
production as a solution that is learned. 
The practices undertaken by organizational members to identify and implement a 
learning solution are defined as learning process (Elkjaer, 2004). Investigating the 
learning process thus answers the question how learning takes place. A focus on 
the learning process brings to the fore concerns about what sort of activities are 
taken by organizational members, how these activities are structured (Daft, 1982; 
McKenney, Mason, & Copeland, 1997), what actors are involved (Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994), which roles and responsibilities are defined (Crossan, Lane, & 
White, 1999), and in what temporal pattern OL process unfolds.  
Learning context refers to the factors and conditions that affect the learning 
process. More specifically, the learning context describes the structural (Lam, 
2000), political (Blackler, 2000; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; Lawrence, Mauws, 
Dyck, & Kleysen, 2005), cultural (Blackler, 1995), legal (Mayer & Argyres, 2004), 
and material factors (Epple et al., 1991; Hargadon & Fanelli, 2002) either 
facilitating or hampering the learning process. 
Finally, learning outcome refers to the actual product of the previous three 
dimensions. Learning outcomes can be intended (such as reducing the frequency 
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of incidents or their impacts), as well as unintended (such as creating new 
incidents or turbulences) (Epple et al., 1991). 
Although these four aspects are intertwined, OL literature has shown that 
distinguishing between them can help us analyze and theorize on this 
phenomenon (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). This distinction also allows us to analyze the 
focus of various studies, how OL is framed in their theories, and avoids confusions 
due to mixing different OL dimensions. 
2.1.2 Information system-related incidents (ISRIs)  
Incidents, in general, are defined as deviations from the expected or routine events 
that produce undesirable outcomes (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Mellahi, 2005; 
Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). These events contradict normal expectations, so, they 
entail an element of surprise and shock (Lyytinen, 1988; Weick & Roberts, 1993). 
Although all incidents have rather fuzzy temporal boundaries, they constitute a 
series of interrelated events that occur within a circumscribed and limited period 
of time (D. Smith & Toft, 2005; Turner, 1994a; Weitzel & Marchand, 1991). The 
identification of incidents is based on objective criteria such as the visibility and 
size of impact, and some subjectively and socially constructed criteria. As such, 
understanding both what an incident is and what events should be included in an 
incident account is partially subjective and context dependent (Elliott et al., 2000). 
Given the complexity of incidents and the subjectivity involved in understanding 
them, uncertainty is thus an inextricable aspect of all incidents (Carroll & 
Hatakenaka, 2001). A further critical characteristic of all incidents is their stressful 
nature. The negative impact of incidents and the need to recover from them 
quickly both imply great urgency and pressure (Borodzicz & Haperen, 2002; Stern, 
2002). Hence, incidents often give rise to severe stressful conditions and external 
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pressures from stakeholders and public agents, such as the media (Moynihan, 
2009). 
Information system-related incident (ISRI) is broadly defined as “an unplanned 
interruption to an IT service or reduction in the quality of an IT service” (ITIL, 2012): 
46). This definition is selected because it is close to empirical side that allows 
focusing on ISRIs. Second, the definition is inclusive enough to cover various types 
of ISRIs that this study concentrates on (security incidents and hardware failure). 
The focus on organizational level implies that the negative impacts of ISRIs are 
defined with respect to the organization’s goals and performance. In addition, the 
definition excludes planned interventions by IT service providers and any kind of 
interruptions and quality reduction event that is part of the standard operation of 
a service. From a process view of incidents (Carroll and Hatakenaka 2001), ISRIs 
are incidents in which information technology play a critical role in one or more 
incident stages, whether through their creation, incubation, or escalation (D. 
Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
While ISRIs share several characteristics with all other types of incidents (e.g., they 
are perceived negatively, they have a limited duration, they are stress generating 
and give raise to the need for urgent remedial action), they also have some 
specific features that set them apart from incidents in other domains. First, unlike 
natural disasters or some other human-induced incidents, ISRIs have a strong 
technical dimension (Ang, Thong, & Yap, 1997). Accordingly, ISRIs are likely to 
derive from, impinge on, or being related to technical knowledge and professional 
know-how (Loch et al., 1992; McMullen, 2010).  
Second, ISRIs are also transient as rapid technological changes in information 
technologies can easily pose novel sources of risk for organizations. This implies 
that the capabilities that organizations need to handle and avoid such incident 
might also change frequently. 
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Finally, ISRIs often occur at the interface between a wide range of actors such as 
suppliers of IT facilities and services (Van Eeten & Bauer, 2009), various users 
(Perrow, 1999; Turner, 1994b), and numerous potential attackers. These 
characteristics tend to be simultaneously present and interact in a complex way in 
most ISRIs (see Table 2.1).  
Table ‎2.1: The Characteristics of ISRIs 
Characteristics of 
ISRIs 
Description References 
Technical nature 
ISRIs rely on deep and specialized 
technical knowledge (IT). 
(Ang et al., 1997; Loch et 
al., 1992; McMullen, 
2010) 
Transient and 
emergent 
Rapid technological changes 
make ISRIs novel and give them 
emergent properties. 
(Egan, 2007; Holmes & 
Poulymenakou, 1995; 
Strom, 1993) 
Heterogeneous 
actors and 
institutions 
involved 
Various agents (users, 
developers, supporters), from 
different institutional 
backgrounds, are involved in 
ISRIs. 
(Perrow, 2007; Turner, 
1994; Van Eeten & Bauer, 
2009) 
2.1.3 OL “from” ISRIs 
While incident-handling process aims at controlling the negative impacts of the 
current incident and recovering from crisis, learning process aims at capitalizing on 
the experience of incident (handling) to avoid similar incidents in future or reduce 
their impact. This conceptual distinction, however, sometimes is not so explicit in 
reality, specifically when some practices can serve both incident handling and 
learning purposes. 
Regarding the relation between OL and ISRIs, incidents can be considered as (1) a 
source for drawing learning content; (2) as a trigger to drive learning process; (3) 
as a context in which learning process takes place; (4) as the target when learning 
aims at avoiding them or reducing their impacts (Smith & Elliott, 2007).  
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Incidents as sources of learning 
Incident can act as a source of providing insights about what should be learned to 
avoid similar incidents in future – i.e., learning content. In fact, the revealing 
nature of incident helps organizations see aspects that should be improved 
(Deverell, 2009; Smith & Elliott, 2007). Learning in this view involves various 
actions such as analyzing the patterns of incidents and their causes, comparing 
them with similar incidents, and simulating the models that are constructed out of 
the analysis of the incidents to test the effectiveness of the suggested solutions. In 
this view, frequent and rare incidents act differently in the learning process 
(Lampel et al., 2009; Rerup, 2009; Starbuck, 2009). Frequent incidents help actors 
see patterns among them (learning from communalities), detect the cause of 
incidents by comparing them (learning from variances), and experimenting the 
effectiveness of their learning solutions in the next similar incidents. However, 
rare incidents (March et al., 1991) can point to insights that organizations often 
ignore them. However, organizations might find it difficult to reach reliable 
solutions only by analyzing rare incidents (the basic problem of sampling and 
generalization).  
Framing incident as a source of learning content, the validity, reliability and 
generalizability of the findings are key concerns. Therefore, the complexity (both 
detailed and dynamic complexity (Senge, 1990)) of incidents poses challenges in 
establishing relations between causes of incidents and their effects. Thus, 
organizations are prone to superstitious learning (March, Olsen, & Christensen, 
1979) (wrong attribution between the incident and the causes of it), incomplete 
learning (lack of complete understanding of the whole cause-effect chain), over-
generalization of lessons learned (to what extent the cause-effect map is 
generalizable to other similar incidents) (Hedberg, 1981), and the viability of the 
lessons learned (how long they can use the lessons that are learned from past 
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incidents without being concern about their obsolescence) (Baumard & Starbuck, 
2005).  
Incidents as triggers of learning  
Incidents, especially when they are large and visible, can create serious needs for 
learning, justify learning process (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002), destabilize the 
existing rigidities, and open learning windows (Keeler, 1993; Sabatier, 1993). The 
incident drives the learning process as it draws attentions (Rerup, 2009) towards 
improvements, shows the importance and need for learning (Elliott, 2009), 
marshals political and institutional pressure on actors to learn (Elliott et al., 2000), 
justifies the allocation of resources to learning process, and provides excuses for 
learning advocators to push for learning (Stern, 2002).  
The triggering role of (frequent,) small incidents resides in their frequency, 
otherwise rare, small incidents might have little force to drive learning process as 
they can be easily dismissed (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005) and normalized (Turner, 
1978). On the other hand, the triggering role of (rare,) large incidents are due to 
their visibilities and significant impacts that show the criticality of learning from 
them. In this view, organizations are dealing with challenges such as filtering and 
ignoring the signals of incidents, late detection of signals of incident, normalizing 
incidents (Turner, 1978; Turner, 1994a), and engaging in blame-game (D. Smith & 
Elliott, 2007), that all can diminish the triggering role of incident in the learning 
process.  
Incidents as contexts of learning  
Incident can play the role of context for learning process, especially when learning 
process takes place during or right after incident (Moynihan, 2009). Compared 
with normal conditions, incident situations involve more emotional excitement 
(Wang, 2008), pressure from stakeholders (Stern, 2002) to take urgent actions 
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(Borodzicz & Haperen, 2002), high level of uncertainty, and limited access to 
information (Carroll & Hatakenaka, 2001).  
The most obvious case is when learning takes place during incident process 
(Moynihan, 2009). However, the contextual impacts of incidents can exist before 
and after its occurrence. For example, Y2K caused serious contextual pressure on 
organizations quite a few years before January 2000 (Perrow, 1999). Similarly, the 
tension and pressure caused by incidents can last for a long period afterwards.  
Contextual influence of incidents on learning process can be positive or negative 
(Stern, 2002). The structural and political instability can provide organizations with 
flexibilities, which, in turn, can allow for learning that is more substantial. Cultural 
collapse and the disconfirmation of dominant views can also facilitate cognitive 
processes of learning (Stern, 2002). Incident can be a proper context in which 
experts across organizational boundaries can collaborate in learning process. 
Some information can be revealed mainly through dialogues and debates in such 
situations. 
On the contrary, pressure and urgency caused by this context can result in 
defensive reactions of actors, leading to more rigidities and political struggles 
(Staw, Sanderlands, & Dutton, 1981), which, in turn, can block learning process. 
Limited access to information and emotional excitement can go hand in hand to 
reduce the performance of individual and collective decision making (Augilera, 
1990). Due to political dynamics, some information about incident might be 
distorted or filtered, making organizations adopt immature solutions or apply 
superficial remedies instead of proper learning content. Finally, learning in such 
context might be so past-oriented or focused on the associated incident that 
organizations forget other learning opportunities.  
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Incidents as targets of learning  
Finally, incidents can be targets for learning, when organizations attempt to avoid 
future similar incidents or reducing their impacts (Smith & Elliott, 2007). This view 
is more relevant in situations that organizations have to work under the paradigm 
of high-reliability organizations, which requires prioritizing preventive learning to 
avoid incidents before they occur (LaPorte, 1996). In this view, the focus is on 
potential negative impacts of the incident and avoiding them (learning outcomes). 
Detection of early warning signals that might indicate some future incidents, 
preventive actions (e.g. considering redundancies and contingency plans and …) 
(Rao, 2004), simulating future incidents to learn for them before they occur 
(Borodzicz & Haperen, 2002), and risk analysis are common learning practices. 
2.2 A review of prior studies on OL from ISRIs 
Based on the conceptual framework outlined before, this section reviews three 
bodies of literature that are directly related to learning from ISRIs:  
1) The IS literature, especially works that focus on ISRIs and learning from them. 
 2) Studies in incident management literature that focus on OL from ISRIs.  
3) Studies in managerial literature with specific attention to learning from 
incidents related to IT. 
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Figure ‎2.1: Map of the reviewed fields 
As suggested by Figure 2.1, the focus of the review is on the study of learning from 
ISRIs (area Number 4). Accordingly, I exclude works that merely focus on ISRIs 
(area Number 1), general relations between OL and IS (area Number 2), and OL 
from other types of incidents rather than ISRIs (area Number 3).  
2.2.1 Information systems literature 
IS scholars and practitioners have been traditionally interested in ISRIs and how to 
handle and prevent them. Relevant insights on learning from ISRIs can be found in 
at least five IS domains: 1) IS application failure, 2) IS security and privacy 
incidents, 3) IS risks and early warning signals, 4) IS incident evaluation, 5) IS 
reliability and mindfulness. A summary of how learning from various ISRIs are 
discussed in the IS literature is presented in Table 2.2. 
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Table ‎2.2: Summary of insights about OL from ISRIs in the IS domains 
IS domain Main findings related to OL from ISRIs 
IS application failure  - Learning from implementation failure is particularly difficult as many 
are not reported or are reported as quasi-successes. 
- Applications failures expose organizational weaknesses and tend to be 
concealed. 
IS security and 
privacy incidents 
- Security breach and privacy infringement are seen as increasing threats. 
- Prevention of security and privacy issues requires a combination of 
technical and managerial interventions such as better security 
infrastructures and applications; improved policies; and awareness 
programs. 
- Learning from security failures are often framed as a highly structured 
process of soliciting and disseminating information about threats and 
new policies. 
IS risk & early 
warning signals 
- Focus must be on improving resilience and ‘designing out’ 
vulnerabilities. 
- Major disasters always start with early signs that can be detected if the 
necessary processes are in place. 
- Early warning signals provide useful sources of information about wider 
risks and vulnerabilities. 
IS (incident) 
evaluation  
- Evaluation is a critical step for learning from ISRIs. 
- Ex-post analysis as a way of learning 
- Learning should be a stage at the end of the evaluation process. 
- Barriers to learning from evaluation of IS project include pursuit of 
formal compliance; clash of lessons learned with the existing body of 
knowledge; disincentives for learning; lack of resources and time for 
reflection; and political maneuvering. 
Reliability and 
mindfulness 
- Mindfulness both as a way of learning and preventing future mishaps 
- Learning as an embedded and emergent process 
- Importance of learning for maintaining reliability of operations 
- Focus on practical as well as abstract knowledge 
 
IS Application Failures  
Several works have focused on failures that take place during the operation of 
information systems which generate strong internal and external pressures to 
recover and learn from them, especially in case of major crisis and catastrophes 
(Holmes & Poulymenakou, 1995; Huang, Makoju, Newell, & Galliers, 2003; 
Muhren, Van Den Eede, & Van de Walle, 2007; Weitzel & Marchand, 1991; 
Westland, 2000). These failures can reveal technical or organizational weaknesses 
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and surface serious vulnerabilities, which constitute further learning opportunities 
(Faia-Correia, Patriotta, Brigham, & Corbett, 1999). 
A number of scholars have analyzed these failures to extract lessons on their 
causes during the operation, as well as in previous stages such as IS development 
(Sarosa & Zowghi, 2005) and implementation (Orlikowski, 1992). 
Recommendations often point towards technical solutions such as upgrading the 
technology, reconfiguring it, and adopting new technologies. As for non-technical 
lessons, scholars advise organizations to create backup teams (Faia-Correia, 
Patriotta et al. 1999), improve communication between developers and users 
(Sarosa and Zowghi 2005), and align IT with business goals (Sarosa and Zowghi 
2005). 
IS Security and Privacy Incidents 
A topic that is attracting increasing attention is the analysis of security and privacy 
incidents that take place during the operation of information systems (Culnan & 
Williams, 2009; Greenaway & Chan, 2005; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Kjaerland, 
2006; Shedden, Ahmad, & Ruighaver, 2010; H. J. Smith, 1993; S. Smith, 
Winchester, Bunker, & Jamieson, 2010; Straub & Welke, 1998). Lessons, drawn 
from these works, point to three overall directions. First, authors suggest the need 
to invest in information security technologies and infrastructures (Cavusoglu, 
Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2005; Galbreth & Shor, 2010; Solms & Solms, 2004). 
Second, authors indicate a number of managerial interventions such as the 
adoption of information security management programs (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 
2010; Solms & Solms, 2004) and improvements in policies, processes, and 
standards (S. Smith et al., 2010; Solms & Solms, 2004). A third approach is to raise 
responsiveness by establishing awareness programs (S. Smith et al., 2010; Solms & 
Solms, 2004), improving the knowledge of managers about attackers motivations 
(Willison and (Cremonini & Nizovtsev, 2009; Willison & Backhouse, 2006), and 
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motivating employees to comply with security policies (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat, 2010).  
While these studies provided a wealth of suggestions for initiatives that need to be 
taken, marginal attentions are paid to the process whereby such suggestions 
might take place. Some scholars suggest that organizations should “disseminate 
information about security actions taken” (Straub and Welke 1998, p.460) or set 
up feedback loops that link the various stages of the incident response process 
(Muhren et al., 2007). What is common in all these models is that learning is 
mainly conceived as an activity to “extract useful information from incidents of all 
kinds and to use this information to improve organizational performance over 
time” (Cooke, 2003: 2). Such activity is often described as a sequence of formal 
stages such as documenting (Westland, 2000), standardizing, and sharing 
information on the incidents (Kjaerland, 2006).  
This view is echoed in techno-policy documents such as ISO2700, where learning is 
defined as a step in the final stages of incident handling process, consisting of 
gathering and analyzing information from evaluation and handling security 
incidents “to identify recurring or high impact incidents” (ISO/IEC27002, 2005: 93). 
Recently, however, some authors have started to question such dominant view, 
noting that this view overlooks the importance of feedback timing, the need to 
facilitate double-loop learning, and taking into account informal learning 
processes (Shedden et al., 2010). 
IS Risk and Early Warning Signals 
Another stream of IS literature is shaped around a common finding that major 
incidents often start with some small errors or signals that could be detected by 
the organizations (Keil, 1995; Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Therefore, most of these 
studies identify, classify, and analyze common early warning signals of IS incidents 
(Ginzberg, 1981; Havelka, Rajkuma, & Serve, 2004; Kappelman, McKeeman, & 
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Zhang, 2006; Lyytinen & Robey, 1999), so that they can improve managers’ ability 
to detect such signals early enough to take corrective actions and—in extreme 
cases—abandon faulty projects in their early stages (Lesca & Caron-Fasan, 2008). 
Alternatively, the lessons learned through risk assessment can feed new content 
to the awareness programs and improve tools and techniques for risk assessment 
(Straub & Welke, 1998). 
Recently, authors have come to realize that drawing risk management lessons by 
identifying early warning signals may not be enough as “this does not ensure that 
actions are or will be taken” (Iversen, Mathiassen, & Nielsen, 2004: 412). 
Furthermore, applying lessons from past failures to future risks can be limiting and 
even misleading, since organizations might simply apply old remedies to new and 
poorly-understood problems. Thus, a small number of studies started to focus on 
the process through which organizations learn from IS risks. The view here is that 
the very process of detecting and analyzing risks is as critical as the content of the 
lesson learned. Such process should include a continuous activity of assessment, 
analysis, and planning for the IS risk. This way, the entire risk management process 
is considered as a learning process that runs alongside daily activities 
(Bandyopadhyay, Mykytyn, & Mykytyn, 1999; Spears & Barki, 2010). 
IS (Incident) Evaluation 
Part of the literature on IS evaluation (Nelson, 2005; Poulymenakou & 
Serafeimidis, 1997; Wilson & Howcroft, 2005), post-mortem analysis (evaluation) 
(Boddie, 1987; Kasi et al., 2008), and post-project evaluation (Pan, Pan, Newman, 
& Flynn, 2006) concerns analyzing ISRIs and trying to learn from them. For 
example, even in the post-project evaluation, one of the key themes is analyzing 
incidents (e.g., what went wrong) that took place during the project.  
Unlike the foregoing domains, this line of research takes a process view. Most of 
these works approach evaluation as an ex-post activity that (ideally) takes place 
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right after an IS incident (Kanellis, Lycett, & Paul, 1999; Kasi et al., 2008) and in a 
formal way (Gwillim et al., 2005; Kumar, 1990). In many cases, although learning 
from ISRIs is part of this concern, these evaluations do not necessarily take place 
right after the incident (for example they might be postponed to the end of the 
project). Moreover, incident learning is often only mixed with the analysis of 
success events, risks, and other critical events.  
These studies emphasize that when well-conducted, the evaluation of IS incidents 
results in lessons formulated in terms of explicit solutions that organizations 
should implement continuously after each failure (Poulymenakou & Serafeimidis, 
1997). In this sense, the whole evaluation process is sometimes considered as a 
formal, staged learning process. Kasi, Keil et al. (2008) suggest, for example, a 
four-stage model of post-mortem analysis (identifying the underlying IS project, 
collecting data on it, analyzing data, and sharing and exploiting the resulting 
knowledge). Sometimes, however, learning is considered as part of an evaluation 
process (mostly the final stage). For example, Nelson (2005) models evaluation 
process in three stages “evaluating project performance, extracting lessons 
learned, and making recommendations for the future” (Nelson 2005: 361), where 
the last two stages pertain to learning.  
The evaluation literature offers several insights on the barriers to learning from 
ISRIs. This often follows the finding that organizations rarely follow formal 
evaluation processes (Gwillim et al., 2005) and when they do so, they are often 
motivated by formal compliance (Kumar, 1990) or tactical reasons (such as 
justifying decisions and actions that have already been taken (Wilson & Howcroft, 
2005)), rather than learning purposes (Kasi et al., 2008). Barriers to the actual 
exploitation of the results of post-mortem analysis (Gwillim et al., 2005; Kasi et al., 
2008) include the clash of the lesson learned with the existing body of knowledge, 
disincentives for learning, inappropriate structural settings, lack of resources, lack 
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of time for reflecting on the past initiatives because of the necessity to start the 
next activity, and political issues (Kasi et al., 2008). The feeling is often that 
“evaluation will unearth problems better left undisturbed” (Kumar, 1990: 210), an 
attitude that clearly curbs learning (Kanellis et al., 1999). The time limitation can 
make learning agents too busy to reflect properly on the failures and learn from 
them (Kappelman et al., 2006). 
Reliability and Mindfulness 
Finally, a further small, but growing, body of IS literature is built on the concept of 
high-reliability organizations (LaPorte, 1996). The approach is important in that it 
offers a view of ISRIs as emergent and largely unforeseeable events that often 
cannot be prevented or pre-empted. This is because ISRIs are rooted in the 
complex, dynamic, fragile, componentized, socially situated, and hence, unreliable 
nature of information systems (Butler & Gray, 2006). The focus of these studies is 
thus not so much on the ex-ante forecast of risks or the ex-post evaluation of 
causes. Instead, they focus on the capacity of organizations to act as mindful and 
flexible systems during handling these incidents. By analyzing various types of ISRIs 
such as the unreliable operations of systems (Butler & Gray, 2006) and security 
problems (Wright & Marett, 2010), these studies show that mindfulness is a 
crucial element in handling ISRIs and learning from them in an emergent and 
situated mode (Butler & Gray, 2006). 
Organizations that use information systems in their mission-critical activities 
should therefore organize for mindfulness, as they have no chance to let their 
members learn through trial and error or experimentation. Improving mindfulness 
is not only an important way to improve reliability; it can also enhance the 
capabilities of organizations to learn better from incidents. In this view, learning 
happens when individuals and collectives mindfully interact with incidents and try 
to cope with them. Hence, learning is not limited to the process of extracting 
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abstract lessons through a rational analysis of incidents. As Butler and Gray (2006) 
pointed out, mindfulness involves “focus on the present, attention to operational 
detail, willingness to consider alternative perspectives, and an interest in 
investigating and understanding failures” (p. 212). Acting mindfully gives 
organizations the ability to learn in a flexible, emergent way, as the nature of ISRIs 
incidents implies. Thus, the focus on acting mindfully brings to the fore the 
importance “learning in working” (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000).  
Summing up, the IS literature seems mostly focused on learning content by 
suggesting a wide range of specialized solutions to avoid various ISRIs. Regarding 
learning process, there seems to be a division of labor, with literature on early 
warning signals is focusing on learning before ISRIs and IS evaluation literature is 
concentrating on learning after ISRIs. In contrast, the literature on IS mindfulness 
and reliability contributes to understanding learning a process that happens 
alongside the incident process. 
2.2.2 Incident Management Literature 
Due to the importance and dominance of IS incidents, considerable attention has 
been given to this topic in the field of crisis and incident management. In 
particular, the worries about the Y2K bug and realization of its potential dramatic 
implications on almost every aspect of society was instrumental in drawing 
scholars’ attention to ISRIs (Perrow, 1999). Although most of the hypothesized 
catastrophic consequences of Y2K did not materialize, the event triggered intense 
discussion of IS systems, their vulnerabilities, and the risks linked to IS activities. 
The debate was given new impetus with the advent of Internet and its associated 
security and privacy incidents. This trend has continued so far as the result of the 
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prevalence of a wide range of incidents linked to emergent information 
technologies such as social networks and cloud computing. 
By and large, this body of literature has been informed by an analytical approach. 
Many of these studies on their own are in fact post hoc attempts to understand 
the risks and vulnerabilities of information systems with focus on incident 
prevention (LaPorte, 1996; Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987; Schulman, Roe, Van 
Eeten, & De Bruijne, 2004). Some studies concentrate on the vulnerabilities of 
critical infrastructures such as computer networks and the Internet (Fritzon, 
Ljungkvist, Boin, & Rhinard, 2007; Hills, 2005; LaPorte, 1996; Rochlin et al., 1987; 
Schulman et al., 2004; Van Eeten & Bauer, 2009; Wagenaar, 2009). The cases are 
usually of a supra-organizational nature. These works are also dominated by social 
(Perrow, 1999), national (Gorman, Schintler, Kulkarni, & Stough, 2004), political 
(Eriksson, 2001; Shin & Sung, 1995), and military (Demchak, 1999) concerns. The 
lessons drawn from the analysis are usually on sectoral, national and global levels, 
with the focus on governmental and public agencies as the main actors (de Bruijne 
& van Eeten, 2007). Such lessons, for example, include increasing the collaboration 
and interaction between public and private sectors for better incident analysis and 
avoidance; developing policies and programs at sectoral and national levels to 
enhance companies’ preparedness; setting up knowledge-sharing programs 
between companies (Demchak, 1999).  
Particular attention to ISRIs has been devoted by a specific sub-section of the 
incident management literature, namely the literature on healthcare 
management. Over the last decade, hospitals and community healthcare services 
have come to rely heavily on information system to carry out both clinical and 
non-clinical activities such as queuing, prescription management, and 
management of patients’ information. Today, the most common modern medical 
devices rely greatly on information and communication technologies to operate 
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and this has attracted scholars’ attention to the study of development and 
implementation failures of health information systems (Fauchart, 2006). Thus, in 
addition to ISRIs in medical devices, there have been other mishaps in the use of 
Health Information Systems (HIS) such as mismatches of information, wrong 
prescription of medicines (Y. Chen, Neil, Avery, Dewey, & Johnson, 2005), and 
breaches of privacy (Rangel & Friend, 1995). 
While some of the studies in this field simply reflect general interest on OL and 
learning from incidents (Nikula, 1999; Storey & Buchanan, 2008), others have paid 
particular attention to ISRIs in healthcare and learning from them (Wallace, 2003). 
These studies suggest that organizations need to learn from these incidents by 
analyzing them. For instance, the analysis of previous cases can teach us ways of 
preventing identity theft (Amori, 2008) and reduce the failure of development and 
implementation projects by adopting a top-down plan to set a clear framework for 
interactions between users and implementers and remain flexible to properly 
react to uncertainties in the implementation process of HIS (Berg, 2001). Finally, 
some of these studies have taken into consideration the specificities of the 
healthcare sector as a large, institutionally fragmented, and geographically 
distributed entity (Southon, Sauer, & Dampney, 1999) and have discussed how 
these factors affect the way in which healthcare organizations learn from ISRIs. 
2.2.3 In General Management Literature 
Learning from incidents and failures has been a long-standing interest in the 
managerial literature on OL (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Carroll et al., 2002; 
Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Jasanoff, 1994; Kim & Miner, 2007; Shrivastava, 1988; 
Starbuck & Hedberg, 2001; Toft & Reynolds, 1992). Incidents are widely 
considered as valuable opportunities to shed light on the shortcomings of 
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everyday organizational and managerial processes. Although several of these 
studies are relevant to the understanding of ISRIs, only a few directly addressed 
this particular topic with attention to specific characteristics of ISRIs. For instance, 
Denrell (2003) studied IS incidents and found that a common structural challenge 
in learning process is the isolation between the learning actors that is, those who 
are supposed to learn from incidents versus those who are directly involved in 
handling incidents, mostly due to the traditional isolation of IS departments in 
large organizations from system users. In general, however, the managerial 
literature pays scant regard to ISRIs. Indeed, many of these studies are not 
primarily concerned about ISRIs, unless they use ISRIs as their empirical examples, 
without being concerned about the specific characteristics of ISRIs. 
2.3 Analysis of literatures and what is missing: 
Insufficient attention to process and ISRIs contexts 
As I have briefly shown in the previous section, several strands of IS literature have 
contributed to understanding how organizations learn from ISRIs. The topic has 
also attracted minor attentions from authors in incident management and general 
management literatures. In the present section, I focus on IS literature to identify 
existing patterns and gaps by mapping reviewed studies into the four OL 
dimensions –i.e., content, process, context, and outcomes (See Table 2.3).  
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Table ‎2.3: The mapping of IS literature unto OL dimensions 
IS research 
domain 
OL dimensions 
Content Process Context Outcome 
IS application 
failure  
- lessons for future 
development and 
implementation 
- Lessons on business 
operation continuity 
- Lessons on incident 
management process 
- Learning as keeping records 
of errors and reporting them  
- Time-pressure 
- The concern of reliability 
- The fear of publicity of the 
incident and external 
pressure 
- Reliability of business 
process 
- Fewer incidents with less 
damage 
- Maintained organizational 
image  
- Faster recovery and 
business process continuity 
- Detecting and fixing the 
defects in organizational 
processes and structures  
IS security 
and privacy 
incidents 
- Improvement of security 
infrastructure 
- Improvement of security 
and privacy policies, 
procedures, and culture 
- Improvement of 
information security 
programs 
- Enhancing security 
awareness 
- Adapting incentive 
systems for both insiders 
and outsiders 
- Learning as a feedback 
stage at the end of security 
planning 
- Intentional and political 
concerns in creating 
incidents 
- Fewer incidents with less 
damage 
- Maintained organizational 
image 
- Faster recovery and 
business process continuity 
- Detecting and fixing the 
defects in organizational 
processes and structures 
IS risk & early 
warning 
signals 
- Common IS risks and their 
causes 
- Improvements in risk 
identification, analysis and 
response capabilities 
- Improvements in other 
organizational aspects 
- List of key and common 
warning signals 
- Attention to the early and 
fast response and problem 
solution 
- Learning as a stage at the 
end of the risk management 
process  
 - Preventing IS risks 
- Avoiding the escalation of 
small incidents to critical 
incidents 
IS (incident) 
evaluation  
- Suggestions and 
guidelines for more effective 
IS evaluation 
- Lessons on choosing 
appropriate criteria for 
evaluation 
- Evaluation as a formal and 
staged learning process 
- Learning as a stage in IS 
evaluation vs. learning as an 
embedded activity in the 
whole IS evaluation process 
- The overall political 
context of evaluation 
- Time pressure and lack of 
organizational slack for 
spending on IS evaluation 
- More effective IS 
evaluation process 
- Deeper understanding of 
the problems and solutions 
related to the incidents 
Reliability 
and 
mindfulness 
 - Learning as an emergent 
practice in incidents 
handling 
- The importance of early 
and proactive learning 
process 
- The importance of 
informal and daily learning 
practices 
- The importance of 
practical learning as well as 
cognitive learning 
- motivational involvement 
as a necessary context 
- The emergent and 
unpredictable nature of 
ISRIs 
- Complexity of ISRIs and 
learning from them 
- Being prepared and 
resilient in addition to 
preventing attempts 
- Maintaining reliability 
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As the second column in Table 2.3 shows, most of the reviewed studies focus on 
drawing lessons from the analysis of incidents. ISRIs are approached mostly as 
sources for extracting learning contents by identifying what organizations have 
learned or should learn to avoid such incidents in future. These lessons bear on 
understanding the characteristics of ISRIs, when they might occur, the main 
common causes of these incidents, their early warning signals, and how managers 
can predict, prevent, or successfully handle them. Although some of these lessons 
are drawn by organizations and practitioners, most of them are the results of 
analytical reflection by IS scholars. 
The disproportionate focus of literature on learning content underscores the 
assumption that these learning contents are generalizable to similar cases and can 
be extended into future. However, this assumption is questionable given that 
organizational members interpret incidents in different ways (Lyytinen, 1988). 
Hence, organizations might perceive apparently similar incidents in such different 
ways that leaves no room to capitalize on earlier lessons learned by the company 
or by others. Furthermore, accelerating changes in IT and organizational 
environment goes hand-in-hand with the inherent ambiguity and uncertainty of 
incidents, leaving little room for such generalization. Overemphasis on drawing 
lessons from past can also lead to rigid and outdated incident response behavior. 
The overemphasis on the study of the content of learning from ISRIs matches the 
description and promise of a number of outcomes, which should stem from the 
applications of the recommendations presented in the literature (last column in 
Table 2.3). These outcomes have been presented in terms of: avoiding future 
(similar) incidents, and repeated errors and mistakes (Eriksson, 2001; Fortune & 
Peters, 2005; Irani, Sharif, & Love, 2001; Kappelman et al., 2006; Kasi et al., 2008; 
Kjaerland, 2006; Shedden et al., 2010); reducing the likelihood of the future 
failures and incidents (Butler & Gray, 2006; Demchak, 1999; Eriksson, 2001; 
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Muhren et al., 2007; Raymond Caron, Jarvenpaa, & Stoddard, 1994; Salaway, 
1987; Straub & Welke, 1998); mitigating the negative impacts of IS failures 
(Holmes & Poulymenakou, 1995; Straub & Welke, 1998); enhancing the 
organizational capabilities for better incident management (Shedden et al., 2010); 
and achieving a higher level of resilience (Butler & Gray, 2006). 
Only a handful of studies indicate that learning practices can target prosaic and 
instrumental outcomes such as getting formal approvals (Kumar, 1990), obtaining 
some form of accreditation (S. Smith et al., 2010), enhancing market value 
(Bharadwaj, Keil, & Mähring, 2009), and improving external image (Gordon, Loeb, 
& Sohail, 2010). In addition, very few articles examine the negative and 
unintended outcomes of learning from ISRIs such as the tendency of managers to 
become hidebound and seriously skeptical of technological changes as a result of 
analyzing past incidents (McKenney et al., 1997).  
When IS scholars have approached the study of learning process, they have done 
so in two main ways (third column in Table 2.3). First, many studies consider 
learning as a specific formal stage that often takes place at the beginning or at the 
end of IS activities. For instance, works in the IS risk management field 
recommend operational models with a learning stage at the end of the risk 
management process. This step should allow organizational members to reflect on 
their experience so that similar situations can be better managed in the future. A 
similar approach is also taken in literature on IS evaluation (Raymond Caron et al., 
1994; Scott & Vessey, 2000). The main limitation of these studies is that they 
reduce learning to a rational process based on identifying and articulating lessons 
and applying them in future. As I mentioned earlier, this view is underpinned by 
the somewhat simplistic assumption that when the investigation is conducted in a 
rational way and the results are effectively disseminated, the lessons will be taken 
up by the organization and become part of its existing procedures. Therefore, the 
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mechanisms through which lessons learned are taken up and incorporated (or not) 
by the organization thus remain unexplored. This is particularly consequential as 
the OL literature is rife with examples of the so call “knowing-doing gap”, that is 
the incapacity of organizations to turn existing knowledge into concrete change 
and performance improvement (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000). 
While the abovementioned view is strongly aligned with the emphasis on the 
learning content and have a normative orientation (what the learning process 
should be), a second and different view conceives learning process as an 
embedded element that occurs alongside incident handling process, rather than 
framing it as a separate, formalized, and rational stage. This view matches 
approaches in organizational literature that consider learning as an inevitable 
feature of all work activities (learning-in-organizing: see (Gherardi, 1999; Gherardi 
& Nicolini, 2000)). A good example of this new, and still minority, view is found in 
works addressing the issue of IS reliability by promoting mindfulness. Butler and 
Gray (2006), for example, conceive the learning process as a series of emergent 
and daily practices that take place throughout incident management. In their view, 
the learning process is not reduced to specific and easily identifiable attempts to 
analyze and reflect on incidents. Instead, the learning process mainly consists of 
mindful practices of organizational members that take place during incident 
handling process. The benefit of this approach is that it can grasp the 
heterogeneity, imperfection, and emergent nature of learning process. The major 
limitation is that it does little to explain how local learning is absorbed by the 
entire organization as a whole. 
As noted above, a further dimension is the context in which learning takes (or fails 
to take) place (fourth column in Table 2.3). Several cognitive, cultural, and 
structural factors affecting the capacity to learn from ISRIs have also been 
considered in the IS literature. The cognitive background of top managers and 
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employees, especially in IT (Straub & Welke, 1998), the way in which managers 
and experts frame IT as a threat (Eriksson, 2001), the experience of past failures 
(Raymond Caron et al., 1994; Robey, Boudreau, & Rose, 2000), the supportive 
climate for individual learning (Wastell, 1999), and the overall culture of 
mindfulness (Butler & Gray, 2006) have all been indicated as important factors 
affecting the capacity to learn from the experience of adverse events. Structural 
factors such as the quality of measures and feedback systems on the ISRIs, 
disincentives for learning (Lyytinen & Robey, 1999) and the lack of resources for 
formal learning processes (Iacovou & Dexter, 2005; Sarosa & Zowghi, 2005) have 
also been identified as important factors in determining whether organization will 
learn from incidents or not.  
Apart from the general contextual factors, little attention has been paid to 
examining the characteristics of ISRIs in relation with learning process. In fact, 
recognizing specificities of ISRIs has been well reflected in learning content by 
providing specialized suggestions with regards to various types of ISRIs. 
Nevertheless, most of the studies in IS literature have not systematically examined 
whether and how the specific characteristics of ISRIs might influence the way in 
which organizations learn from their incidents. 
We argue that the overemphasis on content and outcome runs against the recent 
insights from the broader literature on OL, which suggests that attention to how 
organizations learn from incidents is at least as important (if not more so) than 
focusing on what lessons can be drawn from specific incidents. This is so for at 
least two reasons. First, the peculiarities of each incident and organizational 
context often make it difficult to transfer past lessons to new cases. Accessing 
information on historical cases, while is important, does not tell the organization 
how this information can be translated into actionable changes. Second, unless 
organization establishes specific learning mechanisms, each incident risks being 
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addressed individually and some of the lesson that could be learned would go 
unnoticed. Thus, learning contents and lessons from previous incidents are useless 
unless organizations appropriate them and this leads to an expansion of their 
capacity to act. As I noted above, learning is not only about acquiring information 
and knowledge and requires also putting the right mechanisms in place. 
2.4 Towards a framework for studying OL from ISRIs 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the existing studies on organizational 
learning from ISRIs rarely pay close attention to how specific characteristics of 
ISRIs may affect learning process. The literature has a rather generalist flavor, the 
assumption being that general theories of organizational learning are immediately 
applicable to the study of learning from ISRIs. This contrasts with the results of 
studies in the managerial OL and incident management literature, where it has 
been shown that the contextual characteristics of incidents and the particular 
conditions in which specific organization operate work together to define the 
opportunities and constraints for learning. Therefore, the question that remains is 
that how does learning process from ISRIs look like. What is specific to learning 
from ISRIs? Are there any specific practices that exist in learning process from 
ISRIs? (And if there are specific aspects of learning process) what are the specific 
contextual factors that contribute to the way in which organizations learn from 
their ISRIs? 
More specifically, although ISRIs share a series of characteristics with other types 
of incidents (Fitzgerald & Russo, 2005) they also possess specific characteristics 
which set them apart from incidents in other sectors such as healthcare, 
workplace safety, and the nuclear industry. Based on the foregoing discussion, the 
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study aims at providing a contextualized understanding of learning process, that 
allows both articulating what organizations do in their attempt to learn from ISRIS 
(learning process) and how these practices are shaped by the context of ISRIs. 
Accordingly, I rely on the situated learning view of organizational learning 
(Handley, Clark, Fincham, & Sturdy, 2007; Lave & Wagenr, 1991) which “sees 
learning and knowing as processes which are integral to everyday practice in 
workplace, family, and other social settings” (Handley et al., 2007): 174). First, 
situated learning view focuses on the very social practices, which constitute the 
learning process. Compared with traditional cognitive views of learning that focus 
on the content of learning (Handley et al., 2007), situated learning brings to the 
fore the role of participants, their actions, and interactions. Second, another core 
assumption of situated learning perspective is that learning takes place in the very 
context of day-to-day practices. This is aligned with our intent to examine how 
organizations and their actors learn in their organizational context (not for 
example in the off-work training contexts). In addition, it fits with our aim to study 
learning process in the context of incidents where learning practices are 
influenced by the incident factors. In this way, situated learning view helps us 
consider context not as taken for granted factors, but as the factors that interact 
with the very learning practices (affect and are affected by them). This suits our 
aim in examining the relation between the contextual factors and learning 
process. 
Situated learning view has been powerfully adopted in studies that have focused 
on learning process by focusing on social practices as the constitutional elements 
of this process. For studying learning practices, I rely on a specific practice view of 
organizational learning (Nicolini et al., 2003; Orlikowski, 2002; Silvia, 2001) that 
implies understanding OL process requires examining the actions are taken by 
various social actors, the interactions between them, the timing and temporal 
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pattern of those practices, the way these practices are organized in organizational 
settings, and the material aspects of such practices. 
Accordingly, I suggest an overall theoretical framework for the study (see Figure 
2.2). At the center of the framework, there is the learning process, which 
constitutes of the actions that organizations take to leverage incident experience 
to avoid similar incidents and manage them effectively in future. 
The learning process is framed within a broader learning context. The framework 
distinguishes between three categories of contextual factors. First (from outside), 
learning process takes place in general organizational factors that are present 
regardless of having incident. Studies on organizational learning have shown the 
importance of several contextual factors such as psychological safety (Edmondson, 
1999), political factors such as the distribution of power among learning actors 
(Gwillim et al., 2005; Lawrence et al., 2005), and structural features of the 
organization (Daft, 1982; Lam, 2000).  
The second category of factors relates to general characteristics of incidents, such 
as the urgency, external pressure, negative content, complexity, and revealing 
nature of incidents (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Lave & Wagenr, 1991; Smith & 
Elliott, 2007). Considering these factors is critical to examine how learning process 
from incidents might be different from non-incident learning process such as 
learning by doing (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). 
The third category of contextual factors pertains to the characteristics of ISRIs, 
including the technical nature, transient nature, and the heterogeneity of actors 
involved. The focus on these characteristics helps examining how the specific 
characteristics of ISRIs might contribute to the way in which organizations go 
through the learning process. 
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Figure ‎2.2: the overall theoretical framework for studying OL from ISRIs 
The framework implies that empirical study should not only consider the learning 
process, but also the relations between learning process and the contextual 
factors. It also draws attention to different contextual factors, especially the 
characteristics of ISRIs. More specifically, by distinguishing between the general 
organizational factors and other contextual factors, the framework suggests 
examining how the observed learning process is affected by the context of 
incident (compared with general factors that exist in the absence of incidents as 
well). The distinction between general incident factors and the characteristics of 
ISRIs, the framework helps examining the contribution of specific characteristic of 
ISRIs to the learning process (compared with learning from any other type of 
incidents). 
 
Chapter Summary: In this chapter, I defined organizational learning as a cognitive, 
discursive, and material process through which an organization and its members 
aim to expand their existing capabilities (Nicolini et al., 2008; Nicolini et al., 2011). 
Then, ISRIs were defined as “an unplanned interruption to an IT service or 
reduction in the quality of an IT service” (ITIL, 2012): 46). I discussed that the 
incident can be framed as the source, trigger, context, and outcome of learning. 
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Then, I reviewed how literature on information systems, incident management, 
and general management examined OL from ISRIs. The review showed that a 
major gap is understanding how the characteristics of ISRIs might act as part of the 
context in which OL process is shaped. Adopting a situated learning approach, I 
developed a framework that frames learning process as a collection of social 
practices that are embedded in various contextual factors. The characteristics of 
ISRIs are also framed as part of the context in which learning process takes place. 
The next chapter explains the research question and how it is empirically studied. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology and Settings 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the research tries to understand how the 
process of learning from ISRIs unfolds, with regards to the characteristics of these 
incidents. This chapter operationalizes the research question and specifies the unit 
and level of analysis. It then describes the selected research design and data 
collection and analysis process. It is then followed by describing four empirical 
settings. 
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3.1 Research Question 
The study aims at understanding OL process from ISRIs, with regards to the 
characteristics of ISRIs. Previous studies have shown that learning process from 
large incidents can potentially be different from learning process from small 
incidents (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). Unlike small incidents, large incidents 
possess stronger negative content, pose more serious pressure on organizations, 
have more visibility, especially to a wider range of internal and external actors, 
potentially involve more diverse social actors and technological aspects (Deverell 
& Hansén, 2009), and their low frequency affects learning from them (Christianson 
et al., 2009; Rerup, 2009). This study merely focuses on large incidents because 
the characteristics of ISRIs are visible in such settings. 
Literature has also indicated that organizations might follow different learning 
processes when they are learning from their own incidents (Baumard & Starbuck, 
2005) versus when they try to learn from others’ incidents (Kim & Miner, 2007). 
This can be, for example, due to the differences in terms of access to knowledge 
about incidents and incentives to learn from them (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; 
Kim & Miner, 2007). In fact, several socio-cognitive processes mediate the 
influence of external incidents on learning process. This study only focuses on 
internal incidents of organizations, because the characteristics of ISRIs that are 
happening inside the organizations can have more direct impact on the learning 
process, compared with situations that they take place in other companies. 
This leads to the following research question: 
How do organizations learn from their internal, large Information system-related 
incidents? 
Regarding the dearth of studies on the process of OL with regards to the context 
of ISRIs, I will focus in particular on the learning process. Accordingly, the main unit 
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of analysis (Babbie, 2009) in this research is learning process, which has been 
defined as a collection of practices that organizations take to capitalize on the 
experience of their major ISRIs to avoid them or reduce their impacts in future. In 
other words, the operationalization of learning process is through learning 
practices. Learning process involves both individual and collective practices (Silvia, 
2001). In examining learning practices, my attention will be focused on the actions 
taken, their associated actors and their intentions, the situations in which they 
have been taken, their timing, their involved materiality, and their (immediate) 
consequences. 
The study focuses on two types of ISRIs that take place during the operation of 
information systems: (1) the failures of the operation of systems, such as 
hardware or software breakdowns; (2) security and privacy incidents. Both 
categories possess the concerned characteristics –i.e., technical nature, transient 
and emergent, and heterogeneity of involved actors and technologies.  
To select large incidents, I only consider incidents that have been noticed by top 
managers of the organizations. This assures that incidents have been critical for 
organizational goals and performance, not simply being minor, local incidents. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
3.2.1 Overall Research design 
Following the overall aim of this research, which is a contextual understanding of 
organizational learning process, regarding the nature of research questions 
(“How” questions), and considering the unit of analysis (learning process) 
  45 | Page 
 
qualitative approach is selected (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005b; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lee, 
1999). Qualitative approach fits the study because I am interested in deep 
understanding of a social phenomenon in its contextual setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In addition, understanding the complex nature of learning process can be better 
attained through qualitative inquiry because it allows collecting and analyzing rich 
data about social phenomena (Miles, 1979). Through qualitative methods I can 
better grasp the role of contextual factors (Downey & Ireland, 1979; Yin, 2002) 
which is crucial for analyzing the influence of ISRIs as part of learning context. 
Finally, learning process is a dynamic phenomenon, which should be studied 
through methods capable to capture this dynamics over time (Langley, Smallman, 
Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, Andrew H., 2013).  
Among different philosophical paradigms of qualitative research (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005a; Guba & Lincoln, 2005), an interpretative approach (Schuetz, 1953), 
which can be considered as a moderate epistemology between positivism and 
constructivism, fits the research framework. First, interpretative approach is 
capable to consider subjective aspects of human practices such as their meanings 
and purposes. Second, interpretative perspective not only captures objective 
aspects of social phenomena (e.g., the objective impacts of incident and the 
learning activities), but also admits the influence of subjective factors in shaping 
social phenomena (e.g., learners interpretations of incidents). Therefore, the 
outcomes of interpretative approach can be easily transformed into rich 
hypothetical theories that are deeply rooted in empirical data (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1980).  
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3.2.2 Multiple-embedded case study 
Within the adopted methodological approach, case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2002) can be an appropriate research strategy. Case study approach aims at 
understanding a particular case deeply, with regards to its context. Case study 
helps examining the role of contextual factors on the learning process (Stake, 
2005). Thus, it allows focusing on specific characteristics of our cases (Stake, 2005; 
Yin, 2002) to capture the specificities of learning practices in relation with ISRIs.  
Case study also suits studying processes such as organizational learning (Stake, 
2005). It is because the researcher can collect data on the very chain of events, 
actions, and interactions, with particular attention to their temporal aspects (their 
time of occurrence, their sequences, their duration, and their overall temporal 
patterns). Collecting rich data about all these aspects is critical to outline the 
details OL. 
There are several options in designing case study (Yin, 2002). Case study can be 
exploratory (to openly explore the phenomenon) or explanatory (to look for the 
causes of a previously identified phenomenon). I rely on an exploratory approach 
since the aim is to openly examine how OL process unfolds in ISRIs context. This 
way, I am open to observe all sorts of actions, interactions, and actors that 
constitute the OL process. 
I rely on a multiple case study design because it allows for exploring different types 
of ISRIs and enriches the contextual understanding of learning process through 
capturing the diversity of learning practices. I am not going to compare the 
selected cases (it is not a comparative case study). Instead, looking at different 
cases will help finding various patterns of OL process. In addition, multiple case 
study design reduces the risk of case attrition, which is specifically important for a 
sensitive topic such as learning from incidents. Through multiple case studies, I can 
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reach deeper understanding of the influence of ISRIs on learning process by paying 
attention to differences across cases (Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 2002).  
Regarding the unit of analysis (learning process), and the level of analysis 
(organizational), the most aggregate level of the study is organizational. Hence, 
through an embedded-multiple case study design (Yin, 2002) I study multiple ISRIs 
and associated learning processes in each organization.  
I analyze selected cases longitudinally to capture the dynamic nature of learning 
process (Leonard-Barton, 1990). It means that for each learning process, I will 
create the story of the learning process, consisting of the sequence of actions, 
interaction, events, and consequences. This longitudinal view helps me build a 
process data (Langley et al., 2013; Langley, 1999) through which I can make sense 
of the learning process. 
However, the negative content of ISRIs might limit a real-time data collection. 
Therefore, a retrospective mode of inquiry is adopted to collect data (Leonard-
Barton, 1990) around incidents that although were critical at the time of 
occurrence, they are not sensitive to be studied any more. More specifically, I 
focus on specific major incidents that happened in the last three years and I 
examine what the organizations did after the incident in order to avoid it in future 
or reduce its impact in future. This frees me from organizations sensitivity about 
current incidents. In addition, I can use the existing documents and reports that 
the organizations have developed during and after incident handling process. 
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3.3 Research Process 
3.3.1 Case selection criteria 
Regarding the research aim, purposeful sampling of cases is guided by two criteria: 
(1) their business should be IT intensive (any interruption in their IT services for 
several hours would damage the company’s performance and be noticed by the 
top managers); (2) they must have experienced sever ISRIs in the last three years. 
The first criterion assures that in the selected cases, ISRIs are critical and deserve 
paying attention to them to be learned from. Therefore, the selected cases are 
more likely to show various practices related to learning from incidents, because 
such incidents are important for them to be prevented and controlled effectively. 
This way, I can increase the richness of cases in terms of observing the learning 
process. 
The second criterion allows concentrating on specific incidents and examining 
what organizations did to learn from them. Three years is a tentative estimate of a 
proper period in which access to data is feasible and incidents are not so recent 
that makes organizations hesitated to reflect on. To confine the study at 
organizational level, the selected cases are in the same industry (IT services), and 
in the same national context (Spain) to get rid of the variability of factors at supra-
organizational level. 
The literature on ISRIs has points to two broad categories of ISRIs: the failures in 
the operations of information systems and IT security incidents. To increase the 
richness of empirical settings for observing various learning practices, two 
different categories of the companies are selected: two supercomputer centers 
that are mostly dealing with IS operation failures; and two IT security companies 
that mainly deal with handling security and privacy incidents. 
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3.3.2 Access 
Due to the sensitivity of the topic (although my focus is on learning from incidents, 
not the incidents themselves), I started exploring a wide range of companies in 
various sectors. I got access to key actors in 10 organizations from which at least 
one initial interviews was conducted (out of more than 25 potential companies in 
financial, automotive, retail, utility, education, IT, petroleum, and manufacturing 
industries that showed some initial interests). In some cases, I had several 
interviews and visits before deciding to consider them in the analysis. Some cases 
stopped the process of data collection for political reasons (e.g. sensitivity of the 
topic, fear of media, and fear of revealing information) although in all cases I 
assured them about the confidentiality of all information and anonymity of results. 
This appeared when the access to the company was denied suddenly, and the 
given explanations were alien or unclear (e.g., “the top managers preferred to 
stop any further data collection”). 
Some other cases were dropped because the informants were too busy to be 
interviewed. Three of the cases were also excluded because after initial 
interviews, it appeared that the cases are not rich enough in terms of the types of 
incidents and learning process for further exploration. This process of filtering the 
cases allowed me to focus on each case with sufficient depth. I ended up with four 
organizations. 
3.3.3 Data collection process 
Data collection started in June 2011 and finished in October 2013 (16 months). 
Data was collected through interviews with informants, document analysis, and 
observations. Overall, 41 interviews were conducted with managers (at top and 
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middle levels), senior and junior experts, and employees who were involved in the 
process of handling incidents and learning from them. Interviews, by average, took 
64 minutes. All interviews were semi-structured, based on a customized interview 
protocols according to the informants positions in the organizations, their roles in 
incident handling and learning process, their backgrounds, and their personal 
characteristics (as far as it was available before the meetings). Initial interviews 
with each informant were organized around three major sections: 1) 
understanding the role of the informant before, during, and after incident, 2) the 
story of the incident from his/her point of view, and 3) inquiring about what 
actions had been taken during and after incidents to avoid such incident in future 
or reduce its impacts. I asked specific questions about various aspects of learning 
process based on the interview protocol (see Appendix 1).  
All the interviews were voice-recorded (with the consent from the interviewees 
before hand). I documented the reflections, personal notes, nonverbal messages, 
doubts and wonders within 24 hours after each interview (except for 4 
interviews). This reflection helped customizing successive interviews, as well as 
arranging for follow-up interactions with the interviewees for complementary data 
collection. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. Around 20% of the interviews 
were conducted in Spanish. Ambiguities and doubts about some Spanish phrases 
were discussed with a native Spanish Speaker who is also an expert in 
management studies. Table 3.1 presents a summary of collected data in each case. 
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Table ‎3.1: The summary of cases and collected data 
Organization Description Number of 
Interviews  
Covered informants  Other sources of data  
Security-Public Small, public security 
agency of an 
autonomous 
community 
government 
8  CEO; Top managers; 
Technical managers; 
Their provider; 
Technical experts  
Documents of the 
creation and 
performance reports; 
Visits of their systems 
Security-Private Small, private 
company specialized 
in IT security services 
11 CEO; Program 
manager; Project 
Managers; Functional 
managers; Experts  
Documents; 
Observations of 
artifacts, Attending 
follow-up meetings; 
Visit of facilities; 
Observing them when 
they are working 
Supercomputer
-Large 
Large, pubic 
supercomputer 
center 
18 Department 
Manager; Group 
Managers; Experts  
Website; Observations 
during interviews; 
Visits to the facilities,  
Supercomputer
-Small 
Small, public 
supercomputer 
center 
4 Department 
Managers; Middle 
managers; Project 
managers; Team 
managers; Senior 
experts 
Documents; Websites; 
Movies 
Total  41  
 
Another important source of data was the documents that all the organizations 
have provided about incident handling process, and their actions afterwards. Since 
all details of the incidents, actions applied to them, and internal projects are 
documented through various systems such as ticketing system, internal Wikis, and 
other information systems, I had the chance to get rich data about the selected 
cases. These documents specifically helped in several aspects of data collection. 
First, they provided background information about each company and the 
selected incidents, before conducting interviews. This saved many interviews that 
would otherwise be focused on getting background information. Second, it helped 
in developing questions that are more specific and focusing merely on issues that 
are not in the documents. Third, the documents were helpful for collecting more 
details about the issues discussed in the interviews. For instance, managers were 
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talking about several internal projects in their interviews. Then, the documents 
about the internal projects were consulted to glean more details. Fourth, the 
documents also allowed me to cross validate the information collected through 
interviews. In some cases, it resulted in identifying missing information in the 
interviews and some misunderstanding of documents that then was resolved 
through further interviews. Table 3.2 describes various types of documents, and 
their contribution to our data. 
Table ‎3.2: The summary of documents analyzed for data collection 
Document type Contribution to data 
Online documents 
(websites, public 
press) 
information about organizations background, how they work, 
their internal structures, their external relations, their major 
changes over time, and their major incidents 
Tickets in the 
ticketing system 
Information about the incidents and actions applied to handle 
them 
Wiki Articles Information about lessons learned from incident analysis, the 
solutions for avoiding future incidents, and other potential 
sources of information to be consulted in case of similar incidents  
Incident Analysis 
reports 
Information about the causes of a specific incident, its potential 
solutions, and follow-up actions 
Checklists  The details of activities in handling incidents, and (the changes in 
the checklists show) the changes made in the procedures due to 
the experience of incidents 
Users manuals  Information about how users can work in such a way that do not 
face some incidents or be less affected by some incidents 
Performance 
reports 
Information about improving the quality of work as the result of 
experiencing some past incidents 
Managerial reports Decisions for some improvement projects and the decisions 
made for making some investments for technology improvement 
and organizational changes 
 
Various online documents helped collecting information about the background of 
the organizations, their internal procedures and structures, their external 
relations, their major incidents, and their changes over time.  
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The content of tickets was a major source of information for getting detailed data 
about the selected incidents. The companies did not share all their tickets, but 
they did show the content of tickets related to several selected cases. This was 
helpful in getting detailed information about the incidents and the chain of events 
and practices during incident handling process. 
Wiki articles provided information about the lessons that the organizations 
learned as the result of handling incidents and the solutions that they have 
proposed and implemented to prevent similar incidents or reduce their impacts. 
Sometimes, the wiki articles also showed some ideas that they have been thinking 
about for the sake of improving their work 
Some companies have regularly created incident analysis reports for major 
incidents in which they were analyzing the specific incident, its causes, and the 
solutions they have provided, as well as the follow up actions that can help them 
avoid similar incidents or improve their work. 
Some checklists about how to react to an incident and how to manage recovering 
from it revealed the specific actions that the organizations have learned as the 
result of experiencing past incidents. The changes in the checklists (through 
comparing different versions of them), showed such improvements. 
The organizations have often developed and revised the users’ manuals to help 
them work more effectively with their systems. The comparison between versions 
of each manual was helpful in pin pointing learning from past incidents. 
Performance reports that the organizations have developed for their stakeholders 
have been also helpful in spotting changes in technologies, routines, and 
procedures. Some of the changes were done as the result of facing incidents.  
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Finally, several managerial reports that technical managers were developing 
helped identifying solutions that were proposed to managers and solutions that 
have been approved by the managers in order to avoid some incidents in future. 
We also arranged for several on-site observations, in each case, to observe how 
the organizations work in their daily work, how they use different tools and 
artifacts, and what kind of documents they produce. These observations provided 
a detailed and contextual understanding of cases and raised several questions in 
terms of differences between what has been mentioned in the interviews and 
what was observed. This, in turn, resulted in further inquiry. Observations also 
allowed me to enter the communities of experts inside the company, building 
trust with them, and become able to grasp informal aspects of their work. Table 
3.3 summarizes the various on-site observations done in each of the four 
companies and the focal points in the observations. 
Table ‎3.3: The summary of observations done for data collection 
Organization On-site observations and the studied elements 
Security-Public  A whole day staying with various groups and department  
 Visiting their incident analysis laboratory 
 Observing their ticketing system and how they use it 
 Observing their wiki system and how they use it 
Security-Private  Observing their ticketing systems and how they use them 
 Navigating through their wiki system and observing how they work 
 Staying in their open seminar sessions as a silent attendant 
Supercomputer
-Large 
 A tour to the main facilities, how it works, their technologies, and the 
related systems 
 Two day living with them in the company and chatting with experts 
and managers while they were working 
 Observing the hardware and software technologies they use and 
damaged technologies in some incidents 
 Observing how they work with the wiki systems in their incident 
handling process 
 Observing how they use the wiki system in their daily work 
Supercomputer
-Small 
 A tour to the main facilities, how it works, their technologies, and the 
related systems 
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Finally, I had several informal interactions with informants through off-site 
meetings (mostly for taking coffee and lunch before or after interviews or in the 
transition time between two successive interviews). Several points have been 
mentioned during these interactions and some sensitive questions were asked and 
discussed then. These informal meetings were not voice-recorded. However, I 
kept detailed notes of the discussions in my reflection on the interviews right after 
each session. Some of the issues mentioned in these informal meetings allowed 
me to better interpret the assertions in the interviews. In some cases, it helped me 
formulate new questions and new lines of inquiry.  
Several strategies were used to enhance the validity of empirical findings. First I 
stuck to critical incident interview approach, by focusing on indentifying critical 
events (e.g. an incident, a specific change, a key decision, and specific actions 
made by actors). I extracted the timeline of the actions, events, and 
consequences, following the sequence of critical incidents. I constantly asked 
about what has been really done, distinguishing them from what has been merely 
intended or decided to be done. I asked about the intentions and mentalities of 
actors in taking actions. I also asked about the personal interpretations of the 
situations, which then helped me in understanding and interpreting the opinions. 
Second, I cross-validated main findings, ambiguous findings, and contradictory 
assertions by asking from at least two informants. In some cases, I kept asking 
questions from almost all informants. I also used complementary data sources 
(such as documents and observations) to cross validate the findings.  
Third, the results of the each case study were presented to a selected group from 
the same organizations’ managers to validate the findings. Throughout these 
sessions, I exposed ambiguous aspects of the case study, and potential lacking 
information. In addition, in each reflection session, I formulated questions about 
the observations that I had in other cases or are expected to be observed based on 
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the literature, but it was not observed in the first round of data collection. The 
meetings helped me fill gaps in the data and define complementary data 
collections in each case.  
The data collection in each case continued until either I covered all the involved 
actors in the learning process or I reached to a point that further interviews 
showed little potential of revealing new insights. This was detected when 
repeated issues appeared in the last interviews and most of the findings were 
already mentioned in previous inquiries. Of course in Security-Public, the limited 
access to informants restricted collecting further data. In this case, the analysis 
focused on incidents and practices that I could collect sufficient data about them. 
Data collection process in each case (organization) went through three steps (see 
Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure ‎3.1: data collection process 
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Step 1: Extracting background information  
In the first step, I tried to understand how each organization works. Data was 
collected about their internal structures, processes, services, procedures, human 
resources, financial aspects, technologies and artifacts, and their cultures. Data 
was also collected about the external relations of the organizations with their 
providers, clients, partners, and governmental and industrial institutions. This data 
provided background information of each case. At the end of this step, several 
major ISRIs were indentified in each organization that the organizations were 
willing to reflect on them. Overall, 15 major incidents were identified in the four 
organizations. 
Step 2: Single-incident inquiry 
Following the overall research questions, in the second stage, the inquiry focused 
on the identified incidents. In this stage, I concentrated on each of these incidents 
to examine what the organizations did after the incident to avoid it or reduce its 
impact in future.  
The incident-based inquiry allowed for identifying practices that the organizations 
adopted as the result of facing that incident to reduce its likelihood or impact. 
Therefore, I could examine the relation between the incident and learning 
practices (the idea of learning from incidents). In addition, each major incident 
acted as a reference point to judge about the learning outcome and learning 
intentions of actors for each practice. More specifically, in order to be considered 
as a learning practice, either the adopted practice must have some impact in 
terms of reducing the likelihood of incident and its impact or at least learning 
actors have intended such learning impact.  
In the incident-based inquiry, I focused on each incident and adopted an inclusive 
approach in collecting data about the incident itself, the incident management 
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process, and other practices that the organization adopted as the result of 
experiencing that incident afterward. This way, for each incident, I developed a 
rich narrative of all actions, interactions, actors, events, challenges, and contextual 
factors over time. These narratives included both the period during incident 
handling process (from the time that the incident is noticed by the organization to 
the time that it is controlled) and the time after incident handling process. 
In these narratives, some specific practices were identified as learning initiatives 
that the organizations adopted as the result of each of the identified incidents to 
reduce the likelihood and impact of future incident. These actions, called incident-
specific learning accounts, were specific to each incident. Upon identifying the 
learning accounts, I examined the process through which those learning accounts 
were identified and implemented. Table 3.4 summarizes the identified incidents in 
the four organizations and their associated learning accounts. 
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Table ‎3.4: Incident-specific learning accounts 
Organization Studied incidents Incident-specific learning accounts 
Security-
Public 
No specific incident 
was mentioned (due 
to the sensitivity of 
the organization); 
instead the 
organization referred 
to four incidents as 
typical incidents  
Increasing the efficiency of delivering services 
Adopting more proactive approach in ERI
1
 
Expanding in-house ERI activities & improving the 
organizational level of ERI 
Adding technical facilities for mobile incidents 
Changes in the ticketing system (queues, labels, categories of 
incidents) 
The change in catalogue of services 
Clarifying the limits of the capabilities for delivering services 
The changes in the training programs 
Eliminating some internal processes or services that proved 
to be incapable 
Security-
Private 
2 big Incidents in the 
web applications 
Creating a CERT
2
 for a client and moving the team to the site 
of client 
Creating an internal permanent project related to CERT of the 
client 
Supercomput
er-Large 
Central Storage 
problem (moving to 
the new storage) 
Training the users about the universal storage  
Creating and improving quasi-real-time mirroring process 
Improved general knowledge of managing mirroring process 
and other issues  
Spam filter server Creating an application for reporting directly to the user 
about not delivered email  
HSM backup system No specific action in this case, except documenting it in the 
ticketing system 
IP6 compatibility 
incident 
Almost nothing, just some awareness about the possibility of 
similar incidents in future 
Temperature alarm 
and calibration 
Adding new item to the regular maintenance  
Evaporating system Making several technical changes to physical facilities 
Supercomput
er-Small 
Cooling problem Changing the mentality of the Parent University about the 
criticality of their infrastructure 
Taking the ownership of the infrastructure for the new site 
Defining and continuously improving the shut down process 
The storage problem 
(ZSF) 
Developing index of files (where is where) for fast reporting 
of damaged files) 
The storage problem  Basically nothing special, expect documenting the incident in 
the ticketing system 
                                                     
1 ERI refers to “Incident Response Team” 
2 CERT stands for “Computer Emergency Response Team” 
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Step 3: Multi-incident inquiry 
Along with identifying incident-specific practices, I also identified practices that 
although were adopted for preventing and reducing the impact of future 
incidents, they were not necessarily related to one single incident. In fact, these 
practices were adopted as the result of experiencing several incidents. I named 
these practices as multi-incident learning practices.  
I could identify these practices when I asked general questions such as “what have 
you done to avoid these kinds of incidents or to reduce their impacts?” and “what 
are the ways in which you assure that you would experience fewer of such 
incidents in future and with less damages?” These questions (that were not 
referring to any specific incident) helped me identify various practices that the 
organizations adopted for learning purposes. Therefore, in the third step, I 
adopted a change-based inquiry to extract the details of learning activities. As the 
result, I could identify 13 multi-incident learning accounts in the studied 
organizations (see Table 3.5 for details of the general learning accounts). These 
learning accounts, though were informed by several incidents, they were not 
necessarily taken after any single specific incident. 
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Table ‎3.5: Multi-incident learning accounts from ISRIs 
Learning accounts The description of learning process in relation with the related incidents  
Security-Public 
Adopting more 
proactive approach in 
the incident response 
team 
Over time, after experiencing a wide range of security incidents, the key experts in incident 
response team (ERI) got some free time during their annul strategic planning for the new year in 
2012. They identified a pattern that last years, they have been acting more kind of a passive 
incident chaser. They decide to act more proactively, by not waiting until incidents happen. 
Instead, they should adopt a threat-detection approach that allows them to foresee future 
security attacks. They defined a project to implement this approach, as it required deploying 
network scanning tools, establishing procedures for monitoring social networks of suspicious 
groups, defining new associated queues in their ticketing system, and defining and negotiating 
associated roles and responsibilities inside their security service provider (in the form of a new 
type of service). 
Expanding in-house 
incident response 
activities and 
improving the 
organizational level of 
incident response 
department  
Several security incidents happened during 2011 that involved sensitive information of 
politicians. Following the overall outsourcing strategy, the organization delegated them to its 
provider. There were some critical moments that those sensitive users were quite concerned 
about the publicity of their incidents. Over last year, there has been a gradual accumulation of 
experience and interest inside the organization to revise this overall strategy and define criteria 
for identifying sensitive incidents that should be handled internally. This took place when the 
new CEO entered. He assigned his deputy to lead this initiative. As the result, a new (unusual) 
category of incidents “level 4” was defined in the ticketing system that corresponded to this type 
of incidents. Accordingly, the procedures and rules inside the organization and between the 
organization and the provider were defined. This change became more established by promoting 
the position of incident response team as one of the main divisions in the organization. 
Change in the service 
model in relation with 
the provider: from 
body-shopping model 
to volumetrias 
Security-Public has been working with its provider based on body-shopping model (paying based 
on the number of hours that provider works on the defined services). However, after 1.5 years 
working, and because both Security-Public and its provider learned how to deliver services more 
effectively and efficiently, the organization realizes that there are a lot of services that can be 
defined as a specific unit of service (volumetira) and be outsourced with a specific price. When 
the new CEO came to the company, the team of managers started reflecting on a wide range of 
incidents and “how” they were managed by the provider, their relations with the provider, and 
the way they were contracting with the provider. Learning from the pattern of various services 
was needed to help the Security-Public and its provider automate their tasks, reduce the prices 
of services, and identify what tasks cannot be automated. Accumulation of a wide range of 
incidents allowed for extracting the patterns and seeing the big picture of how they were 
managing their services, what services were lacking, and what sort of interactions they lacked in 
the provider’s side. Therefore, they defined a project for changing the service model in the 
contract with their provider in 2014, when their previous contract will finish. This project 
involved defining categories of services, setting quality measures, negotiating prices, and 
defining new rules and procedures for interactions with provider.  
Adding technical 
facilities for mobile 
incidents 
A series of incidents revealed the lack of capacity in analyzing and handling mobile-based 
incidents. For the first few cases, Security-Public tried to rely on the existing capabilities and 
expand the use of available applications to solve the issues, but as far as it became a consistent 
and increasing need, it justified adopting various tools, specialized for mobile-incidents and 
learning how to handle them. This led to a series of actions for acquiring new equipments, 
defining procedures, establishing mechanisms, defining new categories of services and queues in 
the ticketing system, and defining roles and access rights.  
Adding legal services 
as a new category of 
services to the service 
catalogue 
After facing a series of incidents with various legal implications (criminal cases and fringing laws), 
Security-Public realized that a series of legal services should be defined and provided as part of 
the incident management process and as distinct preventive services. This took place when the 
legal expert who was leading the legal activities inside the organization spared some free time to 
reflect on various requests and incidents related to legal themes, identify a series of key legal 
services, define them, and put them into practice. 
Periodically delegating 
more issues to the 
provider 
Often new, critical incidents are handled internally by Security-Public. However, the organization 
has periodically identified a pack of incidents that can be outsourced to the provider. This 
happens when Security-Public gets enough experience and confidence about how to handle 
these incidents, find a kind of consistent pattern among them, and making sure that they do not 
involve any sensitive issue that should be kept in-house. However, Security-Public does this 
often when the load work decreases and the managers and experts of various divisions find time 
to articulate the pack, define some overall quality measures, and negotiate them with the 
provider’s delegate.  
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Learning accounts The description of learning process in relation with the related incidents  
Security-Private 
Changing the service 
model (from 
corrective to 
preventive mode) 
For a specific client, Security-Private starts working as incident handler. After one year, Security-
Private not only handled the incidents, but could detect a wide range of vulnerabilities in client’s 
system that could cause serious damages. Using this experience, Security-Private leveraged its 
good performance and suggested changing the overall service model with the provider to act for 
preventing incident by working closely with the application providers of the client to make sure 
that they commit security principles during their development projects and when they try to 
implement their application.  
Creating a network 
scanning tool out of 
the solutions that 
were temporarily 
developed for the 
incidents of clients 
In several tough incidents happened to various clients, Security-Private had to examine a wide 
range of suspicious network nodes that were distributed globally over the internet. It was 
needed to do so for identifying the scope of the incident, the possible sources of attacks, and 
potential future threats. Security-Private has done several local actions in different projects. 
Some were like developing short software codes (scripts) to run such a scanning, some others 
were mostly doing some manual inspections. When similar case emerged in a project with a big 
client, Security-Private had enough resources (and freedom) to develop a tool that helped 
scanning the nodes automatically. Although this tool was developed in that specific project, 
Security-Private was seeing it as its own tool that can be used as a technology in other projects. 
However, there were some debates between Security-Private and the client about the property 
right of the tool. 
Supercomputer-Large 
Developing script to 
automatically handle 
the problems of 
quotas in the case of 
central storage 
movement 
The need for moving data from one of the main HPCs to the new central storage and the 
temporal situation for keeping both original and copy files, caused some serious problems when 
users wanted copy large files. This could cause data loss, and wasting a lot of time and 
processing resources. After a couple of initial incidents, Supercomputer-Large started a project 
to develop a script that not only solves similar problems in future, but also could incorporate 
several other improvements that had been appeared out of the experience of some other 
incidents before. 
Creating an 
application for 
reporting directly to 
the user about not 
delivered email  
Supercomputer-Large has been constantly faced with problems related to its Email-servers. 
Although most of these problems could not be prevented (because they required a totally new 
application or some of them are quite normal), the big problem from the view of users was that 
they were not informed about the incidents (e.g. not delivering their emails). This issue was 
handled manually, case by case, when the users were noticing this through other ways (for 
example the colleague calling them to ask why the email is not sent). The System-Administrator 
department defined and internal project to develop a tool to be installed on the email-server 
application that can provide detailed report to the users about incidents. This project was 
scheduled as one of the internal projects, and once the other more urgent projects were 
finished, the two experts in this domain started working on it. 
Improving the 
messages to the users 
about the failures of 
backup (HSM) system  
Backup systems for storing large files in long term (HSM) that are partly mechanical often are 
prone to damages and failures. Any damage in the system can corrupt data, and might cause in 
permanent data loss. Although not so often, but Supercomputer-Large had suffered from 
various cases in which the backup system failed during storing data, but the user (who was 
copying data in the backup system) was not able to detect the incident during the copying 
process because the message that the system gives to the user is quite general (“input-output 
error”) without indicating what is the error, and where the copying process is failed. This led the 
expert of HSM with the head of System-Administrator group defined an internal project to 
improve this situation. They first went through the provider of the system, and the provider 
lunched an internal project to deal with this issue. But soon after, it appeared that the provider 
is not capable enough and because this is just a very peculiar case, this issue was not a priority 
for the provider. Therefore Supercomputer-Large started working on the tool internally, and 
finally after testing various methods, could develop a script that could provide specific message 
to the user of the system about why the system has failed, and which specific part of the system 
is damaged. 
Supercomputer-Small 
Defining and 
continuously 
improving the shut 
down process 
Break of electricity is common (happening once every two months, more or less). This is mostly 
unpredictable, and depends on the host university’s infrastructure. Supercomputer-Small can 
only manage the shut-down process to avoid burning its equipments and avoid losing data and 
jobs running in the systems. The shut-down process should be done in less than 5 minutes. 
There are numerous systems, applications, and network nodes that have complex relations. The 
sequence of switching off each equipment is very critical because it can cause the loss of data 
and job (imagine that you shut down the core processes of a distributed process first, before you 
close the peripheral processes). The difficulty is that the relations between the systems change 
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Learning accounts The description of learning process in relation with the related incidents  
almost quickly as new equipments, applications and new configurations of the system appear 
quite frequently. For the first cases, Supercomputer-Small handled the shut-down process 
manually. However, the accumulated experience and the increasingly level of difficulty, and 
experiencing several incidents during this process led Supercomputer-Small to develop a script 
that tries to automatically shut-down the systems. This script needs to be updated continuously 
as the result of other changes in the systems. 
Developing index of 
files for fast reporting 
of damaged files 
Working as part of a bigger network of supercomputers, Supercomputer-Small can retrieve the 
lost data from copies in other centers. Previous incidents that caused data loss were always 
handled in this way. Although retrieving lost data requires time and energy (for finding the 
copies, reprocessing them, and transferring them), it is often not so difficult. However, in a 
recent case, one of the main file systems of the Supercomputer-Small was damaged during the 
copying process which could cause potentially several peta-bytes of data loss (a “nightmare”!). 
This time, although more than 90 percent of data could be retrieved from the damaged file 
system, it took several days to do so. During this time, Supercomputer-Large had to report the 
total (possible) data loss for being recuperated from other sources, because it was not clear 
which parts of the overall file system were damaged. This required a huge amount of time and 
energy for recovering the potentially lost data. This experience, and using the experience of 
other cases led Supercomputer-Small to define an internal project to dynamically store the 
physical address of various parts of data files, so that, when similar incident happens, they can 
easily determine which parts of the data is damaged and needs quick recovery from other 
sources.  
Taking the ownership 
of the infrastructure 
for the new site 
Supercomputer-Small had suffered from numerous infrastructural incidents (electricity breaks, 
cooling system damages) mostly because the host university that owns the infrastructure is not 
considering their infrastructure as a critical onse. The managers of Supercomputer-Small have 
tried to change the mentality of university managers to convince them that their infrastructure 
is critical. However there are various formal and physical limitations to deal with the 
infrastructure of Supercomputer-Small differently. This led Supercomputer-Small to define an 
overall strategy to set up its own computer room, with the ownership of the infrastructure. This 
resulted in a series of projects to equip the new room, based on direct contracts with providers. 
In doing so, they considering most of the experiences of past infrastructural incidents in 
designing the new room. 
3.3.4 Data Analysis process 
Data analysis went through five steps (see Figure 3.2).  
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Figure ‎3.2: data analysis process 
Step 1: Analysis during data collection 
During data collection process, the interviews were voice recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. Spanish interviews were then translated into English and 
checked for potential misunderstandings by consulting a native Spanish speaker. 
Parallel with data collection, I ran the initial analysis of each interview (sometimes 
several interviews together) to 1) check for ambiguous themes (which resulted in 
follow-up inquiry and customizing successive interviews), 2) detect contradictory 
findings (which became part of the further inquiry), and 3) identify lacking 
information regarding learning process (which were translated into specific 
questions and points of inquiry in the following data collection activities). This 
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analysis was done often within 48 hours after each interview and in some cases 
within one week. 
Step 2: Developing Analytical reports 
Upon completing data collection for each organization, all collected data (i.e. 
interviews, observations, documents, and reflections) were integrated to compose 
a complete and detailed analytical report. This resulted in four analytical reports 
for the four organizations. The attempt was made to include all the details. Hence, 
no summarizing or rewording was done on the original data. The analytical reports 
were created with specific attention to different sources of data (e.g., whether 
they are from interviews or from official documents, or from informal documents, 
or are personal reflections of the researcher) by using different colors and 
footnotes to specify data sources. Small sentences or phrases were used as sub-
sections’ titles. The reports were then checked to make sure they were complete 
and clear. In some cases, this reflection led to some additional data collection. 
Each story had three main sections. First, I described how the organization works, 
including its external relations, internal structure, processes, routines and systems 
used in their work. This information helped me understand the context of each 
case. Second, I focused on specific major incidents in each organization to describe 
what and how the organizations learned from these incidents (listed in Table 3.5, 
above). This section covered both actions during and after incident handling that 
the organizations took to prevent similar incidents in future or reduce their 
impacts. These actions were specific to one incident (single-incident learning 
accounts). Third, I articulated the other practices that organizations took as the 
result of experiencing several incidents (multi-incident learning accounts).  
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Step 3: Open Coding  
The third round of analysis was done based on each of the four analytical reports. 
In this step, I first openly coded data (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Following the 
overall principle of open coding- i.e., the process of “breaking down the data into 
distinct units of meaning” (Goulding, 2002): 76) - I analyzed the analytical reports 
line by line to identify meaningful themes regarding the overall research question. 
More specifically, the coding process was sensitized by considering the actors who 
were involved, the actions they made, their intentions, the consequences of their 
actions in terms of avoiding or managing future incidents, the characteristics of 
ISRIs, the relations between the practices and the incidents, and other contextual 
factors. 
In addition to coding, numerous memos were developed in order to reflect on 
concepts that emerged out of the analysis, potential relations between the 
concepts, and the role of some contextual factors in the learning process. I used 
ATLAS.ti (version 7.0.82) to organize better the data, codes, and memos. This step 
resulted in 212 codes and 229 memos.  
The initial list of codes was then classified around more abstract concepts that 
they emerged throughout the reflection on the codes. These overall concepts 
were iteratively refined, to be clearly defined. Accordingly, some codes were 
clarified, some codes were merged, and some codes were broken down into more 
specific sub-codes.  
As shown in Table 3.6, the codes are classified around nine major categories: (1) 
Learning practices (“OL practices”); (2) Cognitive aspects of learning practices 
(“Cognitive”); (3) Structural aspects of learning practices (“Structure”); (4) Politics 
aspects of learning practices (“Politics”); (5) ISRIs Characteristics (“Incident”); (6) 
Relations between ISRIs and learning practices (“Relation”); (7) Contextual factors 
(“Context”); (8) Temporal aspects of learning process (“Time”); (9) Objects in the 
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learning process (“Objects”). The second and third columns in Table 3.6 provide 
the definition of each category and the list of associated codes. 
Table ‎3.6: Categories and associated definitions and open codes 
Category Definition Related Open Codes 
Organizational 
Learning 
Practices 
Practices related 
to learning from 
incidents, 
including the 
actions, inactions, 
intentions, 
interactions, and 
actors 
OL-Actors 
OL-Agenda of learning 
OL-Alternative Learning paths 
OL-Apprenticeship 
OL-Automatization 
OL-Barrier 
OL-Change in identity and self image 
OL-Collaborative 
OL-Competing learning items 
OL-Cost 
OL-Cross-incident analysis 
OL-Detached learning process 
OL-Digitalization vs. codification 
OL-Documentation for formalization 
OL-Eliminating obsolete 
OL-Embedding into artifacts and systems 
OL-Experimentation 
OL-Formal / Formality 
OL-Fundamental vs. remedy 
OL-improvisation 
OL-Inaction 
OL-Incentive / motivation 
OL-Incident Analysis 
OL-Incident reporting system / post incident reporting / post hoc analysis / 
reflection on the incident 
OL-Intention 
OL-Incident Simulation 
OL-Learning from others´ experience 
OL-Learning accounts / learning solutions / learning cases / learning content 
OL-Learning Base 
OL-Learning Conflicts 
OL-Learning trajectory / complementary 
OL-Open sessions follow up sessions 
OL-Overlearning 
OL-path avoiding 
OL-Path dependency 
OL-Perception / framing incidents and incident handlers police vs. doctor 
OL-Reducing the possibilities for complaining 
OL-Roles and Responsibilities 
OL-Routine learning / learning curve / learning by repeating and doing 
OL-Slack 
OL-Specialization of OL based on Cognitive boundaries 
OL-Standardization 
OL-Training 
OL-Trigger 
OL-Trying not to learn: Grey zone of learning 
OL-Turnaround 
OL-Vulnerability Analysis 
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Category Definition Related Open Codes 
Cognitive 
The way that 
actors 
understand 
incidents and 
their 
understanding 
change over time 
Cognitive-accumulation of K from learning 
Cognitive-Abstract Knowledge 
Cognitive-Attention / Attention Management 
Cognitive-Awareness 
Cognitive-codified Knowledge 
Cognitive-Contextual Knowledge 
Cognitive-Detailed vs. transversal Knowledge 
Cognitive-Embedded and Embodied and embrained 
Cognitive-Expert vs. novice 
Cognitive-Heuristic Knowledge and learning 
Cognitive-Holistic Knowledge 
Cognitive-Know-how 
Cognitive-Knowledge Characteristics 
Cognitive-Knowledge Codification 
Cognitive-Knowledge Gap 
Cognitive-Knowledge Integration 
Cognitive-Knowledge lack 
Cognitive-Knowledge Localized 
Cognitive-Knowledge loss 
Cognitive-Knowledge Obsolete 
Cognitive-Knowledge Ownership 
Cognitive-Knowledge replication 
Cognitive-Knowledge slack 
Cognitive-Knowledge Specialization 
Cognitive-Knowledge Structure 
Cognitive-Knowledge Superficial 
Cognitive-Knowledge Superficial vs. Deep 
Cognitive-Knowledge Validation 
Cognitive-Know-who 
Cognitive-Lessons Learned 
Cognitive-Reliance on others´ Knowledge 
Cognitive-Specific Knowledge / Atomic Knowledge / Pieces of Knowledge 
Cognitive-Subjective Knowledge 
Cognitive-Tacit Knowledge 
Cognitive-Tentative Learning Tentative Knowledge 
Cognitive-Trick 
Cognitive-Uncertainty 
Structure 
Aspects that are 
related to the 
stable patterns of 
social actions, 
such as routines, 
procedures, 
processes, roles, 
incentives, 
responsibilities, 
etc. 
Structure- Formal affiliations 
Structure-Dominant Logic 
Structure-Informality-flexibility in structure 
Structure-Legal learning 
Structure-Motivational gap 
Structure-Need for Learning 
Structure-Resource limitation 
Structure-Responsibility of L 
Structure-Rigidity 
Structure-Rules and regulations that facilitate learning process 
Structure-Stabilizing / institutionalizing / fixing / establishing 
Structure-Structural Gap 
Politics 
Issues related to 
the relative 
power of actors 
and the dynamics 
of their power 
Politics- Detour 
Politics- Passing the ball to other´s field 
Politics-Control and surveillance 
Politics-Informal and personal relations with key actors 
Politics-Justifying and Legitimizing 
Politics-Key Actors 
Politics-Political support 
Politics-Prestige 
Politics-Removing the possibilities for claiming 
Politics-Scarce Resources 
Politics-Sensitive decisions / sensitive issues 
Politics-Status and Legitimacy 
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Category Definition Related Open Codes 
Incident 
The labels, types, 
and 
characteristics of 
ISRIs 
Incident- Types and categories 
Incident-abnormal 
Incident-Characteristics 
Incident-complexity 
Incident-concern about incident 
Incident-Criticality 
Incident-Desirable incidents that show market is expanding 
Incident-Dramatizing 
Incident-from legacy systems 
Incident-Heterogeneity-actors 
Incident-Heterogeneity-Knowledge 
Incident-Heterogeneity-suppliers 
Incident-Heterogeneity-Technology 
Incident-Incidents as a result of learning 
Incident-Intentional 
Incident-Intentional incidents and smart changes in the way they are 
formulated 
Incident-Label 
Incident-Mistake 
Incident-Novelty 
Incident-Pain 
Incident-Pattern of incident 
Incident-Potential 
Incident-Proactive detection 
Incident-process 
Incident-Rare incidents 
Incident-The potential of incident for learning changes 
Incident-Visibility 
Relation 
The relation 
between ISRIs 
and learning 
practices 
Relation- the link between learning and incident 
Relation-Learning for 
Relation-learning from 
Relation-Learning Opportunities 
Context 
Factors that are 
stable during the 
learning process 
and affect 
learning process 
Context-Free services 
Context-HR incentive system 
Context-lack of ownership 
Context-Legal 
Context-Low Demand 
Context-luck 
Context-Open Source and cost free learning 
Time 
Temporal aspects 
of OL process 
Time-Absolute 
Time-Amount of time / as a resource 
Time-Coincidence 
Time-Concentration 
Time-Fast change of technology 
Time-Frequency 
Time-limitation 
Time-Moment of learning 
Time-Sequence 
Time-Slack 
Time-Speed / pace of OL 
Time-Temporal distance/gap 
Time-temporal Resonance 
Time-temporality vs. durability 
Object 
Any physically 
observable 
element related 
to learning 
practices 
Object-Article- An executable entity 
Object-Decommissioning 
Object-Interoperable 
Object-Learning space 
Object-Material gap 
Object-Materiality and Artifact 
Object-Redundancy and slack 
Object-ticket and ticketing system 
Object-Ticket vs. Knowledge article 
Object-Ticket-Interaction 
Object-wiki 
Object-wiki-incident specific articles 
Object-Wiki-K articles 
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Step 4: Axial coding of learning practices 
Upon the development of open codes, in the next step I focused on learning 
practices (as first-order codes). I Followed the axial coding procedure – i.e., 
“moving to a higher level of abstraction and is achieved by specifying relationships 
and delineating a core category or construct around which the other concepts 
revolve” (Goulding, 2002:78)- to make sense of learning practices and develop 
patterns among the learning practices. In doing so, I concentrated on the open 
codes related to “OL practices”. I abstracted them into categories of practices. The 
codes related to the relation between practices and incidents (“relation”) were 
helpful to come up with two major categories of learning practices (second-order 
codes): single-incident learning practices (described in Chapter 4) and multi-
incident learning practices (described in Chapter 5). The single incident learning 
practices were then classified into two sub-categories depending on the temporal 
aspects of learning practices (“time”) which are: learning during incident handling 
process and learning practices after incident handling. Figure 3.3 summarizes the 
learning practices. 
 
Figure ‎3.3: Learning practices and their categories 
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I described each learning practice by defining what are the action that various 
actors took in performing that practice, the interactions and challenges in doing 
so, the temporal aspects of those practices, the cognitive, structural, and political 
aspects of those practices, the relations between the practices and past incidents, 
the conditions in which the practices were observed, and the role of objects in the 
practice.  
As an important part of this step, I examined how the characteristics of ISRIs were 
affecting the emergence and evolution of learning practices. These findings were 
discussed with several scholars in the domain of organizational learning to make 
sure they are relevant and clear enough. Several comments from the scholars 
(such as what were the conditions, what contextual factors were present, how the 
findings were different in different cases) resulted in several iterations with data. 
Step 5: Embedding findings into extant literature and articulating learning modes 
In the last step of analysis, the articulated learning modes from ISRIs were 
embedded into extant literature to ground the findings in the previous studies, 
identify similarities and differences, and explain them. Comparing the learning 
practices identified in step 5, with learning practices in the literature, five patterns 
of learning practices were identified that are, called learning modes: 1) learning 
through incident handling practices, 2) learning through post-incident reflection, 
3) transversal learning from incidents, 4) outsourced learning, and 5) learning 
through material replacement (described in Chapter 7). The relation between the 
learning practices and the five learning modes is depicted in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure ‎3.4: Learning modes and their relations with learning practices 
As illustrated in Figure 3.4, several learning practices are contributing to various 
learning modes. For instance, the outsourced learning mode is abstracted from 
the pattern of outsourcing incident-handling practices, the pattern of outsourcing 
some post-incident reflections, and the pattern of outsourcing some improvement 
projects. Moving from describing the learning modes to explaining their 
emergence in different situations, I could reflect on the role of ISRIs characteristics 
in shaping learning process (Chapter 5).  
3.4 Ethical issues 
The study followed the ethical research principles, namely autonomy, informed 
consent, privacy and confidentiality, beneficence, and justice (Minnesota, 2003; 
Orb, Eisenhauer, & Wynaden, 2001). In line with autonomy I did not force any 
company to take part or remain in the research. All companies were voluntarily 
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participating in the study. As mentioned before, several companies were dropped 
from the research process due to their hesitation in giving some information and 
fear of potential harms. In these cases, the data collection was immediately 
stopped when the company expressed its wonders. 
As informed consent principle implies, all the informants (both managers and 
experts) were completely informed about the aim of the study, the supporting 
institution, the details of research process, the final outcomes (e.g., thesis, papers, 
and reports), and the way that the results might be published. This was done 
firstly at the beginning of studying each company, and was applied to each 
informant. In case of interviewing an informant several times, each time this 
process was repeated. I informed the interviewees before the interview sessions, 
so that they could decide whether to take part in the study or not. 
Pursuant to privacy and confidentiality, all the companies and informants are 
anonymous. Even in cases that some companies consented to publish their names, 
I did not do so. In addition, I offered each informant and the managers of each 
company to read and check the interview transcriptions and other research 
outcomes before being used in my data analysis. This was to allow them to check 
for privacy and confidentiality concerns. As for two security companies, I signed 
non-disclosure agreements with specific terms and policies that the companies 
suggested. Before each interview, I asked the interviewee about the possibility of 
voice recording the meeting. In a few occasions, the informants asked me to 
switch-off the recorder when they were providing some information, which I 
committed to that. Finally, I did not ask about any private issue or about any 
information that might threaten or create potential harm to the companies and 
the informants. 
Regarding the beneficence principle, I offered the companies a final practical 
report about the findings that might be helpful for improving their internal 
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practices. I also offered them a workshop on learning models that these 
organizations could benefit from in establishing new learning practices. I also 
openly offered the companies any other academic outcome that they might find 
relevant for their practices. 
Finally, I tried to minimize the unnecessary meetings with informants by 
consulting available documents. I did not force any temporal limitation on the 
meetings and other interactions with the informants. 
3.5 Challenges and limitations 
There were three main challenges in the research process. First, although the 
research focused on learning process, its relation to incidents made it sensitive for 
the organizations to reflect on. This is reflected in the large number of case 
attritions (from around 25 cases to eventually four ones). I tried to reduce this 
challenge by being open to the target industries, while still focusing on cases that 
are IT intensive. Fortunately, the eventual cases that constitute the empirical data 
were committed to providing required information. 
Second, the sensitivity of topic, namely inquiry about incidents of the 
organizations was limiting the chance of collecting data prospectively. Therefore, 
the study focused on retrospective data collection to inquire about learning from 
incidents that were no longer sensitive to the organizations at the time of the 
research. Several methods helped increasing the richness of data and assuring the 
validity of the findings. First, the selected incidents were in the last 3 years, to 
make sure that still the actors have a fresh record of what happened in those 
cases. Second, I focused on major incidents about which the organizations have 
more detailed records such as tickets, reports, meeting notes, and wiki articles. 
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Third, some selected incidents were dropped in the data collection process and 
then in data analysis due to insufficient details. 
The third challenge was related to capturing learning practices. Since the concept 
of learning has been used and discussed among managers and experts, this could 
affect the findings, if I would have used this term in my inquiry. Thus, the data 
collection focused on inquiring about what did the organizations do as the result 
of the experience of major incidents. This way, I could capture a wide range of 
practices that then were analyzed based on the learning definition. Although I 
captured many other practices than learning practices (e.g., routine incident 
handling practices), it avoided filtering out nuances of learning process and 
focusing on what some social actors might subjectively consider as learning. 
3.6 Research settings 
The empirical study is based on four organizations. Two companies are responsible 
for handling security incidents, one of them is public and the other is private, 
referred to as Security-Public and Security-Private 3 respectively. The other two 
companies are international supercomputer centers. Both are public and hosted in 
local universities. The large one is called Supercomputer-Large and the small one is 
named Supercomputer-Small. This setting allowed me to limit the variation on the 
type of incidents and working context that could influence learning process. As for 
the two security companies, the focus has been only on the security incidents. The 
supercomputer organizations did not face any serious security incident, but 
                                                     
3 For the sake of confidentiality, we use pseudo names. 
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suffered from hardware and software incidents. The following sections describe 
the background of the organizations, how they work (e.g., internal processes and 
routines), and what types of incidents they have faced. 
3.6.1 Security-Public 
Security-Public is a public foundation dedicated to handling security incidents, 
delivering security services to public organizations, fostering the development of 
strong and competitive information security industry, and increasing the resilience 
and preparedness of the various communities (businesses, citizens, and public 
organizations) by providing preventive security services. Facing various security 
incidents and the fear of potential negative impacts of security incidents in future 
made the government of a Spanish autonomous region defined an IT security plan 
in 2009 and established Security-Public as the main body that is responsible for 
implementing the plan in the same year. The government owns 51% of its share 
and the rest is held by other nonprofit organizations. Its parents include the 
shareholders and five other organizations that represent various stakeholders 
such as industries and universities. 
Security-Public has a main contractor for delivering most of its services. The main 
contractor has sub-contracted many of its duties to a specialized IT security 
company (we call it the provider). On the daily basis, Security-Public is dealing 
directly with the sub-contractor. The provider was a key actor in the process of 
defining the IT security plan and designing and creating Security-Public since 2007 
(two years before the creation of Security-Public). The provider was disconnected 
from the process during 2008 when local government was doing internal 
negotiations for approving Security-Public and allocating resources. Later on, the 
provider did not take part in the first bid for outsourcing services by Security-
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Public. However, as the winning company (the main contractor) was not able to 
deliver services at the expected quality level, the provider came back to the 
process as the sub-contractor, in late 2009. 
In 2010, the new general director of Security-Public was appointed. He called for a 
change in the services model with the provider to move from body-shopping 
model to service-based contracts. In the body-shopping model, which was in place 
since the creation of Security-Public, the basis of payment to the provider was the 
number of hours that each level of experts from the provider would spend on 
delivering services. However, budget limitation, linked with increasing demand for 
services, went hand in hand with the capability of the provider to improve the 
quality and efficiency of delving various services, making Security-Public suggest 
the new service model in which the payment is based on the number of services 
that are delivered in each category of services. This process has been going on 
with various challenges due to defining the categories of services, setting prices 
for each category, and negotiating the processes. 
Internal structure, processes, routines, and systems at Security-Public 
Security-Public has a rather flat structure. It has outsourced the delivery of its 
services to specialized IT security companies. There are six middle and top 
managers affiliated to Security-Public and there are around 21 experts from the 
provider that work for Security-Public.  
Security-Public provides two main categories of services: proactive and reactive. 
The proactive services include vulnerability analysis, generating notices about 
security threats, awareness and training programs, and promoting the 
development of IT security industry. There are 8 persons involved in the provision 
of proactive services. Reactive services relate to handling incidents that are 
relayed to Security-Public or Security-Public detects them. These services are 
delivered based on the overall incident handling process articulated by Carnegie 
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Mellon model. In this area, there are three levels of experts. Level 1 includes 
employees from the provider who are receiving incidents, log them, and introduce 
them to the ticketing system. In level 2, the experts (mostly from its provider) deal 
with more sophisticated issues that are escalated from level 1 to them. Level 3 
experts (one person from Security-Public and two persons from the provider) are 
responsible for the overall incident handling process, defining frameworks for 
interventions, doing forensic analysis, and providing reports and 
recommendations.  
The organizational structure is composed of a general director, who is appointed 
by the government. There are two staff mangers, i.e. administration and general 
managers, who support the director in managing internal activities. There are five 
internal divisions: (1) Operations, responsible for delivering proactive services and 
managing the internal operations of Security-Public; (2) Incident Handling, 
responsible for handling incidents and doing security intelligence for detecting 
incidents proactively; (3) Legal Services, which is responsible for delivering legal 
services to internal employees and external clients; (4) Promotion, which is 
responsible for providing and delivering contents related to information security 
for various communities; (5) Communication, that handles the interactions 
between Security-Public and other organizations. 
The incident handling process starts when a new incident is reported by a client or 
detected by experts inside Security-Public or inside the provider. There are cases 
that the external bodies such as general security agencies or major IT companies 
(e.g., Google and Facebook) send alerts to Security-Public related to incidents. 
Incidents are sent to specialized queues when they are sent through specific email 
addresses. The incidents might also arrive through the call center that is operating 
24/7 by first-level incident handlers. Upon the arrival of an incident, a ticket is 
opened in the ticketing system. The ticketing system is the main tool in the 
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incident handling process. First level experts log information about the incident, 
assess it, and if needed, they escalate it to level two to be handled. All incidents go 
through an initial phase called Triage, in which three managers from inside 
Security-Public examine the incident, assess its criticality, and define the process 
of handling it. In cases that the incident is sensitive, they might decide that the 
incident be handled internally, without sending it to the provider. The legal and 
criminal consequences and considerations are also discussed in Triage.  
Major incidents at Security-Public 
Security-Public is responsible for handling and preventing a wide range of security 
incidents in the local government. These incidents, for example, include hacking 
incidents, privacy attacks, data breaches, and identity theft. Being part of the local 
government, Security-Public considers these incidents as its own incidents. 
3.6.2 Security-Private 
In 1995, a project of establishing a new Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) was the turning point for creating Security-Private as a start-up within the 
local university that was running the project. One of the senior managers of this 
project started exploring opportunities to establish Security-Private. In 1999, when 
there was still no formal company, two key experts, who later on became the 
managers of Security-Private, were running several IT security projects in banking 
sector and some others. In 2007, Security-Private was formally established as a 
private company specialized in delivering IT security services. This allowed the 
managers to attract financial resources, define their own catalogue of services, 
and equip themselves with required resources.  
Since then, one of the two managers has served as the CEO of the company, and 
the other handles the projects (as projects manager) and manages internal 
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processes. The company experienced a major growth in 2007 and 2008. The 
company has been able to maintain its relations with most of its original clients, as 
well as establishing relations with new clients. The company has pursued quality 
strategy, by providing a rather specialized domain of security services at a 
premium quality. Security-Private has been working with clients from financial 
sector, public administration, education and universities, and manufacturing. In 
2011, 30% of its revenue came from international projects and the plan is to reach 
50% of revenue from international projects.  
Internal structures, processes, routines, and systems at Security-Private 
The company has a matrix structure, mostly shaped around functional 
departments; each specialized in delivering a specific service based on specific 
domains of expertise, such as incident response team, creating CERT, and 
vulnerability analysis. Security-Private provides a wide range of IT security services 
such as 1) handling their clients’ incidents based on Carnegie Mellon Standard, 2) 
vulnerability analysis, and 3) designing and creating CERT teams. 
Security-Private has 25 full-time employees. In the domain of incident handling, 
the employees are organized into three levels of seniority. In other domains of 
activities, the experts are not so formally classified. Instead, they are categorized 
into junior and senior. The employees have a fixed working schedule (40 hours per 
week), with almost fixed salary. A small part of their salary depends on their 
engagement in activities such as documenting their experience, and their 
performance, which is annually evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively. Extra-
work hours are not paid formally, but the friendly and informal context of 
Security-Private allows compensating it through vacation leaves and recognitions 
(such as increasing the salary next year or promoting to a higher level). Most of 
the employees are young (average around 25 years old), specialized in IT security. 
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Incident handling process is based on the stages of the Carnegie Mellon Standard, 
consisting of 1) Identification, 2) Registration, 3) Modification, 4) Containing, 5) 
Resolving the incident (recuperation), 6) Analyzing the incident (technical), 7) 
Documenting and reporting, 8) Escalating (optional, just if other incidents would 
be created as the result) and 9) Follow-up. Normally Security-Private performs all 
these stages on behalf of its clients. However, in case of sensitive incidents, the 
client might take over some of the stages, especially the initial stages (e.g., Triage) 
and latter stages that require interactions with the final user and handling 
potential legal and criminal impacts.  
As often required by its clients, Security-Private is working with the ticketing 
systems of its clients, as well as other complementary systems (e.g., Wiki, intranet, 
and databases) that each provider imposes. In parallel, Security-Private is 
operating its own system, which basically handles its internal events and incidents, 
as well as incidents of clients that do not force their own systems. In addition, 
Security-Private is using an internal Wiki system in which all information and 
documents and experiences of Security-Private projects and its members is store. 
This repository includes all sorts of issues such as formal documents, delivery 
items, internal procedures, and knowledge articles. 
Major incidents at Security-Public 
Security-Private is dealing with a wide range of security incidents for their own 
clients and their own systems. Security-Private has contracts with its clients 
through which the internal team of Security-Private are located inside client’s site 
permanently and act as incident handling team. These teams perceive incidents of 
their clients as their own incidents. 
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3.6.3 Supercomputer-Large 
Supercomputer-Large is a public international research center dedicated to 
supporting basic science researches that require analyzing huge amounts of data. 
Supercomputer-Large is running eight High Performance Computers (HPCs). 
Supercomputer-Large was born through a project in 2003 for launching one of the 
most powerful supercomputers in Europe at that time. In 2004, Supercomputer-
Large was formally established with partners from the local university, local 
government and national government. Still this supercomputer, which was once 
upgraded in 2006, is running a main supercomputer at Supercomputer-Large. Over 
time, Supercomputer-Large has been able to add several other supercomputers. 
Supercomputer-Large is more than a supercomputer center. It is a large, public, 
international research center, dedicated to supporting basic science researches 
that require analyzing huge amounts of data using supercomputers. 
Supercomputer-Large is part of a public University. 
Supercomputer-Large has two categories of user (researchers) groups: internal 
and external groups. Internal users, are structured around “computer science” 
(178 employees), “earth science” (43 employees), and “life science” (86 
employees). External users are researchers who do not belong to the University. 
Around 30% of the computing capacity of the main supercomputer is dedicated to 
the internal groups and the rest is reserved for external applications. Each project 
(application for a specific amount of processing hours) should submit its 
application to a scientific committee. The committee evaluates the application 
based on its scientific relevance and importance. This assessment takes place 
every 4 months. The committee ranks the applications and evaluates the amount 
of processing hours that should be granted to each project. At the beginning of 
each period, the users receive their account information and instruction. 
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Supercomputer-Large is responsible for assuring that each project can utilize the 
granted total amount of processing hours in the period of 4 months. 
Internal structure, processes, routines, and systems at Supercomputer-Large 
 In parallel with research groups, Supercomputer-Large has a big operations 
department, which is responsible for operating the supercomputers, maintaining 
them, assuring the service continuity, handling the interactions of users with the 
systems, and resolving their problems. Operations department is also responsible 
for handling any incident that might happen to the supercomputers and its related 
infrastructure and application. Operations department is structured into three 
main groups: (1) Facility-Management, which is responsible for electricity, cooling 
systems, and other basic office infrastructures (2 persons); (2) System-
Administration , which is responsible for all processing and storage facilities, 
network, basic applications for running the systems, website and other web 
servers, as well as all basic services such as email (11 persons); (3) Users-Support; 
which is responsible for interactions with the users in terms of managing their 
access to the systems, helping them running their jobs on the systems, getting 
their data properly stored, and resolving any issues that users might face in their 
work with the systems (6 persons).  
The focus of this study has been on the operations department as this is the main 
body related to IS incidents. In fact, my inquiry showed that final users and top 
managers often do not enter into the process of handling IS incidents. Experts who 
work in the operations department are mostly from computer engineering 
domain, and some others are specialized in electrical engineering. They have a 
fixed salary with fixed amount of working hours (40 hours per week). The heads of 
System-Administration and Facility-Management groups should be available 
(through mobile phone) on a 24/7 basis to assure timely response to critical 
incidents. In spite of specialization of tasks and responsibilities, all the experts 
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from operations department are close friends and there are a lot of informal 
interactions and with a friendly climate in the department.  
The operations department deploys an overall ticketing system for handling its 
daily works. Each group and sub-groups have their own separated queues in the 
ticketing system. Requests from users or other internal groups arrive to each 
specialized team. To facilitate the process for users, there is a general email for 
each of the three groups to which the users can send their requests. Once this 
arrives, a first level expert takes the ticket. If the ticket is easy enough to be solved 
at first level, it will be done. Otherwise, it will be escalated to level 2 experts who 
are specialized in different themes. The ticketing system for each group has a very 
specialized categorization of queues, which in most of the cases is not visible for 
the final user. Often one or a few experts are handling the incidents related to 
each queue. There are tickets that move across various queues as they deal with 
several specialized aspects of the system. In addition, Supercomputer-Large has 
recently forced users to provide a report every two weeks. In this report, the users 
can present their problems, concerns and requests. This way, Supercomputer-
Large can detect the problems of the users on a regular basis and avoid complains 
from users at the end of the period of access.  
There are, however, differences between groups in terms of handling the incidents 
and daily activities. In Users-Support group that receives numerous requests, 
experts take turn for handling incidents. This way, each of the three experts at 
level 2 is responsible for handling all the tickets of the group in that specific week, 
so that he has 2 weeks with no responsibility about tickets. This allows experts to 
concentrate on their internal projects. System-Administration group is highly 
specialized (6 sub-groups). Although specialized providers provide most of the 
basic facilities (hardware), the group has been taking the responsibility of handling 
the applications (often, open source). In some cases, because the technology is 
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very advance and unique, the group has not been able to find appropriate 
provider to solve their problem. Hence, they often start developing new tools by 
themselves. In Facility-Management group, there are many facilities operating, 
which are all outsourced. The group has various contracts with service providers 
for the maintenance of systems. In case of incidents, these service providers often 
are those who come and solve the issue. Even fundamental changes are often 
formulated in terms of changing the hardware, scheduled repairs, and periodic or 
specific upgrades. 
In addition to handling requests and incidents detected by the operations 
department, the groups spent almost more than half of their time on their internal 
projects. These projects are long-term changes for upgrading systems, expanding 
some capacities and basic repairing. Most of these internal projects are around 
developing some tools and applications (often open-source software). 
Major incidents at Supercomputer-Large 
Supercomputer-Large has experienced a wide range of major failures to its critical 
systems such as damages to its storage and processing systems. As a result of 
these incidents the jobs that are running on supercomputers might be lost and 
some damages to the systems (e.g., hardware damage) might happen. However, 
Supercomputer-Large has not experienced any serious security incident. 
3.6.4 Supercomputer-Small 
Supercomputer-Small was founded in 2003 and maintained through a 
collaboration agreement among the local university and the local government. 
Supercomputer-Small is a data center dedicated to scientific-data processing by 
supporting scientific groups working in projects, which require strong computing 
resources for the analysis of massive, distributed data. Since the beginning, 
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Supercomputer-Small has been collaborating closely with the LHC Computing Grid 
(LCG) as a Tier-1 centre for WLCG project at CERN. Around 80% of this capacity 
(both storage and processing) is dedicated to WLCG project. 
Supercomputer-Small has been pursuing to acquire other research projects from 
other domains such as astronomy, life science, and medicine, though most of 
them have been minor pilot projects. Each project often has its own funding. This 
funding sometimes is in the form of bringing new machines (processors or storage) 
to Supercomputer-Small. 
Supercomputer-Small interacts with the host university (as the owner of the 
infrastructure), with tier-0 of WLCG project at CERN, with other tier-1 sites of 
WLCG, with its own tier-2 sites, and its providers and vendors of systems and 
technologies (that are directly connected with Supercomputer-Small). 
Internal structure, processes, routines, and systems at Supercomputer-Small 
Supercomputer-Small is organized into five Areas: Administration, Infrastructures, 
Services, LHC, and Projects Area. Around 30 experts work at Supercomputer-Small. 
Their backgrounds are mostly in computer, IT, and physics.  
There are two computer rooms at Supercomputer-Small. The traditional one is 
bigger, with older machines, and its facilities (electricity, network, and cooling) are 
owned by the host university. As for the second one, Supercomputer-Small owns 
the infrastructure and operates them through directly outsourcing to providers. 
This gives Supercomputer-Small more control and autonomy for handling the 
infrastructure. One of the challenges of Supercomputer-Small with the host 
university is how to convince the university to consider Supercomputer-Small’s 
facility as a critical system, not something like other departments.  
Energy is one of the most critical concerns of Supercomputer-Small. The cost of 
energy (for cooling systems and for operating machines) is the main concern for 
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the host university. In addition, reliable supply of electricity has been constantly a 
challenge and has been challenged with several incidents. This concern justifies 
the upgrade of the machines (both processors and storages) quite frequently 
(almost every 2 years), although most of them are still working properly in the 
time of decommissioning. However, operating them is not cost effecting with 
regard to the high energy costs. This concern, however, has facilitated justifying 
the need for frequent upgrading, making Supercomputer-Small working on the 
latest technologies, with a constant trend of expanding its capacity.  
Supercomputer-Small is using numerous technologies from a wide range of 
providers. As an overall strategy, Supercomputer-Small has avoided being locked 
into a specific vendor and technology. Supercomputer-Small has an informal and 
friendly climate. Most of the activities are organized through daily and informal 
interactions. Relations with the host university and other suppliers are often at 
technical levels, without the involvement of top managers. Each week, one person 
from the experts and middle managers at Supercomputer-Small takes the 
responsibility of “manager on duty”. This person is responsible for being available 
on a 24/7 basis, and is the one who is responsible for handling incidents and 
interactions with other groups and providers. Supercomputer-Small uses a 
ticketing system to organize its tasks, requests from the users, and incidents. Even 
big incidents are handled through the ticketing system. In addition, 
Supercomputer-Small has its internal Wiki system. 
Major incidents at Supercomputer-Small 
Supercomputer-Small has experienced very similar incidents as Supercomputer-
Large did. In some cases, major damages to hardware have resulted in partial 
damages in stored data, as well as losses in running jobs. The former effect is often 
considered more serious than the latter. 
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Chapter summary: The chapter articulated the specific research question that is 
“how does the process of organizational learning from ISRIs unfold, with regards 
to the characteristics of ISRIs”? It described that a multiple case study design is 
selected for looking at the learning process, including what organizational actors 
do to capitalize on their incident experience. The chapter then described the data 
collection process in each case, which took place in three steps: understanding the 
background of the organization, incident based inquiry, and change based inquiry. 
The chapter described the process of analyzing the data, which went through four 
steps: analyzing during data collection, developing analytical reports for each case, 
open coding, axial coding for learning practices, and embedding findings into the 
extant literature and articulating learning modes. Ethical considerations and main 
challenges in the research process were then reported. Finally, the four case 
settings (two security companies and two supercomputer centers) were described. 
The next two chapters describe what the studied organizations did to leverage 
their incident experience. 
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Chapter 4: Findings: Single-incident Learning 
In this chapter, I focus on single incidents to examine what the organizations did in 
relation with each of their major incidents to benefit from the experience of that 
incident for future (the next chapter concentrates on actions related to multiple 
incidents). Examining how organizations benefit from their experience of a given 
incident surfaced a series of practices that organizations adopted during and after 
handling major incidents (Figure 4.1). The chapter first describes the practices that 
the organizations took during incident handling process. These practices are 
classified around three overall themes that emerged inductively from the 
empirical study: “handling incidents through ticketing systems”, “performing 
Triage”, and “interacting with specialized providers”. In the second part, I describe 
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the practices that the organizations adopted after handling each incident. These 
practices are articulated under “post-incident reflection” and “laboratory incident 
analysis” practices. 
The chapter describes these practices by explaining the way these practices were 
taken, in which situations, by which actors, and with what temporal patterns. An 
illustrative example of each practice is presented in boxes. In addition, different 
patterns of the practices across organizations are described.  
 
Figure ‎4.1: single-incident learning practices 
4.1 Practices during incident handling process 
The studied organizations were actively engaged in three sorts of practices during 
incident handling process, namely from the time that the organizations faced an 
incident to the time that they could control the impacts of the incident and return 
to the normal situation. Table 4.1 summarizes these practices and how each 
practice is differently adopted by the studied organizations. 
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Table ‎4.1: Learning practices during incident handling process 
Practice Description 
Specificities of the organizations 
Security-Public Security-Private Supercomputer-
Large 
Supercomputer-
Small 
Handling 
incidents 
through 
ticketing 
systems 
Handling incidents 
itself provides 
intimate experience 
about various types 
of incidents, how 
they work and how 
they can be 
prevented or 
managed in future. 
In addition, using 
ticketing system 
facilitates 
documenting the 
events, experiences, 
ideas, and 
reflections during 
incident handling 
process. 
- Incident handling 
process is outsourced 
to a specialized 
provider who operates 
Security-Public’s 
ticketing system.  
- Politically sensitive 
incidents and their 
tickets are internally 
managed. 
- Triage is only done by 
internal experts. 
- Ticketing system is 
supposed to keep the 
record of all incident 
handling experience, 
although it is done by 
the provider  
- Operating several 
ticketing systems for 
various clients 
creates the 
challenge of not 
being able to 
systematically move 
tickets and 
documents across 
different ticketing 
systems. 
- The limited access 
to ticketing system 
due to 
confidentiality and 
sensitivity for the 
provider 
- High level of 
specialization in 
queues and 
incident handling 
process (at 
System-
Administration 
group) 
- Rotations for 
handling incidents 
among senior 
experts (at Users-
Support group) 
- Ticketing system 
as a repository 
that everything 
about incidents 
should be logged 
there 
- Ticketing system 
is also used for 
tracking follow-up 
actions 
Interactions 
with 
specialized 
providers 
The organizations 
rely on the 
experiences of their 
specialized 
providers during 
incident handling 
process. This way, 
they try to establish 
relations with their 
providers to allow 
the providers 
leverage their 
experiences and 
keep their relations 
with the providers 
to help them avoid 
similar incidents and 
manage them 
better in future 
cases. 
- Asking the provider to 
document the 
experience of incident 
handling 
- Changing the contract 
with the provider from 
body-shopping to 
volumetrias 
- Not Applicable - In some cases 
trying to 
collaborate with 
the provider 
during incident 
handling process, 
while in some 
other cases trying 
not to be involved 
and delegate all 
the process to the 
providers 
- Mostly relying on 
the specialized 
providers 
- A highly 
diversified 
collection of 
providers 
Performing 
Triage 
Before starting to 
handle incident, 
senior experts 
examine the scope 
of incident, previous 
related incidents 
and experiences, 
and set an overall 
framework for 
handling it. 
- Done internally (unlike 
other stages of 
incident handling 
process that are 
outsourced) 
- Doing it formally for 
all incidents 
- Doing it rather 
informally 
- Doing it informally 
and occasionally 
only for novel 
incidents 
- Doing it 
informally and 
occasionally only 
for novel 
incidents 
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4.1.1 Handling incidents through ticketing system  
The organizations handle all incidents using ticketing systems. Large incidents are 
handled, sometimes, through several tickets. Ticket is an artifact in the ticketing 
system that is created when a specific incident, request, or task arrives (See Figure 
4.2 bellow). For doing that, the user of the ticketing system (often first-level 
experts), opens a new form in which the user first introduces the name of the 
ticket, which is a rather short name (e.g., around 5 words) to show what the 
incident is about. Then, the user enters a description of what is the incident about 
(around one paragraph). The expert writes this description based on the 
information gained from end-users, from observations of the incident, and from 
further investigations done at the time of receiving incident (e.g., searching in 
weblogs to see if any similar virus is reported recently). The time that the user 
enters these two items and creates the ticket, the system automatically records 
the “issue time” of the ticket (date, hour, minute, and second). Upon the creation 
of the ticket, it is considered as an “open ticket”, meaning that it still should be 
handled. From this point on, the ticket becomes the core element in the system 
upon which all incident-handling activities are focused. Experts, who work on the 
ticket, often do not use “incident” or “failure” terms in their interactions. Instead, 
they use “ticket” to refer to the incident. 
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Figure ‎4.2: The process of handling incidents through ticketing system 
In the ticketing systems, there are categories in which open tickets are stored. 
These categories are called “queues”. The queues are often specialized based on 
departments, groups, and sub-groups. For instance, at Security-Public, each of the 
three departments –i.e., operations, incident handling, and legal- has its own 
queues. In many cases, the queues are further specialized in terms of technical 
systems, incident types, and importance levels. For example, in the area of 
incident handling at Security-Public, there are several queues, each related to 
different levels of importance (e.g., level 1, level 2, level 3, and level 4). At 
Supercomputer-Large, for instance, in the System-Administration group, each 
specialized sub-group has its own queue. Sometimes the distinction between 
queues relates to different ways in which incidents arrive. For instance, some 
tickets are automatically generated at Security-Public from on-line services that 
some companies such as Google provide. Finally, the specialization of queues 
sometimes is done to facilitate the access control of various users. For instance, at 
Security-Public, a queue is only for Triage to which the provider of Security-Public 
cannot access. 
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At any time, each ticket has only one owner who is responsible for taking care of 
the ticket. When the ticket arrives, it should be taken (owned) by a user (the 
expert who handles the incident). During incident handling process, a ticket might 
move from one owner to another owner. 
Each user of the system has its own account in the ticketing system. This means 
that when the user enters the system, the system records all his activities done on 
the tickets. From the time that a ticket is opened, all the transactions that are 
done on it are automatically stored in the log of the ticket. This includes who, 
when, did what action on the ticket. These actions, for instance, can be picking the 
ticket for handling it, observing it, moving it to another user, and editing the 
content of the ticket (for example revising the description of the ticket).  
Almost all actions that experts perform for handling incident either are done 
through or at least are reflected in the related tickets. For instance, all the tools 
used for handling incidents, all trials and errors, all tests, all failed actions, and all 
personal reflections are logged in the ticketing system. Part of this is done 
automatically. For instance, when an expert writes back to the user to ask him to 
run a specific file to solve his problem, this message, the file that is attached, and 
the details of the interaction (e.g., when and who sent the message) are 
automatically stored in the ticket. 
Other users, even if they are not the owners of the ticket, can see all the tickets in 
the queues to which they have access. Tickets can be seen and be commented on 
by other actors who are not its owners. For instance, in the Security-Private, when 
new tickets arrive, the head of the incident-handling department who is not often 
involved in the details of handling incidents receives emails related to those 
tickets. He sometimes opens some of the tickets just “to see what is going on” [the 
head of incident handling department]. 
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Experts who handle a ticket write short notes describing their actions on the 
ticket. For instance, in a ticket, the user reports an incident related to batch files 
(the files that should be run on the supercomputers). The incident arrives to 
Users-Support group. They guess that the problem can be solved if the user uses a 
different process of uploading the job. They send the message back. The user tries 
the new method, but it does not work again. Then the user sends back the ticket 
and the experts in Users-Support group realize that the problem is more complex 
and System-Administration group should handle it. Therefore, they move the 
ticket to the queue of the System-Administration.  
The ticket at each time has one of these states, depending on its position in the 
incident handling process: (1) “not contained”, from the time that it is created 
until the time that one expert owns it; (2) “Open”, during the period that the ticket 
is under handling by experts; (3) “Pending”, when the real activities for handling 
incident are finished, but still it is not formally approved as finished by the person 
who has the authority to close tickets; (4) “closed”, once the ticket is approved by 
the person who has the authority to formally close the case.  
Apart from these normal states, some innovative states are also defined for 
specific cases. For instance, at Security-Public’s ticketing system, there is a state 
for tickets that is added by its provider, called “pending closed”. This corresponds 
to tickets that from the view of the provider, everything that should be done for 
its handling is finished, and they are almost sure that Security-Public’s delegate 
will approve it (based on their experience), but he has not had time to do so. This 
category is important because at the end of each month, the provider can report 
the handled incidents (by summing the “pending closed” and “closed” tickets) for 
billing purposes. 
The system allows that similar tickets be grouped. Large tickets can be split into 
smaller ones. Tickets can have sub-tickets (“child tickets”). In Security-Public and 
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Security-Private, this feature is used for defining sub-tickets that different actors 
should handle independently. For example, once a sever security attack arrives, it 
might be considered as a single ticket. Then, during the process, it might appear 
that the technical department should control the attack and recover the lost data 
and the legal department should start filing legal cases and start evaluating the 
legal consequences. Then, the ticket would be split into two tickets for each 
department. At the end of the process of handling incident, the two tickets will be 
integrated. 
Tickets, although sometimes might go through several departments and several 
actors to work on them, even though they are often individual tasks, related to a 
single person. Since large, challenging tickets are specialized, a senior expert often 
handles them individually. This means that most of tickets just have one single 
owner throughout their life. For example, in Supercomputer-Large, more than 95% 
of the tickets are single owners. In fact, tickets that are handled by several users 
are either exceptional or are those that were mistakenly arrived to the wrong 
person, and then moved to the next person. In fact, tickets are attached to 
individuals (“was this your ticket?”, as a common way of talking about tickets). The 
experts either handle the ticket alone, or ask the related providers to handle the 
incident. For example, at Supercomputer-Large, the experts at System-
Administration group each have a narrow domain of specialization. The person 
responsible for network, for instance, handles less than 10 incidents per month. 
These serious incidents are quite specialized. Since the specialized systems are 
often outsourced to specialized providers, these internal experts work with the 
suppliers to handle the incident. 
The system allows searching in the tickets’ titles and contents. It also provides 
various reporting facilities. For instance, the users can find all the incidents in the 
last month related to batch files. The search and reporting facilities of ticketing 
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system is used for finding a specific ticket that can help in handling a current 
ticket. It often happens when the expert who is handling the ticket remembers 
that he had handled a similar ticket in past. They use this feature when they do 
not remember by memory, which often happens to incidents that repeat 
occasionally. Previous similar tickets are useful because they show the full history 
of all actions taken in previous cases, including both things that worked and things 
that did not work. This helps experts not repeat the same unsuccessful actions. 
Each expert can search in the tickets that are handled by other experts to see if 
there has been similar incidents in past. However, this is done quite rarely, mostly 
because first, they are not sure whether other experts have handled similar cases 
or not. Second, they are not sure which specific keywords other experts have used 
when they were writing the content of similar tickets. Third, they are not sure if 
what others have written can help them. It is because when an expert puts 
comments on the ticket, it is mostly for his own use, to remember what he did in 
case of future similar incidents. Fourth, other ways, such as just asking loudly in 
the room from colleagues would be much easier and more preferable to see if 
others know something about this incident. Finally, because the search capabilities 
of the system is not as strong as the web-search engines, it is much easier and 
more effective that instead of searching in the ticketing system, they just “Google 
it”. 
There are differences between organizations and their departments in terms of 
using the ticketing system. For instance, in Security-Public, the system is shared 
with the provider. The provider has access to almost all queues, except some of 
them that are for very politically sensitive incidents. In fact, the ticketing system at 
Security-Public is forced to the provider, as the provider has to do everything 
related to incident handling on Security-Public’s ticketing system. This is because 
Security-Public wanted from the very beginning, to have all knowledge and 
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experience about the incident handling be stored inside it, to reduce the risk of 
losing that knowledge in case of switching to another provider. In terms of daily 
work, the provider’s experts do most of the actions in the ticketing system. 
Security-Private uses several ticketing systems from various clients, as well as an 
internal ticketing system for its own. These systems are disconnected. Therefore, if 
a ticket is generated in one system, it cannot be moved or replicated in another 
system. This separation is mostly because of the confidentiality of the incidents 
that each client has.  
In Supercomputer-Large, the ticketing system is specialized in the different 
departments. In Users-Support group, there is only one queue for all requests 
from users. It is to make it easier for users to interact with a single contact point. 
In System-Administration group, there are very specialized queues, each related to 
a specific aspect of the technology or a specific technical system. Box 4.1 
illustrates the process of handling a recent incident that interrupted the email 
system at Supercomputer-Large. 
Box 4.1: Handling Email-servers incident at Supercomputer-Large 
In a recent, rare incident, two research institutes that were receiving the services from 
Supercomputer-Large could not receive any email from Supercomputer-Large. This 
incident caused serious problems because they could not get their jobs run and examine 
the progress of their jobs on the supercomputer. The incident was detected when a user 
in one of the institutes called the Users-Support group. At Users-Support groups, the 
Email-servers expert, who was responsible for incident handling during that week, opened 
a ticket related to the incident. He documented the information about the incident, 
including when and how it happened, who were the users that were affected, and what 
were the specific problems created.  
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Realizing that the problem might be related to the email service, the expert at Users-
Support group moved the ticket to the expert at System-Administration group that is 
responsible for incidents related to Email-servers.  
Upon receiving the ticket, this expert read the ticket’s description and he doubted if there 
was any problem with the email-server applications. He ran some tests on the system and 
checked if the messages could be delivered properly to other clients. Then, it appeared 
that the problem was not from the Email-servers. He thought that it might be a problem 
at the network level. Therefore, he passed the incident to the expert who is specialist in 
network incidents.  
The expert at System-Administration group who deals with network incidents received 
the ticket and read the description that his two colleagues had written in the ticket. He 
started testing the network connections with the two clients, using several specialized 
network probes. He then ran tests on the suspicious network nodes. He realized that the 
problem must be outside the Supercomputer-Large network. In fact, Supercomputer-
Large is connected to these clients through a dedicated network that is operated by a 
special network provider. He then opened a ticket in the ticketing system of the network 
provider to pass the incident to them. Doing so, he used the same description in the 
internal ticket and added his own part. He then descried that the tests he had done 
showed that the problem was outside Supercomputer-Large network. In parallel, he called 
the provider on phone, explaining the incident. 
After a couple of hours, the experts in the network provider resolved the problem. It 
turned out that it was a problem with the new configuration that they recently applied for 
migrating to IP6. The provider did not explain so much details of the incident, as it was not 
related to Supercomputer-Large’s network.  
Figure 4.3 illustrates the flow of the ticket during incident handling. Table 4.2 summarizes 
the interactions inside Supercomputer-Large and between Supercomputer-Large and its 
network provider during incident handling. 
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Figure ‎4.3:The flow of actions and interaction in handling IP6 incident 
Table ‎4.2: The steps of handling incident and related ticket activities 
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Finally, in Supercomputer-Small, the ticketing system is considered as “the only 
must”, stated the head of technical department. The organization wants to have a 
repository of everything that happens in incidents. Therefore, from the very initial 
minutes of the incident, everything is managed through the ticketing system. 
Supercomputer-Small uses the ticketing system also for tracking the progress of its 
follow-up actions. In fact, there are two types of tickets: those that are related to 
incidents and tickets that represent a specific internal project. Although the 
organizations use ticketing system differently, it is a key working tool that helps 
them use their past experience during handling incidents and store their 
experience for future incidents. 
4.1.2 Performing Triage 
A second practice that Security-Public and Security-Private used during incident 
handling process is Triage. These two organizations use Carnegie Mellon 
methodology, which is a detailed, staged incident handling process. In this 
process, after receiving and containing the incident, there is a stage called “Triage” 
in which incident handlers hold a meeting to discuss the incident, evaluate its 
scope, its criticality, and its potential impacts, set the overall framework for 
handling it, define roles and responsibilities for managing it, and make sure that 
legal and criminal considerations are taken into account. All incidents must go 
through Triage. The same ticketing infrastructure that the organizations use for 
incident handling is helping the Triage stage. Among all other queues in the 
ticketing system, there is a specific queue, for doing Triage where the incidents 
that are waiting to be Triaged are stored. The access to this queue is critical and 
only a few senior experts have access to it. Box 4.2 illustrates a typical Triage at 
Security-Public. 
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Box 4.2: A typical Triage at Security-Public 
When an incident enters any of the queues in the ticketing system, the first-level 
experts in provider make sure that its information is complete and clear. This 
includes, basic information about what is the incident about, when and how it 
happened, and all the initial information gained in the time of creating the ticket. 
Then, these experts move the ticket to a queue called “Triage”. In cases that the 
provider recognizes that the incident is of high priority, uses colored flags to 
indicate its priority (red for the most critical incidents).  
There are four second level experts inside Security-Public who are members of 
Triage team: (1) The head of incident response team (ERI), who is a senior IT 
security expert; (2) The internal executive administrator who is managing all 
internal activities and coordinates interactions among different departments (as 
the “right hand” of the CEO); (3) The legal expert who is a lawyer with 10 years of 
experience in IT law; (4) The representative from local police who is expert in IT 
crime. 
The head of ERI is responsible for Triage. He reads the incidents in the queue, 
before the meeting. For minor cases, he might decide that no formal Triage is 
needed. Therefore, he passes those tickets to their associated queues (depending 
on the type of incident). From that point on, the provider that has access to these 
queues starts handling the incidents. There are other incidents that the ERI 
manager put some short notes inside their tickets. This helps the provider in 
handling them. These notes can be suggestions about how the incident should be 
handled, what specific cares should be taken, what potential incidents might result 
during or after this incident, and sometimes some references to similar incidents 
that were handled before. 
For novel and serious incidents, the ERI manager reads the details of information 
that is written in the ticket. He sometimes searches in weblogs, forums, and daily 
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notices that are related to similar incidents. In some cases, they go back and look 
at some specific incidents that they handled before. It is mostly in cases that they 
remember some specific past incident and they want to remember a specific 
point, for example the hacking methods used or the specific solution that did work 
last time. However, no systematic analysis of past tickets is often done.  
The four experts meet normally every two days physically where they examine the 
tickets in the Triage queue. In urgent situations, they hold extra meetings when an 
urgent, critical incident arrives. It is common that the meeting takes place on a 
telephone conference session, or by using the dedicated network to which these 
four people have access. 
The ERI manager prepares a short list of novel, critical incidents for the meeting. 
He manages the meeting by introducing incidents one by one. He starts from 
incidents that are more serious. This can be related to the potential damage of the 
incident, as well as the urgency of handling it. He opens the ticketing system in his 
laptop and goes straightforward to the Triage queue that is already cleaned before 
the meeting by removing the unimportant tickets. He starts from the most 
important ticket that from his point of view needs the opinion and decision of 
other Triage team members. Other team members also have access to the tickets 
in the Triage queue and look at it during the discussion. 
ERI manager opens the ticket, which might have some of his notes that he had 
prepared during his search before the meeting. He describes briefly the ticket to 
the other members using his own words. He outlines the technical aspects of the 
incident, when and how it happened. Knowing the whole incident management 
process then the ERI manager asks specific questions that require discussions with 
other colleagues responsible for organizational, legal, and criminal aspects.  
They discuss the incident among themselves. They discuss the potential threats 
that the incident can bring about, possible related incidents that might not be so 
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visible in the first place, the incidents that might occur as the result of this incident 
or during handling it, the legal considerations that should be taken into 
considerations when the experts are handling the incident, and potential criminal 
implications of the incident. Finally, they define the steps through which the 
incident should be handled and identify which expert should take which part of 
the job. More specifically, technical tasks (e.g., controlling the virus) is assigned to 
ERI manager, and then, he break them down into sub-tickets to be handled by the 
provider’s experts. Legal tasks are delegated to legal expert. The police expert 
handles the tasks related to criminal activities (e.g., filing a record in police office). 
The ERI manager then puts notes in the ticket that reminds him and other team 
members about what each of the four persons are supposed to do. If needed, new 
specific sub-tickets are defined under the overall ticket that they need to be 
handled by each of the four members. Sometimes they conclude that there is 
some significant lacking information about the incident that needs to be gathered. 
This can imply that they need to redo Triage once they got the picture clearer. 
Figure 4.4 depicts various aspects of Triage in the incident handling process. 
 
Figure ‎4.4: Triage in the incident handling process 
In Security-Public, the composition of actors involved in Triage has changed over 
time. At the beginning, it was done by the technical expert who was the head of 
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incident handling group and another middle manager who was the head of 
operations. Later, the legal expert was added to the team, as the legal 
consequences of incidents and incident handling became more and more 
observable. Recently, a representative from local police is also added to Triage 
team, due to facing incidents that have criminal implications. 
Although all incidents should go through Triage, small or familiar incidents do not 
take a long time to be analyzed in Triage. It might be a matter of minutes to decide 
that these incidents should be assigned to the provider to handle them. However, 
for complex, novel incidents, Triage might take a long time (sometimes several 
long meetings). These incidents might require Triage to be repeated several times. 
This happened in cases that new issues, for example related to legal consequences 
of identity theft, appeared during incident handling process. Sometimes one 
incident might be part of a chain of interrelated incidents (e.g., a series of security 
attacks). Then, it is critical that the possible relations between the detected 
incident and other incidents be examined. This task, that is mostly done through 
Triage is called correlating, which means various pieces of information related to 
the current incident and other incidents are put together to see the whole picture 
of the incident. Correlating, as described by a senior expert in Security-Private, 
does not necessarily confine to Triage meetings. Rather, it is done throughout the 
whole incident handling process. He said,  
“you constantly do correlating when you are handling a specific incident. It is a 
constant thinking about what might be related to this incident, searching and 
finding clues, and connecting them to each other” [a senior expert at Security-
Private]. 
As mentioned before, one of the aims of Triage is to make sure that incident 
handling does not yield in further damages. However, the fact that all incidents 
should go through Triage makes this stage sometimes a bottleneck in the incident 
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handling process. This is particularly the case in Security-Public where most of 
incidents are delegated to the provider to be handled, after Triage. The provider 
first receives the incidents, files them, and sends them to Security-Public for 
Triage. In many cases, the incidents are quite simple and routine. However, 
officially, the provider should wait until it receives the incidents back from 
Security-Public. Over time, the provider has learned which incidents are not 
sensitive. Thus, the provider benefits from the trust that Security-Public has on it, 
does an internal assessment (they call it “auto-Triage”), and starts the process of 
handling them if they are not sensitive. 
At Supercomputer-Large and Supercomputer-Small, Triage is mostly done 
informally and occasionally for very novel incidents. Even in such cases, it is not a 
specific stage in the incident handling process. It is more embedded with other 
incident handling activities such as discussing the incident among the experts. 
To conclude, Triage as a formal step in incident handling process provides an 
opportunity for the organizations to reflect on the incident, before rushing into its 
handling. This way, the can draw on their past experience early on in the incident 
handling process. 
4.1.3 Interactions with specialized providers 
The third category of practices during incident handling process pertains to the 
interactions with specialized suppliers. All the organizations (except Security-
Private) were relying on their specialized providers in handling incidents, since 
they outsourced a wide range of specialized maintenance services to their 
technology vendors and specialized services providers. Handling incident is part of 
contracts with their providers. This includes both preventive revisions to detect 
the potential incidents and resolve them before they result in severe damage, and 
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corrective actions to control the incidents and fix the damages. Therefore, most of 
incident handling activities take place in the site of their providers. Box 4.3 
illustrates this process in a recent incident at Supercomputer-Small. 
Box 4.3: ZSF File-system damage at Supercomputer-Small 
One of the critical responsibilities of Supercomputer-Small is to store processed 
data coming from all parts of WLCG project. The data is stored in huge file-systems 
(several peta-bytes) on storage systems. In a recent upgrade, after making several 
changes to the software and hardware, the whole system was switched on. 
However, when new data arrived, the storage system generated errors, because 
the new data was written over the existing data. This damaged around 250 tera-
byte data on the disk. This huge amount of data was likely to be lost. As expressed 
by the head of LHC at Supercomputer-Small, “the nightmare is data loss” [the 
head of LHC at Supercomputer-Small].  
The head of facility manager quickly switched off the system and opened the 
ticket in the system. Then, she contacted the service provider of the damaged 
storage system. Since the system was a rather old-fashion technology, it took 
around two days to find an expert of the system and contact him. The provider’s 
expert got access through Internet to the system and started retrieving damaged 
data. Around 90% of data then was retrieved. 
During this period, experts of Supercomputer-Small were only giving access to the 
provider’s expert, providing him with some information about the history of the 
system, and finally checking the recovered data. As mentioned by the facility 
manager at Supercomputer-Small, “we were here on-line and waiting” [the Facility 
Manager at Supercomputer-Small]. She added, “These technologies are very 
special. Even for big providers, it takes a while to assign a proper expert to us” [the 
Facility Manager at Supercomputer-Small]. 
108 | Page 
 
Further analysis showed that the interactions with specialized suppliers for 
incident handling might take place in different ways. In some situations, the 
organizations fully outsource incident-handling process to their providers, while in 
some other occasions they collaborate with the providers to the extent they make 
sure that incident handling process is taking place properly. All the organizations, 
except security-public, have outsourced their incident handling processes to 
various specialized suppliers. Security-Public has been mostly working with a single 
security supplier that handles the whole range of its incidents, mostly due to its 
overall outsourcing strategy. Finally, there are some circumstances in which 
incident handling process is done internally by the organizations. The next 
paragraphs describe these ways of interacting with suppliers and illustrate them. 
Fully outsourced incident handling to numerous providers 
In some situations, the internal experts are detached from the details of incident 
handling process. It is because the organizations are operating a wide range of 
technologies, all outsourced to specialized suppliers and providers. In addition, in 
cases such as Supercomputer-Large, the contract forces that all changes in the 
hardware should be done by the provider through scheduled upgrades. For 
instance, Supercomputer-Large works with more than 30 specialized service 
providers for different technologies (e.g., processing systems, storage systems, 
backup systems, simulation systems, network infrastructures, servers, operating 
systems, and data processing applications). Each department and specialized 
group is working with its own specialized providers. For instance, the backup 
expert in Supercomputer-Large is working with 5 major service providers that are 
only specialized in backup systems. As the head of Facility-Management group at 
Supercomputer-Large mentioned about the process of handling a recent hardware 
damage, the organizations did not involve in the process, since it was delegated to 
the specialized supplier: 
  109 | Page 
 
“I don’t know, they just come, fix the system and they go… for me, it is important 
that I have the guarantee and they have to solve the issue…” [The head of Facility-
Management group at Supercomputer-Large]. 
The excerpt suggests that in such situations the expert becomes detached from 
the incident handling process and its details. While the practice ensures a swift 
resolution of the problem, how this is done becomes a black box. There are, of 
course, good reasons for adopting such procedure. For example, organizations 
operate a wide range of technologies, and these tend to be outsourced to 
specialized suppliers and providers. However, as I will see later, this arrangement 
may have unintended effects on learning process. 
At Supercomputer-Large, there are two groups that are mostly dealing with their 
providers for handling incidents: Facility-Management and System-Administration. 
In the Facility-Management group, the model of working with the providers is 
quite outsourced. In case of incidents, the internal team (one junior expert and 
one senior expert) just make some initial actions to control the incident. This often 
involves switching off the systems that might be damaged. Since the systems are 
modularly designed, they can easily detect which part of the system has the 
problem. A wide range of alarms and sensors help them spot exactly the faulty 
part. If needed, they disconnect the faulty part and they call the related service 
provider. The service providers should arrive in 48 hours. As described by the head 
of the group, 
“From that point on, I do not do anything. They just come and do their job, fix it 
and go” [the head of Facility-Management group at Supercomputer-Large]. 
This is partly because the process of solving the problem relies on replacing the 
damaged part with a new one. The group often does not get any specific feedback 
from the provider on why the incident happened and how it can be prevented. It is 
mostly because  
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“We cannot do anything to the system. It is designed. It is fixed. We cannot prevent 
these incidents. They happen sometimes. The hardware might break down. We just 
make sure that we have contract with the providers” [the head of Facility-
Management group at Supercomputer-Large]. 
This is very similar to the situation at Supercomputer-Small. As the head of 
infrastructure group pointed out, they almost rely on whatever their, specialized 
providers do: 
“It is easy for us. We just have spare parts. We replace the iron! Then, the 
providers come and take the damaged part and examine what was the problem” 
[the head of infrastructure group at Supercomputer-Small]. 
Outsourcing to single provider by Security-Public 
Although Security-Public is mostly relying on one specialized provider, the overall 
strategy is based on outsourcing handling almost all incidents. This has allowed 
Security-Public to constantly improve its capability in terms of handling more 
incidents, in shorter period, and more efficiently. For the first 3 years, Security-
Public had been contracting with the provider based on body-shopping model in 
which the payment to the provider was based on the number of hours that 
experts from different levels spend on handling their incidents. Since in that 
period, many incidents were quite new to the provider, the provider constantly 
improved delivering its services as gaining more experience. 
In 2011, Security-Public changed the service model in its contract with the 
provider from body-shopping to “volumetrias”. In the volumetrias model, the 
provider is paid based on the number of incident handling services in each 
category of services. Thanks to the experience of the first three years, Security-
Public and the provider could define categories of incident handling services and 
define a price for each category based on its difficulty. Within an overall annual 
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budget, Security-Public asks its providers to be prepared to provide an expected 
amount of services in each category (for example 30 lost data recovery). These 
services are common in most of the incidents. One service can be enough for 
handling a small incident, such as a specific virus infection. However, for big 
incidents, such as big security attack, often a range of services should be 
integrated to handle a big incident. This way, Security-Public makes its provider 
improve the services to be done more efficiently, so that the provider can gain a 
higher margin.  
Obviously, there are services that are difficult to be standardized like this. This is a 
key debate among managers and senior experts inside Security-Public about to 
what extent the new service model can be applied. They fear that applying this 
services model for a series of highly sensitive and non-standard services would 
make them compromise their quality. As one of the middle managers at Security-
Public mentioned, 
“The analysis of the vulnerabilities or response remotely … are more “art”, these 
ones are more complicated” [middle managers at Security-Public] 
This shows that the expert thinks some incident handling services cannot be 
defined clearly and be outsourced at a specific price. In these cases, Security-
Public tries to give more flexibility to the provider in terms of the amount of 
resources available to handle the incidents. Sometimes, some contingent, small 
projects are defined for handling these incidents, instead of breaking them into 
standard services. For example, when a series of serious security attacks were 
launched on the government servers in parallel with an international conference, 
Security-Public defined an extra project (beyond the normal contract) to manage 
the incidents during this conference. In parallel, the senior experts inside Security-
Public engaged in the process of handling novel incidents. As a rather stable 
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pattern in the last four years, non-standard services have become standardized by 
the provider and then, are added to new contracts. 
Collaborating with providers 
There are also cases that the internal experts enter incident-handling process to 
collaborate with the supplier. For instance, in Security-Public, when a novel 
incident happened, the experts from Security-Public collaborated actively with 
their provider, instead of fully delegating it to their provider. As a senior incident 
handler at Security-Public mentioned,  
“In novel cases, I act as a member of the provider team. I take part in their 
discussions. We do tests on the faulty system …” [A senior incident handler at 
Security-Public]. 
As internal experts actively engage in incident handling, they get a practical sense 
of what is going on in this kind of incidents. They can, thus, determine to what 
extent these incidents can be delegated to the provider, what specific measures 
should be considered for assessing the quality of incident handling by the 
provider, and what are the risks of outsourcing their incident handling process.  
Experts in the System-Administration group at Supercomputer-Large also engage 
with their specialized providers in incident handling process. These experts are 
highly specialized in terms of different technologies and systems. In many 
incidents, they work closely with providers’ experts to identify the problems, find 
the solutions, and implement them. 
Exceptions for outsourcing incident handling 
In several situations, the organizations handled their incidents internally. First, 
Security-Private does not outsource its incident handling process, and handles the 
incidents internally. With the specialized experts, Security-Private handles the 
incidents of its clients and its own incidents internally. At Security-Public, 
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politically sensitive incidents are also handled internally, and the provider does not 
have access to these incidents. These incidents are not necessarily complex, but 
they relate to sensitive authorities or sensitive data. Another exception is Triage 
that is done internally by Security-Public. 
 
To sum up, several practices during incident handling process help organizations 
benefit from their experiences of incidents to avoid them and manage them better 
in future. Although these practices were primarily taken for incident handling 
sake, they also helped the organizations benefit from their ISRIs experiences. The 
very actions that experts did to handle an incident (e.g., restarting a broken 
system) provided them with a detailed, intimate understanding of incidents, and 
practical capabilities and skills for handling similar incidents in future. In addition, 
the past experiences about other incidents are integrated and discussed through 
Triage collectively to define how the current incidents can be managed effectively. 
Finally, in their interactions with their specialized providers, the organizations 
were constantly adding to their mutual experience and repertoire of practices that 
they can use in handling other incidents. This adds to their capabilities to handle 
incidents internally, as well as getting their specialized providers handle their 
incidents more effectively. 
4.2 Post-incident learning practices 
The studied organizations adopted several practices after handling incidents that 
helped them examine the incidents and identify ways in which similar incidents 
can be prevented or, at least, be managed better in future. These practices are 
classified under “post-incident reflection” and “laboratory incidents analysis”. 
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Table 4.3 summarizes the two practices and the way they were differently 
adopted by the studied organizations. 
4.2.1 Post-incident reflection 
Reflecting on handled incidents, discussing them, and making sense of the 
experience of incident handling is a common practice that takes place through 
informal talks, periodic meetings, open seminars, and incident reporting systems. 
The current research was also another opportunity for the organizations to reflect 
on some of the already managed incidents during the interviews. 
Table ‎4.3: Practices after incident handling process 
Practice Description 
Specificities of the organizations 
Security-
Public 
Security-Private Supercomputer-
Large 
Supercomputer-
Small 
Post-
incident 
reflection 
Senior experts 
reflect on major 
incidents after 
handling them, 
through various 
informal and 
formal 
interactions, to 
discuss their 
experiences and 
ideas.  
- Mostly in 
relation 
with the 
experts 
inside their 
provider 
- Running 
“open 
seminars” 
across 
specialized 
teams 
 
- Mostly 
through 
informal talks 
- Adopting a 
formal 
incident 
reporting 
system  
Laboratory 
incident 
analysis  
Novel incidents 
are analyzed by 
specialized 
technologies to 
understand the 
causes of 
incident and 
how it can 
damage 
systems 
- Done 
internally by 
third-level 
experts 
- The results 
are formally 
documented 
- Done mostly 
by using the 
technologies 
inside the 
clients 
- In some minor 
situations are 
done in a trial 
way 
Done for 
reproducing 
the incidents 
for the 
provider 
- Done for 
reproducing 
the incidents 
for the 
provider 
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Informal reflection on incidents 
The fact that experts and technical managers discuss incidents in their daily work 
informally reduces the need for specific extra meetings. In these talks, For 
instance, a senior expert at Supercomputer-Large mentioned that  
“Well, we talk about the incidents [that] we handle all the time. My manager is 
sitting just beside me. We constantly talk about the issues” [a senior expert at 
Supercomputer-Large]. 
This indicates that reflection on past incidents is done informally as part of the 
daily routines. 
Talking about incidents is also a common part of the daily breakfast and lunchtime 
in all the companies. Box 4.4 illustrates this point at Security-Public. 
Box 4.4: Discussing incidents during lunch time 
The operative manager of Security-Public nocks the door of the room in which ERI 
manager is meeting with some external visitors and invites them to have lunch 
together in a restaurant, located beside the building. He knows the visitors and 
says  
“I am hungry. But take your time. I will wait for you. Let me know when you finish 
with your talk then we go for lunch together” [The operative manager of Security-
Public].  
After around 30 minutes the ERI manager and the visitors stop the meeting, go to 
the office of the operative manager, and call him for going outside for lunch. In 
Spanish culture, lunchtime takes almost one hour. There are four people at the 
table, two managers from Security-Public and two visitors. They order lunch and 
wait for the first plate. The conversation starts from the recent political changes in 
the local government and, after several minutes, it moves to discussing various 
recent incidents. The ERI manager talks about specifically a recent major incident 
116 | Page 
 
that was grabbing the attentions of a wide range of local organizations. He 
explains a bit the technical aspects of the incident, and then quickly moves to 
other similar incidents that he had recently come across when reading a weblog 
today. [The first plate arrives and conversation interrupts for seconds].  
The ERI manager continues his speech, while the operative manager seems to be 
unaware of some information that he was saying about other similar incidents. At 
a point in the conversation, the ERI manager and operative manager appear to 
disagree about one of their actions that they took in the last incident. They both 
turn to the visitors, who are sitting in front of them on the other side of the table, 
and say:  
“Well, you know, we are still growing. We have to improve a lot our ways of 
working and handling incidents. These kinds of discussions are what we have every 
day, especially now that we are thinking about restructuring our service model” 
[The operative manager and ERI manager of Security-Public]. 
The friendly atmosphere and close personal ties facilitates this process. Experts 
often bring their interesting stories to the discussion, to say something that is 
interesting for their colleagues. Normal incidents often are not talked about. The 
experts are not necessarily thinking systematically about any particular lesson that 
might help any specific audience. As one expert at Supercomputer-Large 
mentioned: 
“Sometimes I just say an interesting point that I just learned from an incident 
loudly to my two other colleagues who are sitting just in front of me… it might help 
them ” [an expert at Supercomputer-Large]. 
This shows that little preparation is done for such conversation and is mainly 
derived by the desire to bring out some unusual point in the discussions. 
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In addition, the specialization of experts makes it irrelevant that experts talk about 
the details of incidents because those technical details would be alien to their 
specialized domain, unless, the detailed discussion about incidents would be 
confined to a very limited number of experts. For instance, at Supercomputer-
Large, network incidents are discussed only among the expert dedicated to 
network administration and his group manager. Furthermore, the fact that most 
of incidents are handled by providers reduces the need for discussing them 
internally. 
Periodic meetings 
Another common time for discussing major, handled incidents is during periodic 
(e.g., weekly or monthly) meetings. For example, in Security-Public, post-incident 
reflections are mostly organized through weekly meetings. At management level, 
the heads of departments who are senior experts in their own field meet every 
Tuesday morning. As part of this meeting, they talk about the big incidents that 
were handled in the last week. The discussion is mainly for informing other 
managers about incidents. So that, in case they found some other similar 
incidents, they could benefit from the experience of past incidents. 
Similar weekly meetings between the head of projects, project managers and 
functional managers take place at Security-Private. According to the informants, 
together with daily activities and urgent cases, participants often also discuss any 
important incident, which occurred in the past week. 
This discussion is often very short because normally other colleagues already know 
about the big incidents and because the details of the experience are irrelevant to 
them as they are specialized in other types of incidents.  
In Supercomputer-Small, Most of the reflection on the internal incidents happens 
through weekly meetings that are called “hand-over meetings”. Each week, one of 
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the senior experts at Supercomputer-Small is responsible for handling incidents. 
This person, called Management on Duty (MOD), is the first one who is informed 
about the incident. He leads incident-handling process, by taking the initial control 
actions (e.g., disconnecting the faulty part or shutting down the whole system), 
calling the provider, and taking further recovery actions. At the end of each week, 
the current MOD, the next week’s MOD, the head of technical department, and 
the head of LHC department meet and talk about what happened in the last week 
and plan for the next week. As the head of LHC department said, 
“We talk [about] these incidents …. Manager on Duty has a list with all the 
incidents that has happened in that week…. And sometimes the follow-up actions 
… are also discussed” [the head of LHC department at Supercomputer-Small]. 
By embedding post-incident reflection into periodic meetings, the organizations 
frame such reflection as part of their ordinary work. This way, even major 
incidents are discussed as normal events, beside other tasks. Second, the 
organizations pick and discuss the incidents in the background of their current 
activities. They pick those aspects of the incidents that are relevant to their tasks 
at hand. For instance, in meetings about getting prepared for upgrading the main 
supercomputer at Supercomputer-Large, whenever the members of the meeting 
(senior experts from three units) saw it relevant, they commented on some 
specific incidents that they had experienced. This gives more practical relevance to 
the incidents that are discussed. Hence, the discussion about incidents in the 
meetings is often grounded in the current workflow, which makes the 
organizations connect their incident-reflection to specific practical decisions 
related to their current tasks. As another example, when deciding about which 
specific incidents should not be outsourced to the provider, the head of 
operations department at Security-Public bring out a recent incident that showed 
the difficulty of handling such type of incidents. 
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Most of the conversations about incidents in the meetings are shaped around 
what happened to give a hint to others to be aware of that, and how they can act 
on it in other incidents or make some other improvements. There are very few 
detailed technical conversations in these periodic meetings, because normally 
senior experts are assigned to their own domain of specialization. For instance, in 
Supercomputer-Large, a recent backup system damage was discussed to the level 
that the head of Users-Support group becomes alert about the potential failures 
that might take place to users who are trying to store huge amount of data in a 
short time. 
Formal, systematic post-incident reflection 
In addition to informal talks and discussions during periodic working meetings, the 
organizations also adopt practices through which they formally analyze their major 
incidents and extract lessons. An illustrative example of systematic analysis of 
incidents is incident-presorting system as Supercomputer-Small. At CERN, there is 
a public, web-based database of critical incidents that all tier 1st sites should report 
their major incidents there. Supercomputer-Small, as the tier 1st site of CERN, is 
asked from the very beginning (2003) to report its major incidents by developing 
an analytical report soon after incident is controlled. The reports are directly 
uploaded on the website that is accessible to other peer sites.  
The expected audiences of the reports are technical experts in other tier-1 sites. 
As noted by the experts and managers at Supercomputer-Small, there have been 
some cases that experts from other sites have contacted Supercomputer-Small to 
inquire about further details on their reports, showing that the reports had been 
read by some colleagues. 
The report is developed for “critical” incidents, meaning incidents that are 
important for all tier-1 sites and are important enough to be reported. CERN does 
not provide any definition or criteria of “major incident”. However, for 
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Supercomputer-Small, it is easy to identify which incident is critical enough to be 
reported. The head of LHC at Supercomputer-Small, who is in charge of developing 
such reports, elaborates this point by referring to the impact of incident on the 
main services as the criterion for judging about the criticality of incidents.  
“We have many incidents and not for all of them we file an incident report. … there 
is a decision … is this incident sever enough to file in the services incident…. it is not 
such a huge decision. It is quite obvious sometimes. … . it depends very much on 
the time of the outage and what services were affected. … If the main services are 
affected, for a reasonable amount of time, … it is pretty obvious” [the head of LHC 
department at Supercomputer-Small]. 
The reports have a rather fixed structure (see Figure 4.5 as a typical structure of 
incident reports), suggested by CERN. It includes 1) description of the incident, 2) 
the impacts of incident, 3) timeline of events during the incident, 4) the analysis of 
cause, and 5) the follow-up actions, and 6) a final summary. The follow-up section 
is related to actions that should be taken to avoid similar incidents in future.  
[Title of the incident] 
Description  
[What happened, when, where, the situation] 
Impact  
[The damages, the interruptions in the service, any data loss, potential impacts in future] 
Time line of the incident  
[The timing of events and the interventions] 
Analysis  
[The details of technical causes of the incident and the technical solutions provided, both 
those that did work and those that failed to be effective] 
Follow up actions  
[Other actions that should be done after controlling the situation, including both short-
term actions and long-term ones] 
Summary  
[A summary of the incident and making sure that all actions are properly 
considered] 
Figure ‎4.5: The structure of incident reports at Supercomputer-Small 
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Within this overall structure, there is a lot of room for adopting different styles 
and providing different levels of details. Over time, the reports have changed in 
terms of the content, mostly towards more specific and concise material, and just 
providing very crucial content. As the head of LHC department at Supercomputer-
Small, said: 
“I think there is an evolution … because of sort of experience and so on. … and the 
format … it is a suggestion top down but also very light level. Essentially the 
headers of the sections. There should be an analysis, there should be a timeline, 
there should be a follow-up actions.. more or less. But there is no guidance 
imposing in the level of details or the content” [the head of LHC department at 
Supercomputer-Small]. 
The head of LHC starts developing the report the day after the incident. However, 
there is no formal time limitation for that. As he mentioned 
“We try to do it as soon as possible. But … we don’t have a timeline. Sometimes … 
we can do … it depends on the work we have …” [the head of LHC department at 
Supercomputer-Small]. 
He starts the process by contacting the experts who were present in the incident 
handling process, especially the person in charge of incidents in that week (called 
“manager on duty”). He talks to them face to face, and sometimes on phone and 
asks about the story of the incident, what happened, actions taken, the current 
situation, the perception of the experts about the causes, and the actions that are 
needed to be taken afterwards. He takes notes of the information by trying to fill 
out the template: He describes this process: 
“I am the one starting the template and just saying … OK, you did these things, 
please provide us with the explanation. Technical explanation that we can put 
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here. … just to make sure that everything which was relevant get into here” [the 
head of LHC department at Supercomputer-Small]. 
The report is developed through a shared document (Google Docs) to which all the 
experts involved in the incident have access. Most of the time, the head of LHC is 
the one who is writing the material. In some cases, an expert might just adjust a 
small detail or just give a small feedback. If any specific content is needed to be 
developed by an expert, the head of LHC specifically contacts that expert. At the 
end of the process, a final message is sent to all collaborators to get their final 
approval of the report. Normally, other experts do not respond. As the head of 
LHC mentioned “silence implies confirmation”. However, it has happened that 
experts could not correct some mistakes in the report, just because they were too 
busy. 
“It is true that probably writing something which is rotten and just the experts are 
too busy to read and will never find it… it could happen. Because we don’t 
formalize …” [the head of LHC department at Supercomputer-Small]. 
Another important source of information is tickets related to the incident. 
However, the content of tickets that are filled by experts is often quite technical. 
The head of LHC has a PhD in Physics. He has more than 10 years of experience 
working with supercomputers. However, he does not have such a detailed 
technical knowledge, as computer engineers do. Thus, an important job for him in 
writing the report is to make sense of very technical issues that the engineers have 
put in the tickets. He does this by trying to abstract the technical content into 
more general issues and asking the experts to tell the technical stories in a way 
that he can understand. He explains this process: 
“Dealing with this, I go and talk to the guy … and ask what hell is this. Because in 
the ticket … what most of the information that you find are like commands. Like 
Linux commands. So, I just ask … sometimes I just know what they are doing here is 
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starting a services or reconfiguring this module” [the head of LHC department at 
Supercomputer-Small]. 
Due to the details in the tickets, he also needs to filter out a lot of technical noises 
when he is analyzing the technical content related to the incident:  
“I don’t need to know the details. But … I need to know … what they mean, at the 
higher level. … I make sure that the relevant things are written here. It is a bit 
deciding what is important and what is not. Because … easily it can be quite a lot 
of noise. Technical noise. And … so, the cleaning up of that noise and putting in a 
human readable sentence is something … I am doing as the editor of this… ” [the 
head of LHC department at Supercomputer-Small]. 
The last section of each report is devoted to “follow-up actions”. These are actions 
that Supercomputer-Small identifies as the result of the analysis of the incident, to 
fix the damages of the incident, avoid it, and reduce its damage in future. For 
instance, in the case of cooling incidents, they considered “improving the shut-
down process” as a follow-up action that helped them handle the process of 
switching off the whole systems in case of cooling incidents. Some follow-up 
actions are simply asking for further detailed technical examination (mostly by the 
provider) to identify the causes of incidents. These follow-up actions are not so 
systematically derived.  
They are often based on examining the tickets related to the incident, the 
experience of handling it, the discussions during and after incident handling, and 
some ideas in the weekly meetings. However, the way in which the follow-up 
actions are articulated is mostly the product of reading the whole story of the 
incident (once the incident report is composed) and then thinking about those 
follow-up actions. This point is mentioned by the head of LHC when he said about 
how he develops the follow-up actions in the reports 
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“Typically… sometimes, they don’t think about it and it is only at the end that … we 
read the complete story. It is a good way to detect the useful follow-up actions. So, 
I would say many times it comes at the end. … There are some which are not that 
obvious … that once everything is quiet and you read everything from A to Z, you 
say… why all this mess happens in the first place. And you say yes… because we 
have this typical monitoring that is not good enough. So, it is afterwards you 
decide let’s … to make sure that it will not happen again, let’s write it here” [the 
head of LHC department at Supercomputer-Small]. 
There is no systematic way that the follow-up actions written in the reports be 
implemented. Depending on their priority and available time and resources, some 
of these follow-up actions result in some internal improvement projects. For these 
internal projects, a ticket is opened for tracking its progress. 
Another way of performing post-incident analysis is through open seminars that 
Security-Private has been formally implemented. Box 4.5 describes a typical open 
seminar at Security-Private. The story shows how these seminars have evolved 
over time from regular incident-specific seminars for the all the technical experts 
to rather occasional seminars with more homogenous audience.  
Box 4.5: “Open‎Seminars”‎at Security-Private 
From the very beginning, Security-Private designed two-week seminars among all 
technical experts in which one group or an expert from a group would present 
their work that they have done recently, reflect on it by examining what went right 
and what went wrong, and present the lessons they learned. As an important part 
of the seminar, experts were supposed to discuss the major security incidents that 
they handled for their clients or faced internally. The presentation had to be 
finished in 45 minutes. The meetings were scheduled often on Friday afternoons, 
when experts have already closed their weekly works and are relaxed from their 
operational duties. After the presentation, the slides of the presentation were 
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uploaded in a publicly accessed space in the internal Wiki. The meetings were not 
obligatory, but the invitation was sent to all the project teams. 
The original idea of the seminar came from the CEO of Security-Private, as he put 
out: 
“Every two weeks, the team inside Security-Private have their open sessions in each 
project that they reflect on what they have learned from incidents handled and 
they share their experience. In some cases, the incident is so complex that we do 
not explain the lessons learned to the client. But learning from incidents help us to 
suggest new services to the market” [the CEO of Security-Private]. 
Security-Private could hold these seminars for almost the first year of its 
operation. In practice, most of these open seminars were gradually scheduled at 
the end of each project. This way, the experts could reflect on a whole project, in 
which, they often faced various incidents. Then, they could pick some critical and 
novel incidents to discuss in open seminars. 
“And at the end of the project the manager thinks about what elements of the 
gained knowledge should be distributed and shared with other people… When 
each project finishes, we do this seminar, talking about 1) what has been done in 
this project, 2) what has been done well, 3) what has not been done well, 4) what 
has been learned and where is it situated in the intranet” [the projects manager at 
Security-Private].  
After around one year, the open seminars took place in a monthly manner. It was 
mostly because experts were too busy to have seminars and prepare for that 
every two weeks. Another challenge was that often the contents of seminars were 
too specialized, making it irrelevant for experts from other groups.  
Gradually, these open seminars took place irregularly, mostly determined by the 
load work of the current projects. However, the CEO, as the proponent of the 
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seminar, has been insisting on having the seminars regularly. In practice, the open 
seminars of many finished projects just took place long time after, when the load 
work of experts diminished. In the last year, except for a few seminars, most of the 
seminars were postponed to summer time, when the clients are on vacation, thus, 
Security-Private has more time to dedicate a whole week for holding a series of 
open seminars, all together. 
 
Reflections during the interviews! 
Finally, organizations reflected on their critical incidents also when I interviewed 
them. Even in case of several critical incidents, they had never had the chance to 
reflect on it in a specific meeting. In several occasions, the managers and experts 
mentioned  
“emm… well… interesting, Now you are asking me, it is my first time to think about 
this …”,  
For instance, in a recent incident at Supercomputer-Large, the thermometer of the 
main supercomputing room alarmed as the temperature went above the 
threshold. This is a very dangerous event since high temperature reduces 
significantly the processing power and can easily damage the hardware. They 
made quick actions to reduce the temperature by increasing the cooling power. 
However, it was very surprising that they could not feel any higher temperature or 
any event that might increase the temperature. Two days later, the technical 
expert from the provider came and started measuring the temperature using his 
own thermometer. Surprisingly, he found that the temperature is much lower 
than the threshold. In comparing with the thermometers in the room, it appeared 
that the problem was that these thermometers deviated from their calibration, so, 
they showed a higher temperature than it really was. Around four months later, 
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when the research team interviewed the head of Facility-Management group, he 
mentioned that they have never thought about what they could learn from this 
incident.  
“Maybe nothing. Because the providers do all the job” [the head of facility manager 
group at Supercomputer-Large]. 
Thinking a bit more, just a few seconds after this point, he interrupted and said  
“So, we know that when the next time they come we have one more item in the 
checklist. I can say we learned that we can put a point on the checklist to check the 
calibration of the thermometers” [the head of facility manager group at 
Supercomputer-Large]. 
In other similar cases, inside Supercomputer-Large, I found instances that the 
experts did not formalize their learning from specific incidents. They said, “It is 
quite obvious”, which does not need to be done in such a formal way. In some 
cases, they were the only person in the whole organization dealing with the 
incident, so that, it would not be needed to do any formal assessment of what the 
expert perfectly has in his mind. 
4.2.2 Laboratory incident analysis 
In addition to reflections on incidents after handling them, security companies also 
performed laboratory analysis on novel security incidents to figure out how they 
are working and how they can be prevented in future. Box 4.6 illustrates a typical 
example of laboratory analysis at Security-Public. The laboratory analysis focuses 
on novel incidents that have some technically unknown elements for the 
organizations. The aim of laboratory analysis is to understand how the novel 
incidents work and create damages to the systems. It is mostly a technical process 
that only senior experts who have been trained on that can perform. It requires 
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specialized technologies and instruments. The results of such analysis are often 
translated into some specific new methods, tools, and databases of incidents, 
from which incident handlers can act on similar future incidents. 
Box 4.6: A typical example of laboratory analysis at Security-Public 
Take the example of a new virus that has affected a hard disk. During incident 
handling process, the hard disk is first disconnected from the other devices to 
avoid distributing the virus to other systems. The system resumed working by 
replacing the infected hard disk and retrieving data from a backup. After handling 
incident, the infected hard disk is sent to laboratory, with special care to make 
sure that the hard disk is well isolated and the data on it is frozen. At laboratory, 
there are special technologies, such as isolated hosts and specific test applications 
that are adopted for laboratory analysis purposes. These technologies are rather 
expensive and they constitute an important part of the investment by Security-
Public. These technologies are also specialized to different types of incidents. For 
example, some technologies are specialized for analyzing incidents in mobile 
devices. Even when the provider of Security-Public needs to do some laboratory 
analysis, it is done by these technologies that are inside Security-Public. 
At security-Public, only the head of ERI department and two high-level experts 
(they are third-level experts who are specifically trained for incident analysis) 
perform laboratory analysis. They take the infected hard disk and connect it to the 
analysis technologies. The software tries to re-activate the virus in a protected 
virtual environment to examine its behavior in various situations. Several 
experiments can help experts identify how the virus works and how it might affect 
systems. This sometimes requires several trial and errors to run the virus under 
different conditions to detect its behavior. For instance, the virus might be 
activated (to reproduce the incident) in a controlled network and its behavior be 
monitored to understand how it can damage systems. They might also analyze the 
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log of the affected system to track the behavior of the virus. There are always 
many uncertainties about how the virus might behave in new situations. 
Only novel incidents that their behaviors are unknown for the experts are sent to 
laboratory analysis. For example, in 2011, Security-Public sent only 100 incidents 
to the laboratory analysis (out of around 500 managed incidents). As the head of 
operations department mentioned: 
“Some incidents are highly complex or technically sophisticated. Especially if the 
incident is abnormal, we analyze it more seriously. The time that we spend for the 
analysis of an incident depends on the complexity and severity of the incident” [the 
head of operations department at Security-Public]. 
The results of the analysis are often documented in specific articles inside Wiki 
system. As the result of this analysis, experts might detect some defects and 
vulnerabilities in the existing systems, which, in turn, can result in new tickets for 
fixing them. The insights that experts gain from this analysis help them be aware 
of new sources of threat and control them in case of future events. The head of 
ERI at Security-Public referred to this point by saying:  
“They learn why such incident happened, what should we do to avoid it in future. 
What should we do if it happens again…. Then they make recommendations for 
security issues. For example, they say that this incident happened because this 
proxy was not well set up. Or this firewall is not well tuned” [the head of ERI at 
Security-Public]. 
At Supercomputer-Large and Supercomputer-Small, laboratory analysis of 
incidents is not done as a specific formal task. Instead, in case of some novel 
incidents, they try to reproduce the incident in order to make sure that the 
incident is not due to random events. In addition, reproducing the incident is 
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needed for opening the case for the provider and showing to the providers that 
the problem is related to systems that are maintained by those specific providers. 
To summarize, the organizations adopted a wide range of formal and informal 
practices to reflect on and analyze critical incidents once they are handled. The 
results of these analyses can help organizations be more prepared for similar 
incidents in future or take some actions to avoid them. Overall, Security-Public and 
Security-Private have more systematic ways for post-incident learning, while these 
activities at Supercomputer-Large and Supercomputer-Small are done more 
informally, as embedded parts in daily practices, on a less regular basis. The 
exception is when some formal structures are imposed from outside (the case of 
incident reporting at Supercomputer-Small). Most of these practices, although are 
designed to be done collectively, in practice, take place among a limited number 
of experts in the same domain or simply by single experts individually. Only senior 
experts (level 2 and 3) are involved in these practices. 
 
Chapter Summary  
The chapter narrated the practices that the organizations adopted in relation with 
each major ISRI that allowed them benefit from their incident experience to avoid 
and manage future incidents. Two categories of practices were identified: 
practices during incident handling, including handling incidents based on their 
ticketing system, performing Triage, and interacting with specialized suppliers, as 
well as practices after incident handling process, such as post-incident reflection 
and laboratory analysis. However, there are practices that the organizations 
adopted in relation with multiple incidents that are described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Findings: Multi-incident Learning 
The previous chapter described practices that the organizations adopted during or 
after handling each major incident to avoid similar incidents in future or reduce 
their impacts. The organizations have also adopted other practices for learning 
purposes that they are related to several incidents (multi-incident learning). In 
fact, these practices allow organizations to capitalize on the experience of several 
incidents that have some similarities and relations. This chapter narrates these 
practices that are classified under 1) using Wiki system, 2) internal improvement 
projects, and 3) upgrading systems. Table 5.1 summarizes the three practices and 
the differences among the four organizations in terms of adopting these practices. 
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Table ‎5.1: Multi-incident learning practices 
Practice Description 
Specificities of the organizations 
Security-Public Security-Private Supercomputer-
Large 
Supercomputer-
Small 
Using Wiki 
System 
The organizations 
try to document 
their incident 
handling 
experiences and 
improvement 
ideas in their 
internal Wiki 
system and share 
it among their 
experts. 
- Both internal 
experts and 
provider’s experts 
develop Wiki 
content 
- The content is 
specialized based 
on the 
departments 
- Lack of time for 
documenting 
experiences by 
senior experts 
- Gradual nature of 
writing articles 
and developing 
them over time 
(semi-empty 
articles) 
- Wiki as a 
repository of all 
information that 
might be 
needed in 
handling 
incidents in 
future 
- It is only used 
for 
documenting 
the tools and 
changes that 
are developed 
internally 
- Only using for 
documenting 
the tools and 
changes that 
are developed 
internally 
Executing 
improveme
nt projects 
The organizations 
run internal 
projects through 
which they 
improve some 
aspects of their 
technologies or 
their processes, 
often by 
developing an 
open-source 
application or 
script. 
- The projects are 
defined by 
internal senior 
experts and 
outsourced as 
commercial 
services to the 
providers 
- Done as part of 
the services for 
the clients 
- In few cases 
they have been 
organized as 
specific internal 
projects 
- Improvement 
projects are 
the main tasks 
of senior 
experts  
- Relying on 
open source 
applications 
- Limitedly done, 
only for short-
term changes 
- Mostly avoided 
since the 
specialized 
providers 
automatically 
solve the issue 
in the next 
upgrades 
Performing 
Upgrades 
Regular upgrades 
of systems and 
parts of them 
help the 
organizations 
avoid past 
incidents to occur 
in future. 
- Mostly done by 
the provider 
- Done for some 
open-source 
applications 
- Easily done for 
small parts 
and parts that 
already have 
their own 
financial 
resources, but 
delayed for 
major 
upgrades 
- Done 
frequently to a 
wide range of 
technologies 
5.1 Using Wiki system 
The first category of practices pertains to articulating the experience of incidents 
into Wiki system. All the studied organizations use internal Wiki systems 
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(sometimes, called knowledge-based systems) to document and store their 
experiences of handling incidents and other useful information that can help them 
avoid similar incidents or handle them better in future. This tool though, is used 
differently in the organizations, helps them keep some tracks of critical incidents 
by documenting its experience and ideas for improvements.  
Security-Public has an internal Wiki system, called knowledge-based system, to 
document and maintain the knowledge gained from handled incidents. It has been 
one of the key ideas of Security-Public founders that all the knowledge and 
information should remain in Security-Public systems, even though the provider 
handles them. For this reason, one of the duties of the provider is to introduce 
knowledge and important issues into the Wiki system. Security-Public urged its 
provider to document all experience, tools, knowledge, information, methods, and 
lessons that they develop and gain through handling its incidents, into the Wiki 
system. This way, they want to make sure that  
“All the information of the cases is in the knowledge database” [e.g., the head of 
LHC at Supercomputer-Small]. 
In parallel, the experts of Security-Public continuously compose articles related to 
various services and incidents that they face. These articles are only used by the 
internal experts and the experts from the provider, so that external users do not 
have any access to them.  
The content of the Wiki is structured around specialized departments (e.g., 
incident response, operations, and legal services). This way, each department has 
their own space for creating sub-categories of articles. However, there is no 
imposed structure on the content inside each department. Normally, senior 
experts who are also the heads of the departments identify an important topic as 
they are handling various incidents and develop an article about that topic. For 
instance, a recent article about “how to protect your Smartphone when 
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downloading apps” was created by the head of ERI department as he detected 
several serious incidents on this issue. This way, most of the articles are not 
specific to any single incident. Rather, they focus on a specific solution. 
All experts inside Security-Public have access to all the content in the Wiki system. 
The provider only has access to articles in ERI departments. Normally the articles 
that the provider writes are specific and technical (e.g., how to isolate a Mac-Hard 
disk that is affected by some virus). Using the Wiki system, other experts who have 
the access, can revise the article (removing parts, adding some content, and 
putting comments on the article).  
Except for very few cases, these articles are written individually. The owner 
(writer) of the article is known. However, quite rarely an expert revises the articles 
that are written by others. Interestingly, articles are mostly read by those who 
write them to remember specific ideas. The exception is when the expert who is 
dealing with a specific domain is leaving the company or is on vacation. In these 
situations, other closely specialized colleagues read articles to figure out how to 
perform some specific technical actions. 
The legal expert is almost an exception who tries to read the technical articles of 
other technical groups. The most active group in terms of developing articles is the 
incident response team as they are constantly facing new themes and issues 
related to handling incidents. In addition, the head of incident response team 
takes Wiki as an opportunity to document his experience in handling incidents so 
that the provider can easily access it. This, in turn, facilitates the process of 
outsourcing incident handling to the provider in future. 
Since Security-Public is in its initial years of development, the experts have many 
ideas in their mind, but they are waiting to spare some free time to document 
them into knowledge articles. Therefore, experts often have a list of articles in 
their mind or in their personal notes. They mostly enter Wiki system to write 
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something, rather than reading the existing articles. The main bottleneck seems to 
be time limitations. They have the system open, in parallel with their daily work of 
handling incidents. They constantly take notes and write articles as a progressive 
task. There is no specific plan, unless for the year 2012, it is planned that the 
system be fully organized, which means that  
“… everybody knows who, how, and what is wiring the other people” [the head of 
operations department at Security-Public]. 
Box 5.1 describes the process of developing and using a typical knowledge article 
at Security-Public. 
Box 5.1: the process of developing a typical knowledge article at Security-Public 
The legal expert at Security-Public recently wrote an article about the legal 
considerations of handling security incidents in smart phones. He decided to write 
this article after receiving a series of security incidents related to smart phones. He 
started by opening an article, with a name and just a few bullet points, after the 
experience of a few initial incidents. At that time, still he did not have such a clear 
mind about the exact content of the article. As new incidents related to smart 
phones happened and new legal aspects of such incidents were more discussed in 
legal communities, he gradually got more specific ideas. Opening a rather empty 
article helped him to collect information and ideas about it, and in case other 
peers had some ideas on it, they could share with him. He took notes of ideas 
through successive incidents, until a time that he felt that  
“I have enough in my mind to put into the article” [the legal expert at Security-
Public]. 
Then, he started writing the article, when he could spare a few relaxed times. He 
mentioned that he often postpones writing articles until a time that he feels that 
he has got to a rather “stable knowledge” about it. This is important especially in 
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the IT sector as many technical issues change quite rapidly. Another reason is that 
the content of knowledge often changes dramatically when the expert 
experienced the second, third, and next incidents of a kind. The legal expert 
described the nature of legal knowledge of IT security, as it is highly subjective, 
rapidly changing, and a matter of holistic interpretation. 
“On the legal part, that’s quite curious,… I mean the legal knowledge is different, … 
is quite abstract…. We normally say that for some particular situation, we have 
seen that the court has decided this or that…. And then it is quite probable that if 
you do this, this will happen. You cannot be certain that this is going to be every 
time, … tomorrow there is another decision, from the court that is different. …. ” 
[the legal expert at Security-Public]. 
This led the expert to avoid hasty reflection. Therefore, he postponed writing the 
article until he reached a rather stable and holistic view (“a big picture” as he 
mentioned) to be reliable enough to be put in an article: 
“That’s why I am also quite cautious with introducing some kind of particular 
information…” [the legal expert at Security-Public]. 
The uncertain nature of legal knowledge adds to this situation, as even seasoned 
experts cannot be sure about their judgments. This made the expert consider the 
different interpretations and changes, which might not fit with the content of their 
article. He stressed this point saying: 
“For my experience in this sector, from 10 years ago, we have worked on 
absolutely grey areas, … …. You need to understand what means Internet, and 
what is security, … and the data protection part, … the legal procedures part, the 
contracts part. It is like trying to build up a theory from understanding how the 
legal part works” [The legal expert at Security-Public]. 
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At Security-Private, the Wiki system is used as a repository for all information that 
is worth storing, in addition to the ticketing system. Security-Private does not 
allow its employees to use any other data storage rather than the Wiki. All 
information, files, and documents, about both technical and non-technical issues 
must be stored in the Wiki system. This includes everything such as lessons 
learned from a specific incident, an idea for improvement related to a specific 
incident, some new organizational procedures that can improve the work, as well 
as more general content such as the formal procedure of interactions with the 
clients in reporting incidents. 
Each user has his own personal space for storing and even sharing information 
that is related to the person, his role in the organization, and the involved 
projects. This part is mostly consulted by its owner except in situations that some 
specific invitations is sent to other colleagues to see some content there. This part 
is more related to the personal notes, tasks, concerns, ideas, and personal 
documents. The rest of the content is structured around projects. Projects have an 
overall fixed structure which includes: (1) “Management” of the project that 
includes all documents and information about how to manage the project, its 
methodology, schedule, costs, managerial reports, and so forth; (2) “Work”, 
including all documents that are used and produced during the project, such as 
technical reports, technical methodologies, and technical tools; (3) “Deliverables”, 
which includes all the documents and outcomes that are delivered to the client as 
the deliverables of the project. Only those who are participating in each project 
have access to these three areas. 
In addition to personal and project spaces, there are some general spaces for 
documenting ideas for improvements, ideas for new services, and best practices 
that are related to various projects. Very few articles are related to a specific 
incident. Only a specific part of the Wiki is devoted to open seminars (mentioned 
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in previous chapter) for uploading the slides of all open seminars. This space is 
shared and all groups have access to it. Another category is devoted to 
documenting all the tools, methods, and innovative solutions for handling 
incidents that Security-Private develops them when delivering security services to 
its clients. The CEO, project managers, and department managers have always 
thought about their Wiki as “a place that everything we need for our work should 
be put there”. 
Although the Wiki provides opportunities for collaborative writing of articles and 
commenting on other’s articles, this rarely happens, as most of the articles are 
written individually. For example, just in a very special case, the head of incident 
management team created an article and one of his experts commented a few 
words on it. However, this feature is used for developing reports for the clients. 
For example, in a recent project, they have to create a manual that provides 
security instructions for citizens when using Internet. This document was created 
through an article in the Wiki system. The project manager created an initial 
template (with the overall bullets that shows the structure of the report). Then, it 
was shared with two other experts and the head of the group. They divided work 
and each expert was responsible for writing a specific section. There have been 
some interactions on the document, when an expert asked another colleague to 
comment on a specific section. Therefore, this collaborative feature is used to 
support developing articles in an individual way. 
At Supercomputer-Large, the Wiki system is considered as a complementary 
documentation system. The content of the Wiki is updated only when a new tool 
or new procedure is put in place (e.g., a new script that detects network failures) 
to describe how the tool works. Figure 5.1 shows an example of Wiki entries at 
Supercomputer-Large that describes how jobs should be executed on a specific 
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machine (please note the specific information is not presented for the sake of 
confidentiality). 
How to run jobs on Machine XYZ 
Introduction  
[The general characteristics of the machine, its processing capabilities, 
its architecture, normal algorithms that can be used, and the 
limitations] 
The steps for running jobs on the machine 
[Explaining the steps for uploading, executing and examining the jobs 
on the machine, with some examples of instructions, and the codes that 
are needed for running the job and comments on how to use them and 
adapt them for different cases] 
Practical implications 
[The possible problems that might happen in getting jobs run on the 
system, an example of each and solutions, and some tricks for solving 
potential problems (e.g., put a space character before the first line juts 
to avoid some strange crazy errors in compiling the job)] 
Figure ‎5.1: An example of a Wiki entry at Supercomputer-Large 
This is mostly to help the same expert who has developed the tool, remember the 
technical details when he is trying to use or change the tool in future (personal 
memory). In some cases, the articles help other experts in situations that the 
principle expert is absent or leaves the company. 
Almost all articles are about a specific technical solution that has been developed 
for a specific problem. This way, articles often have an introduction of what is the 
problem, then it follows by the solution, often accompanied by the source code of 
the software developed (the script), and finally, is completed by some practical 
considerations about how to use the tool. For instance, an article is about a recent 
solution that allows laptops remain connected to different Wi-Fi zones without 
being disconnected when the laptop is moving from one zone to another zone. 
The same person who developed the tools is responsible for documenting it in the 
Wiki system.  
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All the experts from the same group have access to all articles. However, in 
practice, just in exceptional cases that the owner of the article is not able to 
handle the case, other colleagues might consult others’ articles. The articles are 
often written after the development of the solution. It sometimes takes a long 
time (even more than six months) for the experts to find a relaxed time to 
document the tool. The updates in the tools can make the experts revise their 
related articles.  
Supercomputer-Small uses its Wiki system very similarly to Supercomputer-large. 
It is used for documenting specific information that can help in future. It can be 
about a specific solution, how to deal with a specific type of incident, or simply 
documenting a specific tool or procedure. In fact, Wiki is used as a complement of 
ticketing system. This is described by a middle manager at Supercomputer-Small,  
“I would say it is for documents which are less dynamic than the ticket. The ticket is 
a flow of information. And when it is like procedures… for instance … systematic 
procedures …. So this is like a document which is … les dynamic and this is in our 
Wiki…” [a middle manager at Supercomputer-Small] 
Similar to Supercomputer-Large, the articles in the Wiki are mostly consulted by 
those who have written them, except when the author is absent and some urgent 
needs arise. Even the authors of articles consult their own few articles only when 
they want to remember some specific technical information.  
Wiki system, at Supercomputer-Small, is not so critical, as it is used only for 
specific contents. In addition, experts use their own ways, such as an Excel file, to 
document some information more easily. The articles in the Wiki system are not 
incident-specific. They are related to overall themes or several incidents. Incident 
specific content is documented in the ticketing system. Distinguishing between 
what should be stored in the Wiki system, versus what should be put in the 
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ticketing system is reflected in the following point said by the head of LHC 
department: 
“The Wiki perhaps the information is more transversally … ticket is the first level 
documentation” [the head of LHC department at Supercomputer-Small]. 
Unlike the security organizations, both supercomputers have a thin content in 
their Wikis (very few articles). However, the security organizations have tended to 
document all information that they think might be needed in future.  
To conclude, the organizations use internal Wiki systems to help them document 
their experience in handling incident and ways of improvement for future 
incidents. However, much of the content is not specifically related to any incident. 
Moreover, the content is often individually created and often is used by the same 
person who has developed it. In fact, although the content is shared, it is highly 
specialized and is used mostly as a memory support for individual experts. In 
addition, there are variations among the organizations in terms of how to deploy 
Wiki system and how to incorporate it into their daily work. For security 
organizations, it is a crucial, active tool, while for supercomputer organizations it is 
a support tool that is consulted contingently. 
5.2 Executing Improvement projects 
The second sort of practices that the organizations adopted in relation to several 
incidents is executing improvement projects. The studied organizations have 
constantly run improvement projects to avoid incidents in future and reduce their 
impacts. In fact, defining internal projects and creating new tools as the result of 
experiencing (repeated) incidents is a routine practice in the organizations. These 
projects often focus on addressing a specific change or making a specific 
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improvement, mostly by developing a specific technical solution such as a new 
software application, and a script that improves the functionality of the existing 
systems. The organizations often work on open-source applications that allow 
them to make changes that solve their specific problems. In a few cases these 
solutions requires some hardware accompaniments. These projects are done by 
senior experts (from level two or three), and are guided by middle managers 
(managers with strong technical background).  
At Security-Public, the internal projects are mostly outsourced to the provider. In 
fact, the provider does two things for Security-Public: handling the incident, and 
executing long term projects. For example, a recent improvement projects at 
Security-Public is designing, acquiring, and implementing the whole set of 
technologies and methods for handling mobile security incidents. Some of these 
projects are suggested by the departments’ heads who were observing some 
needs as the result of facing several incidents. For example, the provider was 
asked to develop a database of vulnerabilities that Security-Public has been using 
for detecting security vulnerabilities. This project was defined because the head of 
operations department at Security-Public realized that the traditional vulnerability 
database does not include some recent vulnerabilities that they were detecting in 
some incidents or through their laboratory analysis. Sometimes, the provider 
suggests some similar projects, during handling incidents. For instance, the 
provider suggested a specific Wiki system to Security-Public that could help them 
document their experience more effectively than their traditional file-system. 
Each project is defined as a specific service and should be delivered within a 
specific budget limit. Normally the senior experts inside Security-Public define the 
project, delegate it to the provider, lead it through continuous contacts with the 
provider team, and finally test and approve it. For instance, for developing the 
database of vulnerabilities, the head of operations department defined a clear 
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project, with the specifications of the database, and with a clear schedule. He was 
helping the provider team during the project in designing the structure of the 
database and implementing it. In the case of legal services, the legal expert from 
Security-Public directly contacts some legal companies (that are different from the 
technical provider) for outsourcing specific projects. 
Security-Private also runs internal projects for improving its work because of 
experiencing various incidents. However, most of these activities are defined as 
part of the service that they deliver to their customers. It is because Security-
Private does not have enough extra resources to spend on developing internal 
projects. As the head of projects at Security-Private mentioned,  
“habitually, these things have been in the form of small projects… small 
development,… by small, I mean those that require like 10 working days … 15 days 
of working … and very good experts can do things very good in a very short time… 
but these hours normally is charged as part of the work for the client….. all these 
things are paid by the client” [the head of projects at Security-Private]. 
This way, Security-Private can improve its work and do not need to spare extra 
resources for the improvement projects. In a few cases, however, there have been 
some small internal projects funded by Security-Private. The projects that cannot 
be framed as part of the work for the client are very carefully discussed between 
the experts who suggest the project and the head of the projects. Once the idea is 
initially assessed and has been proved to be a profitable proposal, it would be 
suggested to the CEO. He is also the head of “business development” department. 
The proposal should have a clear estimation of benefits for the company. Upon 
the approval of the CEO, it would be assigned to an expert or some experts to be 
implemented. The costs of these projects are kept under control.  
Recently, in some cases, Security-Private faced challenges with some of its clients 
about the property rights of the tools that they had developed for delivering their 
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services. For instance, during delivering some web security services, Security-
Private team could develop a script that can quickly search critical nodes of a 
network and find security threats. This was done as the result of an urgent need of 
a client. Although the times that experts have spend on this project were 
considered as part of the service to the client, the developed tool per se was not a 
deliverable to the client. Security-Private is trying to clarify the property rights of 
the tool with the client. 
At Supercomputer-Large, internal projects are central to the daily work. This is 
particularly true for System-Administration and Users-Supports groups, which 
constitute the main technical groups inside Supercomputer-Large. There, more 
than 70% of the time of experts is devoted to their improvement projects. In fact, 
for the experts (often from level 2), incident handling is an inferior task, which 
distracts them from their “main, important” tasks, which are developing their 
internal projects. Therefore, the experts have implemented a turning system in 
which each expert is dealing with the incidents for one week, and the other weeks, 
he is free to work on his own projects. Box 5.2 explains a recent improvement 
projects at Supercomputer-Large. 
Box 5.2: Central Storage Mirroring Project at Supercomputer-Large  
Supercomputer-Large started a project to install a new central data-storage (see 
Figure 5.2) that would provide services to various high performance computers 
(HPCs). In parallel, one of the main HPCs (HPC #1 in Figure 5.2) had to be replaced 
with a new one (HPC #2). Therefore, the data stored in HPC #1 had to be moved to 
the central storage because the new machine (HPC #2) does not have any internal 
storage. However, meanwhile, Supercomputer-Large was not able to make HPC #1 
work with the central storage because it required a lot of modifications and 
changes in the operating system and related applications. In addition, it was 
because still the central storage was not reliable enough to be connected to the 
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main HPC. This created a transitory situation in which Supercomputer-Large had to 
keep the data in inside HPC #1, and at the same time, start migrating parts of the 
less active data in HPC #1 to the new central storage.  
This transition period took more than one year, even though it was supposed to 
last only a few months. It was mostly because of the delay in buying HPC #2. 
Meanwhile, some users who were intensively using HPC #1 and some other 
machines faced several problems. The first critical problem came from a user who 
had processed his job, and the huge amount of produced data had to be quickly 
stored (almost without delay). Otherwise, all the millions of processing-hours used 
for producing the results would be lost.  
 
Figure ‎5.2: Central storage, related HPCs and the user’s space 
The problem was that the user was receiving a general error “input-output error” 
when trying to copy the results to its storage space (quota). The user was scary 
about losing the whole results. Then the user reported an error and the ticket 
arrived at the Users-Support group. Since the Users-Support group does not 
handle basic infrastructure, they forwarded the ticket to the System-
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Administration group. Due to the urgency of the case, experts at System-
Administration extend the storage space of the user temporarily to allow him to 
store his results. The Users-Support group got back to the user and informed the 
user about the resolution of the problem. 
The experts at System-Administration group who were responsible for handling 
the quotas and the transition to the central storage started thinking about 
whether this way of solving the issue was appropriate or not. This point was 
discussed, in the days after, between the experts and their manager who was 
aware of this critical incident. They did not reach a concrete solution because 
there were other more urgent tasks to be done. 
After one week, the second incident came from another user who received similar 
error, with the same problem. This made the experts at System-Administration 
group think more seriously about some other solutions. The third similar incident 
arrived the following week. Again, the same process toke place for resolving the 
incident. However, this time, the System-Administration group expressed its 
concerns to the Users-Support group about turning this solution into a routine. It 
would be problematic, because they had to extend constantly the spaces available 
to the users, while there were quite limited spaces available for each user.  
The experts in the System-Administration group shared their concerns with their 
manager. This point remained in the mind of the manager until the next weekly 
meeting among the groups’ heads, where the heads of the Users-Support group 
and System-Administration group discussed the issue. Users-Support group 
preferred keeping this temporal remedy solution as it was the easiest way to deal 
with the users, and keeping them happy. However, System-Administration group 
showed objections and requested that clear limits be defined for the extension of 
spaces. The argument of the System-Administration group was that this is 
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something that we have to “teach them” that they do not have unlimited space, 
and these incidents are good excuses for making them learn that.  
Finally, they came to an agreement that in similar cases, they only extend the 
space by 15%, and Users-Support group should inform the users that they had to 
start deleting their legacy files that they did not need any more to create free 
space. However, there was a discussion that critical and sensitive users (e.g. the 
heads of the research departments) are exceptional and should be treated with 
more flexibility.  
The senior expert at System-Administration group who was mostly taking care of 
this issue suggested to System-Administration group head that “why not to create 
a tool (a specific code) that solves several issues together”. He mentions that they 
have had the problem of unclear messages to the users. That is, instead of giving a 
specific error message that shows the specific problem (e.g., “the space is full”), it 
gives an unclear basic error. He added, “We can automate the 15% extension of 
the space by this tool. We also know that there have been some imperfections in 
our mirroring process (copying data from HPC to the central storage for having a 
provisional copy)”. “Now that we are creating a tool”, he added, “let us create a 
script that solves all these three issues together”, he continued. 
The manager agreed about this internal project and started working with the 
expert to develop, test, and install the script on the system. Once the tool was 
finalized, the expert who was working on it created an article in the Wiki page to 
describe what this is tool for, how it should be used, and practical points about 
how to use it. He also copied the source code of the tool (script) in the article to be 
accessible for the other colleagues. 
The tool worked properly, especially when the fourth incident arrived. However, 
the fourth incident was slightly different. This time, the user was supposed to have 
enough space in the main storage. However, the system was saying that the space 
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is not enough. It was because the user was using several HPCs in parallel. In these 
cases, there is one single overall storage space. Therefore, if the user exceeds its 
storage limit in one of the HPCs, this would deduce from the space available in 
other HPCs. This point although was solved by adding the 15% of space, opened a 
new issue among Users-Support group and System-Administration group that they 
should “change the mindset of users about local spaces for each HPC” to “a 
universal space for all HPCs”. This resulted in a series of training activities for 
conveying this point to the users. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the events happened during each incident in the second 
column (mostly captured through ticketing system), the actions that 
Supercomputer-Large took related to developing the new tool (improvement 
project) in the third column, and the formal documentations of the project and 
tool inside their Wiki System, in the fourth column. 
Table ‎5.2: Central storage problem at Supercomputer-Large 
 
  149 | Page 
 
 
150 | Page 
 
 
* Quotations are by the senior expert responsible for the improvement project 
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Like the example in Box 5.2, senior experts often suggest the projects as they face 
several specialized problems. Each project aims at improving a specific problem by 
providing a technical solution. The experts often provide their ideas about 
improvement projects in their daily talks and weekly meetings with their group 
managers. Group managers are always hands-on in the incident handling process, 
as well as their internal projects. These technical managers know almost 
everything at a very detailed technical level. However, they often just lead the 
activities and intervene when they feel that things might go wrong, if they do not 
help their experts. 
The heads of groups provide some insights about the priority of the projects. Each 
senior expert, who is specialized in a specific technical domain, has its own list of 
internal projects to develop. The expert goes through the list based on the 
priorities. Often experts are working on two or three projects at the same time. 
Most of the projects only involved one expert, except a few projects in which two 
experts collaborate. The result of each project is first tested by asking other 
colleagues to use it internally. Then, the tool is implemented in the whole 
Supercomputer-Large. Finally, the expert who has developed the tool is 
responsible for documenting the tool in the Wiki system. This includes defining 
what is the problem of interest, what is the solution (describing the tool and how 
it works), and providing practical guide for using the tool.  
In some cases, Supercomputer-Large preferred to perform improvement projects 
internally, although, the support contracts with the provider could allow 
outsourcing them. For example, in a recent case, Supercomputer-Large faced a 
problem in one of its backup systems. They had to modify the operating system of 
the machine in a way that shows exactly where the process of copying files fails. 
The expert in storage started working with the provider company. After several 
months, it turned out that the company is not capable to solve the problem. It was 
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because the provider had other priorities rather than this specific problem. Hence, 
Supercomputer-Large’s expert started solving the problem on his own. 
At Supercomputer-Small, internal projects also exist, although they are not as 
frequent as Supercomputer-Large. Internal projects are limited to cases in which 
experts can solve a problem by writing a short script. Changes that are more 
fundamental are outsourced to their providers. Being part of the whole CERN 
network, Supercomputer-Small often suggests more basic improvements to be 
done centrally at CERN. Finally, the fact that Supercomputer-Small upgrades its 
systems frequently reduces the need for developing internal projects because 
most of the expected changes would be automatically addressed in the next 
version of technology. 
5.3 Performing Upgrades 
The third category of practices that the studied organizations were actively doing 
in relation with several incidents was performing upgrades. Upgrading problematic 
and outdated technologies is a common practice that the organizations do to 
avoid past incidents in future and reduce their likelihood. This practice is more 
visible in Supercomputer-Large and Supercomputer-Small, as they operate a wide 
range of different systems. The systems are often very specialized, modularly 
designed, and are supported by specialized providers.  
For instance, at the Supercomputer-Large, there are several storage systems from 
different technology, supported by various providers. Normally, a specific expert 
handles systems with similar functionality (e.g., all backup systems) internally. 
Inside each system, there are modularly distinct parts. Therefore, replacing one 
part would not require changes in the other working parts of the system. Box 5.3 
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illustrates a typical replacement case at Supercomputers-Large. The example 
shows how the accumulation of several incidents makes Supercomputer-Large 
replace its faulty system to avoid similar incidents in future.  
Box 5.3: Upgrading the Backup System at Supercomputer-Large 
Supercomputer-Large has a backup system for long-term storage of huge data. 
This system is composed of an electro-mechanical robot (controller) that links 
supercomputers to the backup hard disks. When a user wants to store big data for 
several months or years, it should move the data from temporal storages in the 
supercomputers to the hard disks. Since the robot is electro-mechanical and has 
not been updated since 2006, there have been several major failures in the backup 
system. These incidents have occurred in different steps of copying data, including 
in reading a temporal copy of data to intermediary memory, moving the data to 
the disks, verifying the stored data, and removing the temporal copy. For example, 
in a serious incident, the controller failed to pick the proper disk. Then, it started 
overwriting data on a disk. Although the damaged data could be recovered from 
the backups, it took a lot of time and delayed the copying process. 
In the last years, the speed at which data are entering the storage system has 
increased dramatically. At the time of the study, the prediction was that in a few 
months, the storage system would collapse since it cannot cope with the pace at 
which data should be stored. 
The solution was to upgrade the backup system with a new one in which the 
memory size and the pace of storing data would be enhanced. The expert who is 
in charge of the storage system made the analysis of the problems of the existing 
system using all past incidents and did the prediction of the failure of the system 
due to slow data storage process. He submitted his proposal for upgrade to the 
head of System-Administration group. He approved the upgrade and sent the 
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request to the head of operations department for allocating budget and organizing 
the bid process. 
At Supercomputer-Large, upgrading has done quite frequently in the isolated 
systems such as the cooling system, power transformers, network, and some 
peripheral systems such as security alarms. However, the core processing system, 
including all the processing tracks, internal storages, all wiring and network, and 
associated infrastructure, required to be upgraded in a whole project. This was 
almost the most complex and challenging project at Supercomputer-Large. Since 
the establishment of the first supercomputer in 2003, there has been one upgrade 
in the supercomputer in 2006.  
The project requires changing almost everything related to the main 
supercomputer. Since the new technology is used in the new version, all the 250 
applications that are used for processing the jobs have to be revised again to be 
adapted to the new technology. This requires testing the applications on the new 
system, fixing them, in case they have some incompatibilities, updating their users’ 
guides, and installing them on the new system. The following upgrade was 
supposed to be done in 2008. However, regarding the huge cost of upgrading, the 
project was delayed to be done in 2010, and was postponed again until 2012. 
However, the four year delay in the update created a long period of transition in 
which, the experts had to run internal improvement projects to fix the problems of 
the existing system in short term.  
Regardless of the benefits of upgrades, large costs are sometimes very 
complicated and almost impossible to be justified at Supercomputer-Large, given 
the public nature of the organization and the bureaucratic process of budget 
allocation. The current national crisis has heightened this problem. As the result, I 
could find many internal improvement projects that would not be needed if 
upgrades could be done as quickly as expected. An example is developing a script 
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that allowed parallel usage of backup system for coping with the high speed of 
data generation that cannot be stored by the existing, slow backup systems. This 
issue would be solved when, next year, Supercomputer-Large buys the new 
storage system and replaces the existing one. However, the urgent need of users 
does not allow waiting until that time. This point was stressed by an expert in 
backup systems who had to develop a tool for faster storage of huge amount of 
data, before installing the new storage systems:  
“Although next year we might upgrade this backup system, but I don’t know when, 
I cannot wait for that. It depends on many things, such as the money from the 
ministry, the government, the politics. But what I have to do is to backup this data 
now. The new version of this backup system has a lot of capacity and will solve 
most of the problems, but there are many other uncertainties” [backup expert at 
Supercomputer-Large]. 
Compared with upgrades, which often require big investments, internal 
improvement projects do not often need any other resources except the time that 
internal experts spend on them. Given that the overall strategy of Supercomputer-
Large is to use open source applications, there is often no need to buy any 
software license. Thus, in case of problems, always there is a discussion about to 
what extent the efforts should be channeled towards developing internal projects, 
versus pushing towards faster upgrades. 
Finally, in the upgrade projects, the provider does most of the activities. The 
internal team needs to decide about when to do upgrade, negotiate for the 
budget, contact the provider, arrange for the upgrade, and help the provider’s 
team make the changes. 
Regarding the large number of systems and providers, especially in the Facility-
Management group, even in cases that the problem might be simple and can be 
solved through some internal efforts, it is preferred to be done through upgrades. 
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This is first because the internal team does not have enough time to work on 
those improvements. Second, the reliability of new systems is often higher than 
the repaired systems. Third, the newly upgraded systems have new guarantee 
contracts, which assures enough support in case of incidents.  
Supercomputer-Small has had much more frequent upgrades in its systems, 
compared with Supercomputer-Large. This is a simple and rather routine task: 
“For us, it is easy. We bring out the damaged track, and insert a new one from 
inventory” [the head of infrastructure department at Supercomputer-Small].  
The process of repairing the faulty systems is then a complex job that is done by 
the specialized providers. Most of upgrades involve changes in the hardware as 
well as some related software. In fact, many of the local improvements are 
automatically addressed in the next version of the technology, removing the need 
for short-term remedies or developing internal projects to fix them. 
Supercomputer-Small has also executed frequent upgrades in its core facilities. 
Almost all processing and storage systems have been upgraded every 3 to 4 years. 
This is mostly due to energy consumption concern that is one of the most critical 
factors from the view of the host university. In many cases, the systems that are 
working properly are decommissioned because the cost of energy consumption 
would surpass the cost of upgrading them. In addition, Supercomputer-Small can 
benefit from higher performance of new systems. These points are illustrated in 
the following quote from the head of LHC department at Supercomputer-Small: 
“We retire them every four years. … At some points, essentially after four years, it 
is better to … unplug all stuff. The new technologies are smaller and … in the 
storage, the kilowatt per tera-byte follows like an exponentially growing and then 
after 3 or 4 years, typically 4 years, it is so much better than … a 4-year machine, 
you are essentially paying everything for electricity.… the optimal decision in terms 
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of spending money is to replace the old machine with more tense machine” [the 
head of LHC at Supercomputer-Small]. 
Supercomputer-Small has not been dependent on a specific supplier. There is a 
wide range of technologies, even for a specific system such as storage. This has 
helped Supercomputer-Small benefit from the competition among its providers. In 
the supercomputer sector, the upgrade of core facilities is a huge contract. 
Therefore, the providers are willing to consider their clients’ needs to increase 
their chance in winning the next tender. In addition, using a wide range of 
technologies has made Supercomputer-Small capable enough to operate various 
technologies and systems and make them work with each other. Therefore, 
Supercomputer-Small has learned to manage the interfaces between various 
systems when each of the systems is upgrading independently. The downside, 
however, is that this adds to the complexity that Supercomputer-Small has to 
manage in each case of upgrading. 
The rapid and frequent upgrading has reduced the need for many internal projects 
at Supercomputer-Small. There were cases that internal experts developed some 
temporary solutions, just until the next release of the system. A middle technical 
manager at Supercomputer-Small explained this point: 
“For example, now, we have a hardware that has some problems and it is in the 
production and we know that we should have a new hardware in one or two 
months. … then we don’t take follow-up actions … we could spend a lot of time 
there trying to tune the rate or whatever. But we don’t [do] that. We know that we 
can do it in the infinite manpower scenario (laughing). We would learn something 
about it. But in two months it would be unplugged” [a middle technical manager at 
Supercomputer-Small].  
Being part of the whole CERN network, there are central software providers that 
continuously receive the change requests and release their new versions of 
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applications almost twice a year. Supercomputer-Small takes part in monthly 
meetings with the experts from other tier 1st sites, to discuss the new change 
requests with application providers. A recent example illustrates this point. In 
various incidents, some parts of the stored data were prone to be damaged. Apart 
from recovering the damaged data, which often takes several days or weeks, 
Supercomputer-Small needed to know very quickly (in less than one hour) which 
files are damaged and report it to CERN. This way, the whole network of CERN can 
quickly see if there is any backup of the damaged file. There is an overall 
application that managers the data storage in the whole CERN network, called 
d’cache. This need, once urgently detected in an incident inside Supercomputer-
Small, made the internal team develop quickly a simple script in short-run to 
locate where the damaged files are located. In parallel, this point, which has been 
also reported by other sites, was added to the change requests in the d’cache 
system to be done by the specialized provider: 
Sometimes during the upgrading process, new incidents occur. This is mostly due 
to the increasing complexity of systems that are connected. Thus, recently, 
Supercomputer-Small has recognized the need for developing a systematic 
process for upgrades, in which specific steps should be taken for discontinuing the 
existing system, as well as installing the new one. The process is complex, because 
the newly installed system is prone to some initial incidents due to inappropriate 
installation or configuration. Thus, the existing systems are often kept for a while, 
as a backup, to allow rolling back the upgrade in case of incidents in the new 
systems. 
 
Chapter summary: The chapter described various practices that the organizations 
adopted in relation with multiple incidents. These practices are adding to the 
practices that were specifically taken for each specific incident (previous chapter). 
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The multi-incident practices were described under three categories: using Wiki 
systems for documenting the experience of several incidents and using it as a 
support for future incident handling activities, executing and implementing 
improvement projects that address some defects that have been relent in several 
incidents, and making upgrades in the faulty systems that has created or can 
potentially create future incidents. The next chapter focuses on analyzing the 
learning practices that have been taken during and after each incident, as well as 
the practices taken in relation with several incidents. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis: Beyond Traditional Learning 
Modes 
Chapter 4 and 5 described various practices that helped the organizations 
capitalize on their experience of ISRIs to avoid them in future or manage them 
more effectively. In chapter 4, I described the practices that were adopted in 
relation with single incidents, either during incident handling process (handling 
incidents through ticketing system, doing Triage, and interactions with specialized 
suppliers) or after handling the incident (post-incident reflection and incident 
laboratory analysis). Chapter 5 described various practices that the organizations 
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adopted in relation to several incidents (using Wiki system, executing 
improvement projects, and upgrading the systems and technologies).  
This chapter articulates these practices into five patterns that I call them learning 
modes: (1) Learning through incident handling practice; (2) Learning through post-
incident reflection; (3) Transversal Learning from Incidents; (4) Outsourced 
Learning; (5) Learning through material replacement. Each learning mode shows a 
specific pattern of learning practices that is based on the abstraction from one or 
several categories of learning practices.  
More specifically, learning through incident handling practices refers to the 
process through which the very engagement in incident handling provides detailed 
experience of the incident, its causes, and potential ways for preventing it. This 
learning mode is manifested in handling incidents through ticketing systems, 
performing Triage, and doing laboratory analysis when the experts engage with 
incidents and work on them. 
Learning through post-incident reflection is a learning mode in which the actors 
reflect on their incident experience and draw lessons that can help them avoid 
future incidents or manage them effectively. Learning through reflection pertains 
to post-incident analysis practices and developing some Wiki articles that are 
specific to single incidents.  
Transversal learning mode is a pattern in which the organizations run an 
improvement project that straddles several incidents, but often takes place long 
after them. Transversal learning mode is observed in internal improvement 
projects, developing most of Wiki articles, and upgrades.  
Outsourced learning mode describes the pattern in which the specialized 
providers perform the very learning practices, while the focal organization is still 
benefiting from the learning outcomes. Outsourced learning is evident when the 
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organizations outsource their incident handling processes, post-incident reviews, 
and their improvement projects.  
Finally, learning through material replacement refers to a common pattern in the 
organizations that they tried to avoid future incidents or reduce their impacts by 
replacing the faulty part of their systems. This learning mode can be observed 
when the organizations replaced their IT artifacts during incident handling process, 
through their improvement projects, and in their scheduled upgrades. 
The first two modes are well documented in the literature. However, I highlight 
some nuances that show how the characteristics of ISRIs affected these two 
modes in the studied organizations (sections 6.1 and 6.2). The rest of the chapter 
(section 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5) articulates the other three learning modes. I also analyze 
how the characteristics of ISRIs contributed to the emergence of these modes and 
the way they unfolded. 
6.1 Learning through incident handling practices 
A first learning mode, emerging from this study, rotates around the actual incident 
handling practices. This learning mode means that the engagement of individuals 
and collectives in the incident handling process provides them with experiences 
and capabilities that help them in handling future incidents. The experience gained 
through handling incidents is important for handling future incidents. A senior 
expert at Security-Private mentioned: 
“Of course, you get a lot experience of security threats, the way that hackers 
implement their strategies, various sources of vulnerabilities just as you handle 
these incidents” [A senior expert at Security-Private]. 
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This learning mode manifests in three specific practices: handling tickets, doing 
Triage, and laboratory analysis of incidents. In this section, I comment on five 
aspects of this learning mode that shows how the context of ISRIs can contribute 
to it. First, I show how the organizations neutralized incidents when it entered into 
the ticketing system. Second, I comment on Triage as an integrative learning step 
at the beginning of incident handling process. Third, I comment on the high level 
of specialization that predominates incident handling process and how the 
escalation of incidents and selective involvement of actors influence learning 
opportunities throughout incident handling process. Fourth, I analyze how ticket is 
serving as an individual, shared memory during incident handling process. Fifth, I 
explain how the organizations were relying on the ticketing system as an 
automated, complete memory of incident. 
 
6.1.1 Neutralizing incidents through ticketing system 
Incidents have negative content that might reduce the willingness of experts to dig 
into them for learning from them (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005; Stern, 2002). 
However, in the studied cases, this negative content was hardly observable. It was 
rather surprising that in the interviews, the managers and experts reacted to the 
question “what kind of incidents you have here”, by saying 
“We don’t call them ‘incidents’. We call them ‘tickets’” [e.g., the head of Users-
Support groups at Supercomputer-Large] 
Further exploration showed that this is relevant for major incidents as well. A 
senior expert at Security-Private commented on how the incident is named 
“ticket” and is perceived as a neutral, urgent task, after entering the organization:  
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“From the time that they enter our ticketing system, they are “tickets”” [A senior 
expert at Security-Private]. 
Tickets then become important tasks that should be done urgently. This way, 
incidents become neutralized in the incident handling process. It means that the 
negative content of Incident –i.e., “what was wrong”, “who did the wrong task”, 
“whose fault is this”- is removed by being transformed into a ticket that a 
specialized experts has to handle it. However, tickets still maintain the urgency 
and importance of the incident –i.e., “why it is critical to act on it”, “how 
important is to control it quickly and avoid its occurrence in future”.  
Tickets play an important role in this process. First, it changes the language that 
the organizations use instead of incident. It provides a neutral substitute for 
notions such as “problem”, “incident”, and “failure”. Often, those who have been 
affected by the incident (e.g., the users who could not get access to 
supercomputers) express these negative terms. However, inside the organizations, 
the notion of ticket replaces all these words. In addition, ticket, when it is open, 
has the connotation of “must be handled urgently”. In fact, tickets are different 
from normal tasks (e.g., preparing a report for a manager), because they represent 
urgent needs. 
The literature has shown that organizational actors are likely to ignore or overlook 
the incidents that have negative connotations (normalizing phenomenon (Perrow, 
1999)). However, the ticket is acting in an opposite way. The moment that a ticket 
is created for an incident, it gives the incident an objective presence (“an open 
ticket”) that demands attention. Open tickets scream that “please admit me; I am 
an urgent task that has not been handled yet”. The tickets cannot be closed unless 
the head of the department or the one who is responsible for customer relations 
approves it. This setting reduces the chance that incidents be filtered out when 
they enter the organization or be overlooked beneath the daily activities.  
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Neutralizing allows experts to talk freely about incidents and interact openly 
during and after handling them. In addition, the attribution of tickets to an expert 
(e.g., “this is your ticket for handling”) does not foist any negative connotation on 
the expert to be considered as guilty or so. Instead, it can even be a badge of 
recognition, since the expert is considered capable enough to handle the incident.  
6.1.2 Integrative learning through Triage 
Triage is a specific stage in incident handling process that contributes to learning 
through incident handling practices. Triage involves practices that have unique 
learning aspects. First, learning during Triage has an integrative orientation, 
because the attentions and efforts are directed towards the current incident at 
hand. In other words, the actors draw upon their past experiences that can help 
them in managing the specific underlying incident. Past experiences and newly 
gathered information are all integrated to set a proper framework for handling the 
current incident. At the same time they take into account what happened in the 
past in terms of any similar incident. They think about possible links between the 
current incident and the previous ones. They consider if any experience in the past 
can help understanding and managing better the incident. In doing so, they put 
together various knowledge elements coming from their own experience and 
other sources. 
By the same token, Triage highlights the importance of having a holistic view of 
the incident, its scope, its potential impacts, and the patterns over similar 
incidents. This is reflected in the aim of Triage, which is setting the overall 
framework for handling the incident.  
Triage also brings to the fore the importance of heuristic learning, meaning that 
actors need to rely on their tentative and intuitive knowledge of the existing case, 
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as still little information is available about the incident in this stage (compared 
with after-incident reflection, when more stable and detailed information about 
the incident is available). 
Triage makes the incident handling process different from what is normally 
perceived; that is actors rush into the incident to control it without having time to 
reflect on it (the firefighting metaphor). However, Triage, as a formal stage, is an 
institutionalized reflection time in the midst of disaster. As a middle manager in 
Security-Private mentioned, it is a time that they put aside the pressure of incident 
handling process, and they say  
“OK, wait a minute, and let’s think about it, before we take any action …” [a middle 
manager in Security-Private]. 
This helps the experts become free of the pressure and urgency of incident 
context that can prevent them from deep, comprehensive understanding of the 
incident.  
Compared with learning that individuals get through their practical engagement in 
incident handling, Triage is a collective process. As illustrated in Box 4.2, Triage is 
done among senior experts who are responsible for different aspects of the 
business (e.g., different technologies or different business activities). The 
judgments about the importance and scope of incidents are the key themes of 
Triage that is discussed from the view of the senior experts. In addition, taking 
decisions about how incident-handling process should be structured, who is 
responsible for what, and what are the potential side effects, are all collective 
decisions that these experts make together. This is because various opinions from 
technical, organizational, and legal points of view are discussed for evaluating the 
criticality of the incident. In addition, setting the overall framework for handling 
incident requires that actors from various domains work together. The fact that 
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actors from different domains are involved in this stage provides many 
opportunities for learning about other domains. 
6.1.3 Specialization, escalation, and selective involvement 
In learning through incident handling practices, exerts learn through their 
engagements with various incidents. Particularly for junior experts, this practical 
engagement is critical because it complements what they had learned about IT 
incidents through formal trainings (e.g., university courses), and make them apply 
their knowledge in the real situation of incident handling process, where a lot of 
time pressure, ambiguity, and sensitivity in terms of potential mistakes exist. 
Senior experts with ample experience in incident handling mostly learn by dealing 
with novel incidents that allow them to learn new themes. As the head of incident 
handling department at Security-Public mentioned,  
“In case of new types of security incidents I personally take part. I try to work, in 
these cases with our provider, because these cases might have sensitive issues that 
should be handled with specific care. At the same time, I can learn new things” [the 
head of incident handling department at Security-Public]. 
Several mechanisms helped senior experts detect and involve merely in novel 
incidents. First, according to the escalation process in the incident handling 
process, once an incident arrives at the organizations, it is taken by first-level 
operators. If the incident is not routine (in the list of normal incidents with simple 
responses), it is escalated through ticketing system to the second-level experts.  
In specific cases that incident is complex or has to do with sensitive decisions that 
are beyond the knowledge and responsibility of second-level experts, it is 
escalated to third-level experts. This situation provides opportunities for junior 
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experts who have just promoted from level 1 to level 2 to learn through engaging 
with specialized incidents.  
In addition, the senior experts are also “aware of all incidents and what is going on 
during handling them” [the head of System Administration Group at 
Supercomputer-Large] through ticketing system and daily interactions. However, 
they only intervened when they feel that “something might go wrong”, mentioned 
by a senior expert at Supercomputer-Large. In fact, organizations saw the 
engagement of their junior experts in various incidents as a key mechanism 
through which they “develop experts who are capable to handle the very specific 
types of incidents” [the head of Users-Support group at Supercomputer-Large]. 
This, in turn, adds to the overall capacity of the organizations in dealing with 
similar incidents in future. It also filters out routine incidents that can yield little 
learning at the second and third levels of experts. A senior expert at 
Supercomputer-Large mentioned that  
“Each day, we might receive tens of incidents. I do not go through all of them. Just 
those that are critical and technical enough that cannot be handled by our 
helpdesk team, is sent to me” [a senior expert at Supercomputer-Large]. 
This selective intervention, not only assures appropriate incident handling, 
provides junior experts with learning opportunities through their interactions with 
senior experts. For instance, they can learn what is often called “tricks”. Tricks are 
specific solutions or techniques that help solving puzzling problems, in a rather 
strange way. For instance, the Email-server expert at Supercomputer-Large faced a 
situation that some emails were strangely considered as Spam. He checked them 
and resent them from different senders to different recipients to find the problem. 
It turned out that the problem was not related to the sender, or the receiver. Even 
the problem was not about the subject of email or its attachments. The problem 
was very strange, since there was no reason that such emails would be considered 
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as Spam. Accidentally, the expert changed the first character of the email content. 
He put a space character at the beginning of the text and the problem was solved. 
He did several tests and realized that the problem was because the email text 
started with “LM”. He did not know why that happened and how putting a space 
at the beginning solves the issue. However, he was referring to this as an example 
of many other tricks that just happen in their work and cannot be learned from 
reading formal books. He reflected on this point saying 
“I do not know why it works (laughing). But it works. It is funny. That happens. You 
just put a space and you see the problem is solved” [email-server expert at 
Supercomputer-Large] 
These tricks, though are very specific and sometimes just relevant in very special 
situations, are critical because junior experts cannot learn them through other 
mechanisms (such as formal training or reading available information).  
Second, and in addition to this formal escalation process, senior experts detect 
novel incidents as they are constantly checking out the in-flow of incidents. This 
selective attention is often backed by the experience of senior experts that 
provides them with clues for detecting novel incidents. In doing so, experts often 
look for counter-intuitive and strange incidents that look unfamiliar, with regards 
to their experience of past incidents. The head of System-Administration group at 
Supercomputer-Large said 
“… normally I am on top of the tickets. So, I know more or less the issues that are 
happening and normally these people are reporting me … problem. That we have 
to solve it and we have to find alternative solutions” [The head of System-
Administration group at Supercomputer-Large]. 
This shows that the intuition of the senior expert is helping him to detect strange 
incidents. 
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Third, the specialization of experts in specific categories of incidents also works as 
a mechanism for selecting relevant incidents to engage with. Within the domain of 
IT incidents, all organizations (except Supercomputer-Small) had a detailed 
specialization at the second-level experts. This specialization, in some cases, was 
based on historical preferences. For example, in Supercomputer-Large, in Users-
Supports group, four second-level experts are specialized in handling incidents 
related to different applications. Once expert “A” handles the first incident related 
to a specific application, then the next incidents related to this application will be 
assigned to the same person to leverage his experience. Similarly, in System-
Administration group at Supercomputer-Large, the team of senior experts is 
specialized in handling incidents related to network, security, backup, CPUs, and 
servers. Although in most of the cases experts can handle incidents outside their 
domain of expertise, they intentionally avoid that because it is not efficient. 
“It is not efficient to do so. Other colleagues can handle these network incidents, 
maybe if they spend like 10 hours to understand it, but for me it is a matter of 2 
hours” [network expert at Supercomputer-Large]. 
Over time, this gradually created clear domains of specialization among the four 
experts. This phenomenon is known as transactive memory system (Brandon & 
Hollingshead, 2004; Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995) that allows some actors rely 
on the knowledge of other actors without needing to learn about others’ domains. 
The specialization of incident handling prevents the organizations from spending 
further resources to re-learn what some specific experts have already learned. 
Instead, experts could spare time to learn about incidents that are really new to 
the organization. Regarding the fact that even in large organizations often one 
expert is assigned to a specialized domain, most of the learning that they had 
through their engagement in handling incidents is individual.  
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6.1.4 Ticket as an individual, shared memory 
During incident handling process, tickets keep the record of all the actions 
(including both effective and failed actions) that have been taken for handling 
incident. This way, experts can learn from the actions applied to the current 
incident, when they are still handling the same incident. This is important when a 
group of experts (often first-level helpdesk) fail to handle the incident, so that, 
they move the ticket to more specialized experts (often specialized experts at level 
2 and 3). In fact, the ticket is acting as a temporal, live memory that connects 
different actors. For instance, the ticket that was created for the Email-server 
incident at Supercomputer-Large (please see box 4.1), first, was filled with the 
comments of the users support experts. The same comments were then consulted 
by the expert responsible for the Email-servers, while still the ticket was open. This 
expert changed part of the comment of the Users-Support to correct the 
description of the ticket in a way that shows it is not due to the Email-servers. 
Then until the point that the network expert was resolving the incidents, the ticket 
was used as a memory of what has been done so far.  
In addition, ticket acts as a historically contextual memory of handled incidents 
because it reflects the context in which the incident took place, the very actions 
that were applied on it, and the consequences of those actions. The chronological 
sequence of the ticket content acts as a story that reminds the situation in which 
incident handling process took place. 
Tickets related to major incidents are often quite specialized in narrow domains. 
Therefore, although tickets are shared, they mostly act as occasional, individual 
memories. It means that each expert refers to his own past tickets occasionally to 
refresh his/her mind about a specific piece of information. The very attempt of 
putting detailed descriptions of actions and solutions facilitates retrieving required 
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information in future similar cases. However, this is often done with the 
assumption that the same person who handled it will consult the ticket.  
6.1.5 Ticketing system as an automated, complete memory 
Ticketing system provides an infrastructure that facilitates learning during incident 
handling process. The way tickets are designed and, thus accumulatively store 
information during incident handling (e.g., with the automatic logs), helps 
organizations keep a detailed, retrievable record of incidents that does not require 
extra efforts. In fact, experts do not need to stop their very incident handling 
practices to document some information into tickets. Unlike Wiki, actions on the 
ticket are perceived as the very incident handling practices, not as extra-work 
burdens. Although this might make tickets less structured and articulated than 
Wiki articles, it is aligned with the context of incident handling process in which 
actors are of short of time. 
Another important characteristic of ticketing system is that it keeps a rather 
complete record of the incident handling process. This completeness has been 
quite important for the organizations as almost managers in all the organizations 
mentioned this point as one of their rationales for using ticketing system. For 
instance, the head of LHC at Supercomputer-Small mentioned that  
“What is important is that we have all [emphasis in the original voice] information 
of an incident in its ticket” [the head of LHC at Supercomputer-Small]. 
It is striking that, this completeness is rarely exploited in practice. For instance, 
organizations rarely performed comprehensive search and analysis on the 
information stored in their ticketing systems. It seems that this completeness is 
mainly concerned for the sake of peace of mind. In other words, a complete 
memory of incidents serves the managers psychologically, rather than cognitively. 
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This point is reflected in the answer of the same manager at Supercomputer-Small 
in responding to the question about how they benefit from this completeness:  
“In case that one day we need some specific information, we are sure that we have 
everything in the ticketing system” [the head of LHC at Supercomputer-Small]. 
In fact, being complete, is a subjective judgment that the managers of the 
organizations pursue. There is no specific measure that shows whether the 
content of tickets is complete or not. Even there is no reference point in the 
organizations against which the completeness can be assessed. In other words, it 
reflects more the fear of lacking important information, rather than a specific 
need that drives their zeal to store everything possible. 
 
To sum up, various characteristics of ISRIs affect the way organizations learning 
through handling incidents. The technical nature of incidents and their high level 
of specialization make this process be predominately individual. The critical role 
that ticketing system plays in this process also allows neutralizing incidents into 
tickets, which in turn allows for storing a detailed, historical log about each 
incident. In addition, the specialization of incidents due to their technical natures, 
joint with the escalation process, helps allocating learning opportunities to 
learners, without compromising the quality of delivering incident handling services 
(due to selective intervention of senior experts). 
6.2 Learning through post-incident reflection  
A second group of practices, common to all the organizations, rotated around the 
efforts to reflect on and analyze major incidents after handling them. The studied 
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organizations performed various practices through which they analyzed and 
reflected on handled incidents to draw lessons for future incidents and 
improvements.  
This learning mode is clearly reflected in both informal and formal post-incident 
reflections such as incident reporting and open seminars. In addition, some Wiki 
articles that were specifically developed for single incidents also manifest this 
mode.  
This learning mode is the dominant view in the literature about how organizations 
learn from their incidents. However, three nuances in the way that organizations 
adopted this learning mode unravel some of the characteristics of ISRIs. First, the 
organizations intentionally avoided doing post-incident reflections in various 
situations. Second, although post-incident reflection is supposed to be done 
collectively, it has been conducted individually or in small teams. Third, in spite of 
the original intention of post-incident reflection for extracting the causes of 
incidents (know-why), the focus of organizations has been mostly on identifying 
practical solutions (know-how). In fact, the organizations were skipping the root-
cause analysis of this learning mode. I will go through these three nuances and 
discuss how they can be related to the contextual factors of ISRIs. 
6.2.1 Learning abstinence  
The studied organizations did not perform post-incident reflection and analysis on 
all major incidents. They were quite selective in doing so. Even in organizations 
like Security-Private with a systematic post-incident analysis stage, the experts 
were careful in deciding whether to analyze an incident or not. The experts were 
mentioning that not all incidents are worth being analyzed. One major reason was 
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that technologies change rapidly. Therefore, the next incidents will be different. 
Hence, lessons from past incidents are not applicable in case of future incidents. 
In this sense, learning from ISRIs presents unique challenges that are different 
from other industries. In fact, the period through which the lessons learned from 
past incidents can be used is too short that does not justify spending time and 
effort by the organizations. Sometimes, even the learning process (with its delays 
and challenges) can take longer than the period that such learning might be 
relevant. This point was clear for instance, in the case of backup systems at 
Supercomputer-Large that the organization was not entering into the analysis of 
its incidents since the technology would change very soon. The new backup 
systems are based on a fundamentally different architecture and design, that even 
thinking about the causes of past incidents could mislead experts about how the 
new system works. 
As the second reason, which was more relevant to novel incidents, the experts 
were worried about drawing immature lessons, before they see a rather stable 
pattern. Even in situations that the technology is not changing fast, the experts 
resisted systematic analysis of incidents causes until a good number of incidents 
are accumulating. They had to see some overall patterns over time to see what 
aspect of the technology might be the source of incident, and consequently find 
the appropriate intervention point. Their intuition was indicating that too early 
analysis might make them draw incomplete lessons and erroneous conclusions. In 
addition, they were worried that this might lead to suggesting and sustaining some 
remedies that prevent them from finding solutions that are more fundamental. 
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6.2.2 Collectively designed, but individually performed learning 
Although post-incident reflection and analysis were designed to be done 
collectively, senior experts often conducted them individually. For instance, mainly 
the head of LHC department did incident reporting at Supercomputer-Small. 
Similarly, single, specialized experts who handled the incident mostly did post-
incident documentations and analysis at Supercomputer-Large. This is because 
major incidents are often quite specialized. Therefore, the expert who is 
specialized in that domain handles them. In addition, the fact that IT systems are 
modular makes incidents be technically separated. For instance, although a 
network incident at Supercomputer-Large affected Email-servers, the lessons 
drawn from the former incident was quite unrelated to the latter. This was 
manifested in the case narrated in Box 4.1 in which the Email-servers expert 
mentioned that 
“I do not know exactly what was the issue. I did not ask about it, to be honest 
(laughing). It was not related to Email-servers. It was something about network, I 
guess” [Email-servers expert at Supercomputer-Large]. 
Likewise, open seminars at Security-Private, that were designed to be done 
collectively, faced a problem that a senior expert at the company referred to as 
the problem of “being boring and unrelated to the rest of the team”.  
As we see, over time, collectively designed practices such as open seminars and 
post-incident reflections gradually changed into a rather individual task. Even their 
formality (e.g., all projects must document their lessons) did not help in 
performing them collectively. It has been observed in most of the organizations 
that a specific expert is almost doing everything that is needed for creating such 
document. Even in cases such as Supercomputer-Small, formal post-incident 
  177 | Page 
 
reports are developed with the centrality of a principle expert who occasionally 
consulted other experts for specific information. 
The core issue is the relevance of the analysis to the organizational actors. The fact 
that most of the incidents that are important and novel enough to be worth being 
analyzed, are so specialized that either one or just very few experts relate to them. 
Even in cases such as Security-Private that the organizations have prepared all 
sorts of motivational and resources for holding such analysis sessions collectively, 
the lack of relevance resulted in rather useless participation of expert. 
6.2.3 Shifting the attention from “know-why” to “know-how” 
Post-incident analyses were mostly focused on practical implications, useful tools 
and methods, and, specific tricks that can help in future. For instance, the Wiki 
articles at Supercomputer-Large that were developed as reflections on specific 
incidents were mostly focused on what they call it “how-to-do” content. These 
articles were documenting a specific tool or technique that can solve a specific 
problem. As illustrated in the previous chapters, the content of wiki articles 
focuses on technical know-how, such as step-by-step instructions for running a 
script and modifying it.  
Similarly, the incident reports at Supercomputer-Small turned into shorter reports 
that focus less on the detailed causes of the incident. The part related to the 
causes of incidents shrank over time, giving more centrality to the description of 
the incident and the actions done to handle it and follow up actions that should be 
taken afterwards.  
There were several reasons for this pattern. First, the experts mentioned that the 
audiences of such documents are either themselves or experts in their narrow 
domain of expertise who “all know what is behind”. Therefore, for the experts it 
178 | Page 
 
was not making much sense to document the causes of incidents that they have 
already handled. As mentioned by a senior expert at Supercomputer-Large, there 
are two scenarios. Either the expert has handled the incident. Therefore, he 
already knows everything about the incident. Then, he just needs to put some 
practical points that in the article that in case he forgot something, he can consult 
the article. Or, the expert is not involved in the incident and the incident is 
handled by the provider. In that situation, the expert does not need to know the 
causes of the incident. Perhaps, he only needs to know a little about how to 
control the incident in the first place and hand over the incident to the provider. 
Second, the fact that technical aspects behind incidents change frequently (e.g., 
Internet browsers change, so that the ways in which hackers enter computers 
does) reduces the need for detailed documentation of their causes. In fact, it is not 
efficient in many situations that the experts dig into the incident and spend a 
considerable time to detect and document incident causes, when those causes are 
not going to be relevant in future incidents. 
 
To summarize, rapid changes in information technologies made it unnecessary 
that organizations perform post-incident reflection. Furthermore, the 
organizations sometimes strived to avoid learning practices. Even in cases that 
post-incident reflection was conducted, it has been done mainly by individual 
experts or among limited number of experts who are related to the specialized 
incident. Finally, in documenting the post-incident analysis, the efforts has been 
mostly focused on documenting know-how, with little attention to extracting and 
codifying know-why. This is because either the experts already know and do not 
need to document incident causes for themselves or the technology changes so 
quickly that makes such knowledge irrelevant for the next incidents. 
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6.3 Transversal learning from ISRIs 
The previous two groups of practices (learning through handling incidents and 
learning through reflection) resemble processes that have been documented by 
prior studies as typical learning modes that take place in various contexts. 
However, this study foregrounds a third leaning mode and associated practices 
that is typical of the IS (and other technologically dense) environments. This has to 
do with learning not from individual, but rather several incidents, that is called 
transversal learning (TL). Transversal learning (TL) refers to the process through 
which the organization tries to solve a specific problem or make a specific 
improvement based on the experience of several related incidents. 
Improvement projects, which almost all organizations were running for making 
local improvements in their systems, are clear examples of TL. For instance, when 
Supercomputer-Large launched the central storage mirroring project (see Box 5.2 
in chapter 5), the organization tried to address three categories of past incidents.  
Other examples of transversal learning can also be found in some of the wiki 
articles at Security-Public. For instance, the incident response team created an 
article about considerations that should be taken for isolating the affected hard 
disk of Apple Laptops. This article, was developed when the experts faced several 
incidents in which Apple Laptops were affected and they got the experience of 
some special considerations related to isolating their hard-disk. 
There are several characteristics that all together define TL mode: (1) Multiple 
relation with past incidents; (2) Focusing on specific solution (thematic nature), (3) 
Asymmetric temporal relation with incidents; (4) Being based on a temporal, 
purposeful cognitive base; (5) Being based on accumulated political pressure; (6) 
Being materialized through socio-technical bases. Table 6.1 summarizes the 
characteristics of TL. 
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Table ‎6.1: The characteristics of transversal learning 
Characteristics  Description 
Multi-incident relation The learning process straddles multiple incidents 
Thematic with specific 
purpose 
TL is focused on a specific solution, which often relates to 
a theme that straddles a wide range of incidents  
Asymmetric temporal 
relation with incidents  
The timings of incidents and learning process are not 
synchronized; learning talks place either in a periodic or in 
ad-hoc manner; the temporal distance between incident 
and learning process is significant 
Loose and vague 
relation with incidents 
The relation between the learning process and incidents is 
loose and vague; it is hard to pin point a specific and clear 
relation between TL and related incidents 
Articulated around 
socio-material elements 
In TL, there are socio-material elements that integrate 
various learning practices and incorporate learning 
solutions into specific socio-material elements.  
6.3.1 Multiple relation with past incidents 
TL, as exemplified in these two cases, is informed by the experience of several 
incidents. In fact, the relation between the incident and learning process is not 
one-to-one. The learning process is often based on several incidents that share 
some similarities. Those similarities are selected by learning agents depending on 
the purpose of learning (learning theme). For instance, numerous incidents might 
be selected to be analyzed, by focusing on their similarities in terms of the legal 
issues that they raise, while on another occasion, based on their technical 
similarities.  
The past incidents have been discussed in a rather vague and abstract way in the 
learning sessions to disguise the relations with specific incidents. This rather 
ambiguous reference to incidents helped the organizations avoid political tensions 
in the learning process. In fact, organizational actors were intentionally de-
politicizing learning process by blurring the relations between learning process and 
the related incidents. 
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Although TL occurs in parallel with incident handling process, it often requires a 
different mood of action in which actors free themselves from the pressure of 
incident handling, to see “the big picture”, take a more “long-term” perspective, 
and to see “whether it is worth doing” or not. In some companies, the experts 
were taking turn for handling incidents, so that they could spare “relaxed time” for 
spending on learning projects. 
6.3.2 Focusing on specific solution (thematic nature) 
 
TL is articulated around a specific solution (a theme). For instance, adding a legal 
service for assessing the legal implications of security incidents at Security-Public 
was informed by the experience of various past incidents with significant legal 
implications. The focal purpose of TL determines which past incidents are relevant 
to be drawn upon in the learning process, and more specifically, which aspects of 
them should be taken into consideration. In addition, this central theme 
determines relevant learning practices that are needed to be conducted in the 
learning process. 
6.3.3 Asymmetric temporal relation with incidents 
Another characteristic of TL mode is its timing. TL is often not triggered by any of 
the related incidents. TL often takes place long after the incidents are handled, 
when the political climate of incident calmed down. Sometimes, attempts were 
made to add more temporal distance between the incidents and the learning 
process to make it hard to pin point a specific relation between learning practices 
and the related incidents.  
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This temporal distance was particularly important in cases that technology was 
changing quickly, so that the organizations could bypass temporal changes to 
reach to a stable pattern of incidents for defining their learning initiatives. For 
instance, Security-Public handled the first sever mobile security incident by using 
its general tools. Once a stable pattern of mobile security incidents was 
recognized, the managers and experts realized that specialized incident handling 
tools are needed for effective management of mobile incidents. This led them to 
acquire new set of technologies for handling mobile security incident.  
Instead, TL takes place when a proper moment of learning appears. The 
organizations transversally learned, for example, when they were upgrading their 
systems and technologies, in periodic events, (such as renewing contracts), when 
they were designing new systems, during scheduled interventions for doing 
overhaul or preventive changes, when the daily load work plummeted (e.g. during 
summer time), when required resources (financial, technological, or human) 
became available, and simply when key influential actors were present to be 
involved in the process. For instance, Security-Public has used its annual planning 
as a critical time to revise its service catalogue by adding new services related to 
new incidents detected in the last period. It also helped Security-Public make 
changes in the processes through which the services are delivered. 
6.3.4 Being based on a temporal, purposeful cognitive base 
TL mode benefits from the experiences that organizations accrue during incident 
handling process and in their reflections after each incident. However, it is mostly 
based on the knowledge that is specifically developed and integrated for the 
purpose of the learning project. In fact, the actors focus on a specific targeted 
solution (e.g., the script that creates alarms before the failure of storage system). 
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They often start developing their knowledge exclusively for creating the solution. 
This, for instance, can be done by assisting some specific practical workshops (e.g., 
knowing how the storage system might fail), collecting some new information 
(e.g., searching in the web to see how other similar organizations have solved this 
problem), and conducting some specific experiments (e.g., reproducing the failure 
of the storage system). This results in a body of knowledge that has been 
developed purposefully for the underlying learning project.  
In doing so, the organizations also needed to draw upon their experiences from 
past, related incidents. For each transversal learning solution, often, there have 
been several related incidents. These incidents are sometimes very different in 
terms of their origin, impacts, and handling process. However, each adds to the 
local knowledge base that is needed for developing the intended solution. For 
instance, in the central storage case in Supercomputer-Large (see Box 5.2), the 
experience of three different types of incidents were used: failure in storing data 
files, failure in accessing to the existing files, and failure in copying data with 
sufficient pace.  
Unlike in post-incident reflection, in creating the local, temporal knowledge base, 
the organizations were focusing on a central theme (the solution) and this allowed 
them to identify what part of their experience was relevant. This temporal 
judgment helped them filter out the noises and focus on what they were seeing 
relevant for the sake of the current learning project. Unlike learning through 
incident handling and post-incident reflection, the relevance of past incidents 
derives from their potential contribution to complete the local knowledge base 
that is needed for developing the solution, not necessarily due to their novelty per 
se. 
In developing the local cognitive base, the organizations adopted an integrative 
mode of knowing in which the search for new knowledge was similar to 
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completing a puzzle. Therefore, it was different from the type of discussions that 
are mostly present in post-incident reflection sessions that experts brainstorm on 
what ideas can be drawn from the incident. Instead, the question, in TL, is what is 
needed to be known for developing the solution.  
6.3.5 Being based on accumulated political pressure 
Transversal learning mode is also based on mechanisms that try to accumulate 
political pressure to drive and lead the learning process. Since TL takes place long 
after the related incidents, the sense of urgency and pressure that exists during 
and right after incidents fades away. Instead, TL mode is based on the 
accumulation of pressure that has been accrued out of several related incidents. In 
running TL process, the organizations were building on the past incidents by 
reopening them and upholding the needs for change that those incidents were 
showing. This way, they could create a temporal political pressure that could drive 
the learning project.  
Furthermore, the experts who were leading TL process were playing on the 
knowledge lack that some influential actors such as top managers or external 
customers were suffering from. Hence, they could dramatize further by drawing 
upon a wide range of past incidents, as well as potential future damages. This way, 
a series of incidents were used to construct a discourse that could increase the 
political pressure to a level that drives the learning process. The pain that actors 
could reconstruct and envision based on past experiences and potential future 
incidents is an important aspect of incidents that contributes to dramatizing. 
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6.3.6 Being materialized through socio-technical bases 
TL mode is solution oriented. Therefore, it is often materialized around the 
development and refinement of a specific socio-material element such as a 
specific hardware, a piece of software, or simply a specific technical standard and 
an organizational procedure. This is the objective facet of TL mode. The socio-
material elements sometimes are created through the learning process (e.g., 
developing a script for increasing the pace of mirroring data) and, sometimes, are 
used as the basis upon which learning practices are applied (e.g., adding a script to 
the backup operating system). This way, socio-material elements act as a basis for 
integrating learning practices. At the same time, they incorporate part of the 
knowledge and experience that has been used for developing them. They also 
institutionalize the learning solution into existing organizational practices.  
To summarize, TL mode refers to a pattern of learning that is based on several 
incidents, is focused on a specific intended solution, and often takes place with 
considerable temporal distance from the related incidents. As shown in lower part 
of Figure 6.1, bellow, TL mode is based on the experience of several incidents. In 
fact, the experience that individuals and collectives gain through incident handling 
process and through post-incident reflection adds to the organizational memory. 
However, for the specific intended learning solution, a local cognitive base is 
created out of the overall organizational memory (see the middle part of Figure 
6.1). In doing so, the organizations relied on various mechanisms such as filtering 
the noises, which means selecting parts of organizational memory that are related 
to the underlying solution. Benefiting from several incidents’ experience, the 
organizations could identify some patterns across various incidents and gain 
deeper understanding of some problems that existed in several incidents. This 
experience helped the organizations gain a holistic picture about the incident, its 
cause, and the potential solutions. In addition, various knowledge domains that 
186 | Page 
 
are related to the past incidents are often integrated to build the local knowledge 
base for the development of the solution.  
In addition, TL is based on the accumulation of a local political pressure to drive 
the learning process (right side of Figure 6.1). The organizations rely on various 
mechanisms such as dramatizing on several past incidents to add to the perceived 
urgency and need for learning. In addition, since TL is related to several incidents, 
sometimes the organizations disguised the specific relation with particular 
incidents to avoid some political interference such as blame-game that can be 
created by reflecting on specific incidents. In addition, the support of some key 
actors also triggered some learning projects. 
TL is also based on creating a socio-material bases upon which the intended 
solution is developed. This socio-material base sometimes has a scaffolding role 
(e.g., a temporal model or prototype of the final solution) for the creation of the 
ultimate solution, while in other occasions might become part of the final solution 
(e.g., an initial versions of a script). Creating a socio-material base requires 
mobilizing various resources, deploying material elements, and developing some 
organizational structures (such as a new routine or a project) upon which the 
learning solution is built.  
The final solution in the TL process is then the product of these three pillars 
(cognitive, political, and socio-material) that can be realized in an appropriate 
learning moment.  
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Figure ‎6.1: Transversal learning and its relation with learning through incident handling and post-
incident reflection 
Some recent theoretical developments in the literature on learning from incidents 
emphasize on the importance of inter-incident learning (Moynihan, 2009). Some 
patterns about the cause of incidents can be detected when organizations reflect 
on several incidents over time. These studies mainly focus on the cognitive aspects 
of learning from multi-incident analysis. 
Although TL relies cognitively on multiple incidents (as various sources of 
information), it also benefits from other structural and political mechanisms that 
are based on a series of past incidents. As discussed above, multiple incidents 
accumulate enough political pressure to justify and lead the learning process, the 
fact that might hardly be achieved through single incident learning. Most of the 
focused incidents in this study were significant incidents. Therefore, the empirical 
findings suggest that even single, large incidents might be incapable to mobilize 
resources for learning process, especially when learning process requires 
significant amount of resources and political barriers of learning are sever. 
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TL also provides a temporal pattern for learning process that might suit well 
learning from significant, repetitive incidents (sometimes known as middle-size 
incidents (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005)). These incidents are significant enough that 
require specific learning initiatives (e.g., internal improvement projects). They are 
also repetitive enough (even though not so frequent) that it justifies a transversal 
learning mode be taken to formulate solutions based on cross-incident analysis. 
6.4 Outsourced learning from ISRIs 
The fourth learning mode refers to the pattern observed in situations that the 
organizations outsourced their learning practices to their specialized suppliers and 
providers, which served their learning purposes. Analyzing various learning 
practices in the organizations showed a rather prevalent pattern that the 
organizations rely on and benefit from the learning practices that take place inside 
their providers. They benefit from this learning, by maintaining their relations with 
their providers for handling similar incidents in future. In fact, the organizations 
relied on what and how the providers have learned from incidents.  
In other words, outsourced learning mode implies that not only the incident 
handling process, but also the very learning process takes place inside the 
provider. This pattern is evident in organizations such as Security-Public that 
outsourced developing post-incident reports and knowledge articles and running 
improvement projects. 
The organizations even avoided some internal learning practices to pursue their 
outsourced learning strategy. For instance, the junior expert in Facility-
Management group at Supercomputer-Large has had the chance to take part in 
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some training workshops to learn handling some critical incidents internally. He, 
however, avoided that temptation, since  
“The strategy is that we outsource all these activities” [the junior expert in Facility-
Management group at Supercomputer-Large]. 
The heterogeneity of specialized technologies and their associated incidents also 
contributed to this strategy. For instance, running a wide range of technologies, 
Supercomputer-Small decided, from the very beginning, that a single internal 
facility manager be responsible for dealing with a wide range of providers, and 
making them improve their incident handling services.  
6.4.1 Learning from others, through suppliers 
Outsourced learning not only helped the organizations leverage the learning 
capabilities of their providers, but also could learn from other organizations’ 
incidents through their providers. In fact, the organizations needed to learn from 
the experience of other similar organizations. However, they had to do this on a 
wide range of specialized domains. Outsourced learning provided the 
organizations with the opportunity to benefit from the learning that their 
specialized suppliers accrue from handling incidents for various clients. The 
organizations often did not have any entry into the specific knowledge and 
practices that the providers have learned from other clients.  
In addition, rapid technological changes pave the way for adopting outsourced 
learning mode. This way, the specialized providers can learn and develop new 
technologies, while, the studied organizations could hardly do so on a wide range 
of specialized domains.  
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Nevertheless, the downside is when the incident is occurring for the first time or in 
a peculiar way that the experience of other clients is irrelevant or even misleading. 
This happened in some cases in which Supercomputer-Large tried to rely on the 
provider, while it proved that the case is different from what the provider had 
experienced in other clients. The situation became worse when the provider tried 
to use the same solution that had developed for apparently similar incidents of 
other clients. As a result, Supercomputer-Large acted on its own experience and 
developed the solution internally through a trial and error process. 
6.4.2 Contracts for learning 
The relation between the organizations and their suppliers is important in 
outsourced learning mode. The challenge is how this relation be developed to 
make the providers learn as quickly and effectively as possible. As exemplified in 
the case of Security-Public, the organization was benefiting from the learning that 
its provider had gained through the first two years of engagement with various 
incidents. However, moving from body-shopping to volumetrias contract led the 
provider invest in changing tools, methodologies, procedures, and even structures 
that could allow for handling incidents more efficiently. In fact, paying based on 
the resolved incidents, rather than number of working hours, encouraged the 
provider to find ways in which the same quality of services could be delivered at a 
lower price. These two types of contracts (body-shopping versus volumetrias) 
illustrate how learning can be embedded in the duties of the provider. What was 
seen from the view of the organizations as learning from incidents was considered 
as the core daily business of the providers.  
On the other hand, the provider had the fear that too much learning on the 
services could result in substantial improvement in their efficiencies, which, in 
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turn, might make Security-Public reduce the service prices in the following year. 
There were different opinions inside the provider about the impact of too much 
learning for delivering services. For instance, the CEO of the provider was not 
concerned about too much learning since he was seeing a trend of fast market 
expansion in security sector, as he said  
“We are not worried about this. The IT security sector is expanding very quickly. It 
is changing very quickly as well. We need to learn and this allows us to open new 
opportunities for delivering new services” [the CEO of Security-Public’s provider]. 
This contrasted with the projects manager’s opinion that he saw their substantive 
improvements a tricky decision that should be made concerning the expectations 
that can create inside the clients: 
“We have improved a lot our services. Now we can deliver them much more 
efficiently. However, the [clients] should not feel that this justifies decreasing the 
prices. We invested a lot to reach to this point” [the project manager of Security-
Public’s provider]. 
 
To summarize, outsourced learning mode helps the organizations push the 
learning practices outside their organizational boundaries, while still reaping their 
benefits for future incidents. This pattern seems quite relevant in ISRIs due to 
technological specialization, the heterogeneity of these technologies, and rapid 
technological changes. The organizations pursued this learning mode that helped 
them avoid entering into a wide range of specialized domains. Instead, they could 
black box the learning process and incorporate it into the services that they 
received from their providers. The way that the organizations arranged their 
relations with the providers was also important for motivating providers to learn 
effectively and in a timely manner. 
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6.5 (not) Learning through material replacement  
The fifth learning mode refers to a common pattern observed in situations in 
which the studied organizations avoided similar incidents and reduced their 
impacts by simply replacing parts of their systems. This practice was observable 
during incident handling process and when the organizations chose to replace 
damaged parts of their systems. It was also evident in various internal 
improvement projects that resulted in replacing a specific part. In addition, the 
organizations were running periodic upgrades through which they were replacing 
hardware and software elements that could bring about future incidents.  
Although this does not fit with the traditional understanding of learning, it has 
been a common pattern in the studied organizations for capitalizing on the 
experience of past incidents to avoid them in future or reduce their impacts. This 
learning mode surfaces some of the assumptions about how organizational 
learning process takes place in organizations.  
The fact that technologies changed quickly made the organizations pursue this 
strategy actively. This way, they could easily benefit from the learning that the 
specialized suppliers have gained in developing new versions of technology. In 
fact, the organizations tried not to engage in the technical aspects and confine 
their learning scope to just knowing how to replace the damaged parts and 
manage their suppliers in a way that the experience of past incidents yield future 
improvements. The modularity and malleability of IT systems and the access right 
of the organizations for changing their systems are factors affecting learning 
through material replacement. 
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6.5.1 Modularity versus malleability 
Learning through material replacement becomes more feasible when the 
underlying technologies become more modular; that is replacing one part of the 
system does not require changes in other parts. The modularity of systems 
supported this learning mode, since the organizations could replace one part of 
their systems, without being forced to replace the other related parts. For 
instance, Supercomputer-Small is running a very heterogeneous collection of 
processing and storage systems from different technologies and brands. The fact 
that all systems can work with each other through an open-source platform helps 
them replace one part easily.  
This learning mode is more relevant for hardware components that are closed, 
meaning that the organizations cannot make changes into them. In fact, changes 
in hardware module are often too complex and specialized that only very 
specialized suppliers are able to do. However, in case of software components that 
are more open to changes (especially when they are open source), the 
organizations were relying on improvement projects that aimed at changing and 
manipulating them (in TL mode). As the case of central storage at Supercomputer 
shows (see Box 5.2), sometimes the original preference of the organizations was 
replacement. However, the budget or other practical limitations made them 
embark on learning how to make changes into the objects. This shows two 
different ways of capitalizing on the experience of past incidents: learning by 
knowing their causes and making related solutions versus trying not to get into 
them and only benefiting from the learning of the suppliers. 
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6.5.2 Access right for learning 
The access right and the arrangements with the providers can challenge 
outsourced learning mode. For example, Supercomputer-Large has been 
dependent on a primary provider for its main supercomputer. In spite of system’s 
modularity, Supercomputer-Large has not been able to replace some parts, since 
the provider has been pushing for an overall upgrade in the whole system. This 
delayed upgrading process because it required a big investment.  
This point becomes clearer when we compare Supercomputer-Large with 
Supercomputer-Small. Supercomputer-Large is based on processing systems that 
making changes in them are mainly in the control of the provider. However, 
Supercomputer-Small has built its own systems based on an open-source strategy; 
that is any technology and brand is welcomed as far as it can work with other 
systems and technologies through the open-source platform. Therefore, they can 
make changes to the systems independent of the providers. In the former case, 
learning through material replacement took place less frequently and more 
fundamentally than the latter. 
To summarize, learning through material replacement is similar to outsourced 
learning in the sense that the organizations did not enter the details of incidents 
and their causes. In fact, in both cases, the organizations skipped the process of 
knowing about the causes of incidents, and tried to learn from them from 
distance. In other words, the learning process becomes a black box, either by 
being outsourced to the provider or by being embedded in new artifacts. In both 
cases, although the organizations have learned literally (because they have done 
something that helped them avoid similar incidents in future or reduce their 
impacts), they have minimized their cognitive and practical involvements in the 
learning process. This is contrary to the normal conceptualization of learning 
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process that assumes learners develop new knowledge and practices for avoiding 
future incidents and reducing their impacts. 
 
Chapter summary: This chapter articulated five learning modes by extracting 
patterns observed in learning practices that the organizations adopted in relations 
with single or multiple incidents. Table 6.1 summarizes the five learning modes, 
their definitions, their associated learning practices, and the characteristics of ISRIs 
that are relevant to each mode. As discussed in each learning mode, various 
characteristics of ISRIs qualified the adoption of each mode and the way it 
unfolded in the studied organizations. In learning through incident handling 
process, the specialization and technical nature of incidents helped the 
organizations neutralize incidents, yet not normalizing them. In doing post-
incident reflection, the technical nature and specialization of ISRIs led to the 
dominance of individual learning practices, in spite of their original collective 
design. In addition, rapid technological changes results in learning abstinence that 
prevented the organizations to embark on analyzing incidents before they 
accumulate insights on a series of them. Finally, the outsourced nature of IS 
activities and heterogeneity of ISRIs makes the organization focus on “know-how”, 
rather than “know-why” in their post-incident reflections.  
Rapid technological changes and the high level of specialization created a situation 
in which the organizations learned from multiple incidents for making specific 
solutions, based on a temporal cognitive base. The technical nature of ISRIs paved 
the way for technical experts to dramatize on the past, related incidents to 
increase the political pressure that is needed for moving the learning process 
forward.  
The modularity of ISRIs and the outsourcing trend of numerous technologies that 
the organizations operate went hand in hand with the high level of specialization 
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of ISRIs to lead the organizations to rely on outsourced learning mode. The 
organizations were opting to follow outsourced learning mode since the 
technologies were changing so quickly that justified pushing learning practices 
towards their specialized providers. 
The same characteristics resulted in the dominance of learning through material 
replacement. This way, the organizations were avoiding engagement in specialized 
practices and understanding technical ISRIs that will be automatically solved when 
the new artifacts are adopted. 
In general, most of the learning practices related to five learning modes were done 
individually, and informally. Sharing the experiences and reapplying it in other 
groups happened only to a limited extent because of limited relevance of such 
experience and action to others. This was mostly due to the high level of 
specialization. For instance, learning from network incidents was irrelevant to 
other groups (e.g., email server) since the technology, processes, and types of 
incidents were different. Related to the high level of specialization that made 
learning process be predominantly individual, it also made learning process be 
rather informal since it did not make any sense that the organizations add much 
formality for just one or a couple of people. In spite of such individual and informal 
nature of learning practices, the organizations incorporated the experiences of 
incidents into their organizational processes and technological elements (for 
example through improvement projects). However, this incorporation is done 
often in an individual, informal manner. Next chapter discusses the insights from 
learning modes in relation with the existing literature on organizational learning 
from incidents. 
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Table ‎6.2: Five learning modes from ISRIs 
Learning mode Definition Related practices Related ISRIs 
characteristics 
Learning through 
incident handling 
practice 
The engagement of 
individuals or teams in 
incident handling process 
provides them with 
experience for handling 
future incidents. 
- Handling incidents 
through ticketing 
system 
- Doing Triage 
- Laboratory 
analysis 
- Specialized and 
technical nature 
Learning through 
post-incident 
reflection 
Analyzing the incident 
(when, how, why it 
happened) after handling 
it and drawing lessons for 
future improvements 
- Post-incidents 
reflections 
- Some Wiki articles  
- Rapid 
technological 
changes 
- Specialization of 
technology 
Transversal 
Learning from 
Incidents 
A process through which 
the organization tries to 
solve a specific problem or 
make a specific 
improvement based on 
the experience of several 
related incidents. 
- Internal 
Improvement 
projects 
- Wiki articles 
- Upgrades 
- Negative valance 
of incidents 
- Rapid 
technological 
changes 
Outsourced 
Learning 
The organization relies on 
and benefit from the 
learning practices that 
take place inside its 
providers. 
- Outsourcing 
incident handling 
process 
- Outsourcing post-
incident analysis 
and reflection 
- Outsourcing 
improvement 
projects 
- Modularity  
- Heterogeneity of 
technologies 
- Specialization of 
technologies 
- Rapid 
technological 
changes  
Learning through 
material 
replacement 
By replacing part of the 
technology, the 
organization avoids past 
incidents or reduces their 
damages in future. 
- Replacements 
during incident 
handling and 
Improvement 
projects 
- Upgrades 
- Modularity  
- Heterogeneity of 
technologies 
- Specialization of 
technologies 
- Rapid 
technological 
changes 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
The aim of this research is to understand the process of learning from ISRIs, with 
regards to the characteristics of these incidents (Figure 2.2 in chapter 2). By 
adopting a situated learning view, I focused on learning process in relation with 
contextual factors, particularly the characteristics of ISRIs. Relying on a practice 
view, I examined the actions (and inactions) that the organizations performed in 
relation with single incidents (chapter 4) and in relation with multiple incidents 
(chapter 5) to capitalize on the experience of past incidents. The previous chapter 
articulated five learning modes that emerged from the analysis of various learning 
practices observed in the studied organizations (See Table 6.2 in chapter 6).  
  199 | Page 
 
Therefore, the first contribution of the study is articulating the differences that 
ISRIs context make for the known learning modes. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, learning through incident handling mostly revolves around managing 
tickets that help organizations objectify incidents and reducing their negative 
connotations (neutralizing). The very technical nature of ISRIs is reflected in the 
prevalence of individual learning practices, with limited engagement of other 
peers. In other words, organizational learning is very much dependent on 
specialized learning that single experts accrue in their incident handling practices. 
However, the exception is Triage, which is done collectively across a wide range of 
domains and responsibilities. During Triage, the organizations integrate their 
experiences of past and current incidents into decisions and solutions related to 
the incident at hand. 
Analyzing how the organizations reflected on their handled incidents showed that 
unlike the original intentions, this process often takes place either individually or 
among a few experts. This is mostly due to the high level of specialization of 
technologies that stems from the technical nature of ISRIs. In addition, rapid 
changes in IT prevented the organizations from reflecting on incidents and 
drawing lessons for future incidents, because those lessons would be irrelevant 
and even misleading when new technologies (with new ISRIs) are in place. In fact, 
the effort sometimes should be made to avoid such immature and ineffective 
incident analysis (learning abstinence). Finally, the technical nature of ISRIs and 
the high level of specialization made the organizations focus on documenting 
“know-how” (how they can perform if such incident happens in future), rather 
than going through the causes of the incident (“know-why”).  
The second contribution of the study is articulating three new learning modes that 
seem to be prominent for helping the organizations benefit from their past ISRIs 
experiences. Rapid changes in technology led the organizations to define learning 
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solutions through the analysis of multiple incidents (transversal learning). This 
way, they could address fundamental changes that were relevant in a wide range 
of incidents. Furthermore, the technical nature of incidents allowed them to 
leverage the unfamiliarity of non-expert stakeholders to dramatize on the past 
incidents. This, in turn, added to the political pressure needed for moving the 
learning process forward.  
Prior studies have shown the importance of learning from individual or few 
incidents (March et al., 1991). In addition, recent studies have stressed the 
importance of learning from rare events (Christianson et al., 2009; Lampel et al., 
2009). Contemporary theoretical developments in the literature on learning from 
incidents emphasize on the importance of inter-incident learning (Moynihan, 
2009). For instance, a series of incidents over time can point to a more 
fundamental defect (Fauchart, 2006) than what can be extracted from a single 
incident. Sometimes, the heterogeneity of various incidents acts as a source for 
drawing lessons that might not be drawn from similar incidents (Haunschild & 
Sullivan, 2002). These studies have mostly focused on the advantages of having 
multiple sources of information to increase the validity and reliability of learning 
content, compared with the knowledge that can be drawn through analyzing rare 
events (Lampel et al., 2009). 
However, the articulation of political aspects of transversal learning (TL) process 
shows that incidents play other roles, rather than only providing sources of 
insights and information. In particular, the technical nature of ISRIs facilitates 
dramatizing on past incidents that might not necessarily be used in drawing 
insights for the development of the final solution. In addition, TL, as observed in 
the cases, is solution-oriented rather than incident-oriented. In other words, the 
question is not what we can learn from a series of similar or different incidents 
(the focus of multiple incident learning in the literature). Instead, the question is, 
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for the specific concerned solution, what aspects of past incidents can help, both 
cognitively and politically. In fact, the efforts are directed towards finding a 
specific solution. The relatedness of past incidents is, then, judged based on their 
potential contributions in providing insights for developing the intended solution, 
no matter how different or similar they are. 
The results of the study also show that the organizations actively pushed the 
boundaries of their learning process to their providers (outsourced learning). This 
is because the organizations operate a wide range of specialized technologies that 
change rapidly. This makes the organizations unable to learn about all the rapid 
technological changes. In addition, outsourced learning helps them benefit from 
the learning that their specialized suppliers accrue from handling other clients’ 
incidents. The attempt, then, focuses on defining a relation with the suppliers that 
assures reaping learning outcomes, without being involved in them. 
Finally, my analysis shows that the organizations actively replaced their systems 
and their parts as a common practice to avoid similar incidents in future. In fact, 
the organizations preferred not to learn about the causes of incidents and the 
solutions that can prevent them. All this understanding for them either is useless, 
since the technology is changing very fast, or is almost impossible to attain due to 
the heterogeneity of their specialized technologies. On the other hand, the 
modularity of information systems helps them make rapid replacements in specific 
parts of the system or major upgrades to their overall systems.  
In other words, in both outsourced learning and learning through material 
replacement, the technical nature and the rapid changes of ISRIs make the 
organizations learn from past incidents, without knowing about them. This is 
different from the dominant perspective of literature that envisions knowing 
about the causes of incidents (either through engagement with the incident or by 
analyzing it a posteriori) as the first step in the learning process.  
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In the remaining of this chapter, I examine how the articulation of these learning 
modes can advance our understanding of learning process from ISRIs. These three 
new modes, not only show that organizations go beyond the traditional 
expectation of literature in their attempt to learn from their ISRIs, but also show 
how learning from ISRIs might be different from learning in other contexts. The 
claim is that understanding OL from ISRIs requires rethinking (1) the temporal 
pattern of organizational learning process, (2) the uncertain and emergent nature 
of learning, (3) materiality of knowledge and learning, (4 and 5) the politics of 
learning, (6) learning governance, and (7) the organizational aspects of learning 
process. 
More specifically, the articulation of transversal learning mode questions the 
established view that learning from incidents either takes place during or after 
incidents. Second, the uncertainty and changing nature of ISRIs makes the 
organizations rely on empty knowledge articles as tools that not only expose their 
knowledge lack, but also materialize their learning needs and inspire a transversal 
learning on critical themes. 
Third, the modularity and malleability of IT artifacts, linked with their rapid 
changes, influence the material aspects of learning and knowing, different from 
situations in which the artifacts are stable and tightly coupled.  
Fourth and fifth, the technical nature of ISRIs and the dominance of ticketing 
system in the process of incident management have paved the way for the 
emergence of some political mechanisms in the learning process, such as 
neutralizing and dramatizing.  
Sixth, the widespread outsourcing of IT services has shown the importance of 
considering new governance systems in analyzing how learning process is 
organized; beyond the traditional intra versus inter organizational learning 
dichotomy.  
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Finally, the individual pattern of learning practices poses questions on the 
organizational aspects of learning process. This, in turn, makes us rethink the 
appropriate unit of analysis for studying OL process, when we focus on situations 
that are characterized by high-level of specialization and extensive outsourcing of 
wide range of modular technologies. 
The discussion of these aspects is grounded in the existing literature, which, in 
turn, allows extracting new theoretical insights. 
7.1 Temporal pattern of OL process 
Studies on organizational learning from incidents have shown that learning 
process can take place during incident handling process, known as intra-incident 
learning (Moynihan, 2009), and (right) after handling incidents, known as post-
incident learning (Boddie, 1987; Kasi et al., 2008). The review of IS literature 
(chapter 2) shows that the dominant focus has been on post-incident reflection 
and analysis, through practices such as post-mortem analysis and post-incident 
evaluation. These studies suggest that involved actors should run learning process 
quickly after incident handling process to avoid losing important information and 
sufficient attention. 
A growing body of literature also considers learning during incident handling by 
focusing on learning through working and practicing (so called “knowing” (Nicolini 
et al., 2003; Orlikowski, 2002)) and mindfulness (Butler & Gray, 2006; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993). In these views, learning takes place while organizations handle 
incidents. Therefore, there is no temporal separation between OL and incident 
handling process. This distinction has been insightful as it shows the different 
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opportunities and challenges that organizations might face during and after 
incident handling, when they leverage their incident experiences. 
This study identified transversal learning (TL) as a learning mode that manifests a 
different timing of OL. Instead of focusing on a single incident, which is the case in 
learning through incident handling and in post-incident reflection, TL concentrates 
on multiple incidents that cognitively and politically contribute to the intended 
learning solution. Unlike the previous two learning modes, in which OL process is 
triggered by a specific incident, TL is not triggered necessarily by any specific 
incident. In other words, transversal learning mode does not necessarily take place 
during or after any (major) incident. It occurs in parallel with incidents.  
Transversal learning takes place when a proper moment of learning appears. 
Organizations learn transversally, for example, when they are upgrading their 
systems and technologies, in periodic (mostly seasonal and annual) events such as 
renewing contracts when they are designing new systems, during scheduled 
interventions for doing overhaul or preventive changes, when the daily load work 
drops (e.g. during summer time), when required resources (financial, 
technological, or human) becomes available, and simply when key influential 
actors are present.  
Moreover, TL often takes place long after a series of incidents. This temporal 
distance helps organizations build a holistic, stable cognitive base about the 
solution, mount sufficient political pressure around the concerned solution, and 
develop required socio-material elements as the basis for materializing the 
learning initiative. This temporal pattern of learning seems to be particularly 
relevant in ISRIs since rapid technological changes require that organizations avoid 
hasty learning actions by developing a stable understanding of incidents. In 
addition, this temporal distance helps them bypass the negative content of 
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incidents (e.g., by disguising the relations with incidents) that often poses barriers 
in learning during and right after a specific major incident. 
This challenges the recommendation of literature that organizations should 
engage in learning process right-after incidents to prevent information loss and 
capitalize on the existing political pressure due to fresh wounds (Elliott, 2009). TL 
offers an alternative learning mode that takes place in an appropriate moment, 
when required cognitive, political and socio-material elements are already 
constructed.  
7.2 Learning by seeding through semi-empty articles 
Normally, it is expected that Wiki articles document the experience of an incident 
(in post-incident reflection learning), and codifying lessons that have been drawn 
from a series of incident (in transversal learning mode). However, we observed 
that the articles in the Wiki system are sometimes rather empty. The experts, who 
feel that some themes are important for learning, create an empty article with a 
tentative, broad title (for example “legal consequences of exposing organizational 
passwords”). This often happens when such learning need arises due to facing one 
or several incidents. However, the socio-technical environment (e.g., the laws, the 
capabilities of technologies, the patterns of users’ behavior) is still too uncertain to 
allow the experts to draw any specific lesson. They, at most, might put a few bullet 
points as the potential issues related to the article that should be considered as 
points of attention. For example, one bullet point in the abovementioned empty 
article was “check if the formal employee contracts have any point about this 
issue.” 
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The empty article objectifies and materializes the learning need. The empty article 
is there, in the Wiki system and is observed by other experts. It generates 
questions about a specific topic, and makes other experts think about it and 
search for it. It draws attentions towards an overall theme that is not known, but 
is important to be known. In other words, the empty article articulates the 
knowledge lack. Because Wiki articles are shared, it publicizes such need that can 
make the community of experts search for it. In this the sense, empty article acts 
as a hole that intakes learning efforts. This way, empty articles contribute to the 
need for learning among experts, rather than supplying some knowledge to them. 
The prevalence of empty articles is partly because technologies change quickly. 
This has been one of the rationales of the experts for creating empty articles that 
could help them avoid hasty conclusions about issues that are still changing and 
are uncertain (of course, another reason for creating semi-empty articles is the 
time limitations that experts face).  
Accordingly, (semi)empty articles act as seeds that plant learning practices. They 
are created as starting points around which new learning practices are taken and 
new knowledge is developed. They grow, as they become complete and are 
developed into complete articles. In other words, they act as holes, that different 
learning agents throw their learning efforts into them. Of course, the shape of the 
hole – i.e., the words selected for defining the empty article and the few initial 
bullet points- affect what kind of new knowledge is thrown into them. 
Empty articles are also helpful for the sake of integrating various ideas and 
opinions. They act as discussion meetings in which an open question is going to be 
discussed. Empty articles say loudly that please let me know if you have ideas 
about this theme. This way, each expert knows what other peers do not know, but 
they need to know. This is different from the idea of transactive memory (Brandon 
& Hollingshead, 2004), which relies on what actors know about other actor’s 
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knowledge. Empty articles, instead, let others know what other actors do not 
know. This can help in avoiding naïve reliance on others in domains.  
Empty articles are different from open questions that an expert can pose through 
a wiki system. From social perspective, the creation a semi-empty article implies 
some level of expertise. Unlike questions, empty articles articulate learning need, 
without putting the creator of the article in a lower status in front of other 
experts. In fact, when an expert creates an empty article it means that he is the 
most knowledgeable person about this theme, who still does not know much 
about it. 
Finally, empty articles can contribute to the learning attitude among experts. 
When senior experts who are supposed to know a lot in their domains develop 
several empty articles, it signals to junior experts that there would be no shame in 
doing so. Empty articles institutionalize admitting knowledge lacks, especially 
because those wiki articles have an objective presence (more than just keeping the 
questions in the mind). 
7.3 Regimes of materiality and learning process 
The pattern of OL process in the studied organizations shows that modifying, 
upgrading, and replacing a specific part of information technology is a common 
practice. As mentioned in the previous chapters, most of the improvement 
projects are defined based on developing a local script that can solve a problem 
and avoid some incidents. Similarly, the organizations have constantly considered 
upgrades and replacements as a critical strategy to avoid incidents in future. 
This resulted in the prevalence of a new learning mode, which is learning through 
material replacement. This learning mode contrasts with the conventional learning 
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modes in which the organizations need to develop an understanding of the faulty 
technology, the causes of incidents, and ways of preventing them. Nevertheless, 
learning through material replacement addresses learning aims –i.e., avoiding 
similar incidents in future and reducing their impacts – while the organizations do 
not engage in, and even avoid, understanding the incident and its causes. In doing 
so, they only replace the system or part of that with a new element that 
automatically reduces the likelihood of past incidents. 
This pattern results from the modularity of information systems that allows 
organizations to make local modifications without changing other parts or the 
basic design. Modularity refers to the systems’ design that is composed of 
components that can be independently changed, without requiring changes in 
other related components. These components are interacting through interfaces 
when they are operating as parts of the whole system. In fact, a modular system 
lends itself to be decomposed into parts in such a way that changes in one part do 
not require changes in the other parts. Regardless of the agency of social actors, 
the very design of the system determines the extent to which the system is 
integral versus modular (Kallinikos, 2012).  
The fact that organizations are running a wide range of specialized technologies 
also made them perform such changes frequently by relying on their specialized 
providers. In most of the cases, the organizations just need a thin understanding 
for identifying which part needs to be replaced and a minimum effort to get a 
specialized provider to do so. In this way, learning through material replacement 
and outsourced learning can complement each other when the replacement is 
mostly done through the supplier. Then, the supplier analyzes the faulty system to 
understand why such incident happened. 
In addition, the high pace of technological changes requires that organizations 
introduced quick modifications and changes in their technologies, while some 
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other parts (e.g., some basic technologies) are still unchanged. Nevertheless, the 
digital aspects of information technology, linked with the overall open-source 
strategy, helps in situations that revising or developing a local software element 
(known as scripts) can postpone or remove the need for making changes in some 
stable parts of the system.  
This pattern relates to the discussion on materiality in the learning process 
(Leonardi & Barley, 2008; Leonardi, 2010; Nicolini et al., 2011; Orlikowski, 2010). 
Previous studies have shown that material objects can play different roles in the 
learning process, including transferring, translating, and transforming knowledge 
across specialized communities (boundary object) (Carlile, 2002), acting as an 
object to be known and investigated (epistemic object) (Miettinen & Virkkunen, 
2005), serving as an element upon which social actors perform their practices 
(practice object) (Engeström, 2000), and being taken-for-granted material 
conditions within which social coordination takes place (Nicolini et al., 2011).  
Our empirical findings add two specific nuances to this discussion. First, the 
abovementioned roles assume that the object itself remains almost unchanged, 
although it is embedded in various social processes such as knowing and 
practicing. However, the learning during incident handling and in transversal 
learning mode often requires changes in material objects (e.g., upgrading a faulty 
technology). In normal situations of operation, material objects are considered as 
stable and unchanged, while they are evolving during the design period. During 
incident handling process, the doors of materiality open as the faulty systems are 
not under their normal operations. This is the time that organizational actors can 
introduce changes to the material objects, as well as doing several 
experimentations on it. This window of material opportunity becomes selectively 
(e.g., only some specific parts of technology) open again in transversal learning 
mode and when doing upgrades and replacements (e.g., through scheduled 
210 | Page 
 
interventions). In fact, these two learning modes (learning during incident 
handling and transversal learning) are two critical moments concerning material 
learning. Although previous studies have recognized the importance of opening 
social windows that appear during and right after incidents (e.g., “policy window” 
(Stern, 2002)), little attention has been paid to material window that often opens 
during incident handling process and during transversal learning mode. 
More specifically, when the windows of materiality are open, the learners can 
experiment on the material object and introduce changes into it which both are 
important for the sake of learning from incidents. This is different from the 
epistemic and practice roles of objects when social actors try to investigate and 
work with the object, respectively. In both cases, the object remains unchanged. 
However, the technology (faulty system) is changing and revising constantly during 
incident handling process and then during other learning modes.  
Furthermore, even when the policy windows are open after the control of 
incidents (e.g., through post-incident analysis), the organizations might not be able 
to perform their analysis of the incident until the time of scheduled interventions 
that they can experiment on their systems. In that periods, they can reproduce the 
incident (in a controlled environment, and only in a specific part of the whole 
system) to understand how the incident works and how it can be prevented. 
The characteristics of ISRIs, in particular, and information systems in general, allow 
for this learning mode. The fact that IT systems are modular provides a situation in 
which local, quick replacements and modifications become feasible. The digital 
aspects of information systems, and in particular the open source applications, 
also add to this feasibility since the organizations can adapt some digital aspects –
e.g., a specific module of the application- even when changes in the hardware and 
the overall system architecture is not feasible. 
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This pattern can extend the discussion on the role of material objects in the 
learning process by pointing to a specific regime of materiality that dominates 
ISRIs. This regime of materiality, as contrasted with materiality regime in situations 
such as healthcare system, paves the way for making more chances to their 
material conditions as they are working.  
The second nuance relates to the dominance of replacement and upgrades as a 
common way of capitalizing on past ISRIs experience. Following my overall 
definition of learning from incidents, practices taken for replacing material objects 
are considered as learning practices. However, these practices do not require that 
the central organization go through cognitive levels of learning. This is because the 
organizations are operating a wide range of specialized technologies that makes it 
difficult for them to gain sufficient knowledge about all of them. Moreover, their 
outsourcing strategy also makes them abstain from learning about their technical 
incidents, even in situations that they can do. This is partly because these 
technologies change so quickly that the knowledge about them becomes obsolete. 
This pattern modifies the dominant models of organizational learning that assume 
that at least part of the learning process is based on developing an understanding 
of the incident and its causes. For example, Kim (1993) argues that organizational 
learning starts with the understanding of experts about the problem, and then it 
becomes shared into collective schemas, which, in turn, result in creating changes 
at organizational level. Learning through material replacement, however, relies on 
a very limited cognitive involvement of organizational actors (just at the level of 
detecting the problem), and mostly relies on changes in material components. This 
can question an implicit assumption that organizational actors need to develop 
the knowledge of incidents (known as “cognitive aspects of learning” (Fiol & Lyles, 
1985)) to make changes in their behaviors (known as behavioral learning). In fact, 
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learning through material replacement is a complete learning process in which 
cognitive learning is at minimum. 
7.4 From normalizing to neutralizing  
OL studies have shown that organizations are prone to ignore or filter out the 
signals that do not fit their expectations (Hedberg, 1981; March & Olsen, 1975). 
Further studies have shown that even organizational actors tend to overlook, 
suppress, and distort negative signals that can threaten their power (Lawrence et 
al., 2005). Similarly, Brown & Starkey (2000) have argued that there are “identity 
defense mechanisms”, such as denial, rationalization, idealization, fantasy, and 
symbolization that prevent organizations from learning.  
In case of incidents, the chances are high that organizations adopt strong 
defensive mechanisms such as normalizing incidents (Turner, 1976) into 
unimportant signals. This can lead to ignoring the signs of incidents and 
misinterpreting incidents, so that organizations might fail to tap learning 
opportunities, especially when still windows of opportunities for making changes 
are open. 
However, what we have seen in the case of neutralizing process is that 
organizations reconstruct incidents in a way that they do not question the 
established self-concept. Neutralizing is different from normalizing because 
organizations do not overlook or ignore the incident. Instead, they admit it 
attentively (e.g., by entering it into their formal incident handling process, through 
ticketing system). What they do, however, is that they re-create the incident as a 
as “ticket” which implies “an important task”. Thus, the incident loses its identity-
threatening connotation, while still keeps its inherent criticality (urgency).  
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Neutralizing has to do with the discourse that revolves around incident handling 
process. More specifically, the language that the studied organizations had 
established to talk about incidents was concentrated around neutral concepts 
such as “tickets” and “tasks”. 
In addition, objectifying incident through ticket and handling it through ticketing 
system facilitates neutralizing. Similarly, the centrality of technology (e.g., the 
faulty hardware) seems to divert the attention from people to objects. Hence, the 
discussions and efforts focus on “what” (e.g., what is broken and which part of the 
system is faulty) rather than “who” (e.g., who was guilty, who did so).  
Neutralizing also reflects the fundamental assumption about technology in IT 
departments. For them, even in case of sever incidents, the blames would often be 
diverted towards technology. This is the technology that is assumed as “something 
that always fails”, and “never, it is perfect”. This is well illustrated in the technical 
discourse of programmers who believed that “any code has its own bugs”. This 
facilitates neutralizing since the incident is considered inevitable. Instead of 
interpreting incident as the misbehavior or failure of social actors in complying 
with their responsibilities, the focus is diverted towards acting quickly and 
effectively to solve it and making improvements that reduce the chance of similar 
incidents in future. 
This perspective is dominant even in the studied organizations that they were 
handling very critical infrastructures such as supercomputers and national-wide 
information systems. Such organizations are classified in the literature as high-
reliability organizations (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1989; Roberts, 1990), 
in the sense that they have little room to compromise their service quality. 
However, the picture inside the studied organizations, especially in the time of 
major incidents, is different from the prediction of this literature. The studied 
organizations have tolerated a wide range of incidents, although they maintained 
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their service quality through other mechanisms such as technological 
redundancies. For them, incidents were inevitable. More seriously, their default 
assumption was that technology fails. This way, they could maintain their 
reliability through continues learning, with little fear about working through and 
reflecting on past incidents. This has been facilitated through neutralization. 
Neutralizing suggests a different strategy than what Brown & Starkey (2000) 
suggest in their psychodynamic analysis of identity-defense mechanisms. They 
suggest that for organizations to learn, they need to foster a culture and 
mechanisms that make their members critically reflect on their collective identity. 
In doing so, the organizations need to work on the collective wisdom, which allows 
for controlling and counteracting identity-conformation mechanisms. They suggest 
that organizations can foster organizational learning by focusing on mechanisms 
that “promote attitudes of wisdom”, through mechanisms such as “critical self-
reflexivity” and “identity-focused dialogues”. Their suggestion is that organizations 
should learn how “to promote critical reflection upon organizational identity” 
(Brown & Starkey, 2000: 103) through “understanding and the mitigation of those 
ego defenses that tend toward a regressive retreat” (Brown & Starkey, 2000: 103). 
However, in the case of neutralizing, such identity-threatening aspects of incidents 
are removed from the very beginning. Instead of acting against the self-defense 
mechanisms, organizations reframe and reconstruct incidents in a way that do not 
contradict their identities, so that they could tap the learning opportunities. The 
reconstruction of incident into a neutral socio-material element (e.g., a ticket) 
helps circumventing such identity-defense mechanisms, which, in turn, removes 
the need for counteractions in order to foster learning process. 
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7.5 From rationalization to dramatization  
The significant negative impacts of major incidents can both create political 
pressure for organizations to embark on learning process (Stern, 2002) and pose 
challenges in the learning process if blame-game (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Stead 
& Smallman, 1999) and “protecting vested interest” (Elliott & McGuinness, 2002) 
become prevalent. Previous studies mostly consider the political role of incident 
during and right after incident handling process, when the flames of incident and 
the memories of pains are still in place. 
Even when incidents are too big to be normalized, the organizations might 
sacrifice their learning opportunities during and right after incidents by 
rationalizing negative incidents (e.g., attributing them to uncontrollable, external 
factors) (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). Therefore, organizations might fail to see 
incident as a learning opportunity, resulting in no incentive for adopting learning 
practices. For instance, Baumard & Starbuck (2005) analyzed several large 
negative incidents in a telecommunication company and realized that the 
managers do not consider the incidents as learning opportunities due to the 
attribution of them to uncontrollable causes. 
Although the current study focused on major negative incidents, the studied 
organizations showed little tendency to rationalize their incidents. It first appeared 
in the willingness of the organizations to openly talk about their incidents. Even 
when the organizations were asked to pick incidents that they are more willing to 
reflect on, they were quite open to pick any incident that the researchers would 
suggest. Second, it was reflected in the self-critical language of most of the 
managers, without being embarrassed.  
As described in the previous chapter, during incident handling process and even 
right after that, the political pressure was reduced when incidents became 
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“tickets” at the beginning of the incident handling process. In fact, they became 
neutralized as tickets, rather than being perceived as negative incidents. The 
technical levels, in my cases, were mostly considering even big incidents as 
another task or simply a request that should be solved. 
However, the findings showed that, during transversal learning, the organizations 
were even playing on past incidents and intentionally rejuvenating their pains to 
mount political pressure that is needed for driving learning projects. More 
specifically, transversal learning mode surfaced an important political dynamic: 
dramatizing, in which senior experts who were already aware of the importance of 
some learning initiatives reconstructed and added to the political pressure around 
that specific initiative. The targets of dramatizing were managers and the clients 
who had little technical knowledge. Dramatizing could create a feeling of necessity 
among these actors who had to decide about learning initiatives (managers) and 
actually perform them (clients). Senior experts who were dramatizing were 
drawing upon several incidents that could be interpreted as somehow relevant to 
the learning initiative. This way, dramatizers were revitalizing the pain and 
envisioning potential damages. Lack of technical knowledge made targets of 
dramatizing believe in the frightening stories narrated by senior experts, although 
they were not aware of their technical contents. 
Dramatizing resonates with the insights in change management literature about 
creating urgency for change. More specifically, change management literature has 
shown the importance of enhancing the readiness for change by persuading actors 
(Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993; Kotter, 1995; Mento, Jones, & Dirndorfer, 
2002). In the case of dramatizing, the past, related incidents are selected by 
technical experts (not managers of the organization) and have been reinterpreted 
in a way that show the importance of the underlying specific change project 
(mostly in the transversal learning mode). 
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While the literature on incident learning is predicting that the organizations tend 
to rationalize, rather than dramatize on their past incidents, the insights from this 
study point to the contrary. This might be because the existing literature has 
focused on two learning modes (learning during incident handling and post-
incident reflection), while, dramatizing is more likely to appear in the transversal 
learning mode in which the multiple, unclear relations with past incidents reduce 
the chance of blame-game. In addition, neutralizing incidents facilitates 
dramatizing on past incidents, since those incidents have not been perceived as 
threats to individual and collective identities. Furthermore, the technical nature of 
ISRIs contributes to dramatizing since IT experts can act on the unfamiliarity of 
other learning actors (e.g., managers and users) with the technical aspects of ISRIs. 
7.6 The governance of OL process 
The studied organizations were capitalizing on the experience of ISRIs by relying 
on the learning practices that took place inside their providers (outsourced 
learning). This way, the organizations tried to cope with the heterogeneity of 
technologies and their related incidents and the rapid technological changes, by 
relying on distributed learning practices located outside their organizations. The 
modularity of their systems also facilitated this process. As a result, the specialized 
providers could learn and apply their learning to the associated technology, 
without affecting other parts of the system. 
Outsourcing IT services is a well-documented pattern in IT industry (Cha, Pingry, & 
Thatcher, 2008; Levina & Vaast, 2008; Rai, Maruping, & Venkatesh, 2009; 
Ramasubbu, Mithas, & Kemerer, 2008). In this line, various studies have examined 
how a central organization can learn through interactions with its suppliers (Cha et 
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al., 2008; Ramasubbu et al., 2008). For instance, Cha et al. (2008) suggest a model 
in which the more organizations involve in knowledge transfer from their 
providers, the more long-term benefits (e.g., reduction in production cost) would 
be gained and the less would be the rate of internal knowledge depreciation. The 
results of their simulations indicate that organizations should actively engage in 
transferring knowledge from external companies into their internal memory to 
avoid being locked in long-term ineffective relations.  
However, our findings show that the organizations were adopting a different 
strategy. They were intentionally striving not to learn, and rely on the learning 
inside their suppliers. This way they could benefit from the competition among 
their providers in successive contracts. What they learned was how to develop and 
improve their contracts to enhance their benefits in such relations. For instance, 
moving from body-shopping to volumetrias, Security-Public motivated its provider 
to make its services more efficiently. Similarly, Supercomputer-Small tried to 
create a competition among its suppliers by frequent, open bids, in which defining 
the requirements for new systems was informed by past incidents. Instead of 
trying to learn technical aspects from the provider, the organizations learned how 
to contract them (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). 
In fact, the organizations created a specific governance system in which they could 
accrue the benefits of learning that takes place inside their specialized providers, 
without being dependent on internal learning practices. This learning governance 
is different from the dominant view that considers that learning process occurs 
inside the organizational hierarchies. It also contrasts with the idea of 
collaborative learning that takes place when organizations learn through their 
interactions with other organizations (e.g., see literature on interorgnizational 
learning (Ingram, 2002; Kraatz, 1998; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 
1998; Scott, 2000) and vicarious learning (Denrell, 2003; Kim & Miner, 2007)). 
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Outsourced learning is close to the findings of literature on outsourced R&D that 
argues organizations tend to outsource their knowledge-intensive activities 
especially when they establish a long-term relation with suppliers that have 
proved to be capable for improving their services and providing knowledge-
intensive services (Maskell, Pedersen, Petersen, & Dick-Nielsen, 2007). In their 
study on Danish international companies, Maskell et al. (2007) show that in the 
first step, the companies outsourced their activities to reduce their costs. In the 
next step, the managers broadened their perspective about the advantages of 
outsourcing knowledge-intensive activities. Hence, they pursued outsourcing more 
knowledge intensive activities to their providers to seek new knowledge that 
those providers can bring about. Recent studies on R&D outsourcing and cross-
organizational knowledge collaboration have argued that organizations reduce 
their knowledge collaboration to reduce their risk of “unintended leakage of 
valuable” (Martinez-Noya, Garcia-Canal, & Guillen, 2013: 68) knowledge and 
technology to their suppliers. 
However, our analysis shows that the studied organizations did not consider 
knowledge drain to their suppliers as a threat. Instead, they were willing to push 
the process of learning outside their boundaries to avoid investing in quickly 
changing domains of expertise, while making their specialized suppliers learn more 
quickly and effectively (through multiple clients) than what they might have been 
able to do internally. In fact, outsourcing, for them, is not another path for seeing 
knowledge about their incidents and ways of avoiding them. Instead, it is a way to 
avoid acquiring knowledge about the incidents and technologies that are 
heterogeneous, specialized, and rapidly changing, while still benefiting from the 
results of learning practices done by the providers.  
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7.7 Where is organizational learning? 
One of the tenets of organizational learning literature is that it is not enough for 
the organizations that only their individuals learn. The reason is that organizations 
need to translate individual learning into organizational level in order to expand 
and replicate learned practices. Therefore, they do not reinvent the wheel in 
parallel places inside the organization. They also need to institutionalize such 
learning through organizational routines, collective practices, and material objects; 
so that organizations do not lose their learned capabilities if some of their 
members leave the organization (Easterby-Smith, 1997; Kim, 1993). In other 
words, learning journey is incomplete, if it only confines to local, individual 
learning practices. 
The current study has focused on organizational learning, by examining the 
practices that both individuals and collectives performed in order to enhance 
organizational capabilities for avoiding future incidents and reducing their impacts. 
In doing so, the study explored practices, procedures, structures, and mechanisms 
that helped the studied organizations transform their individual learning into 
organizational capabilities. However, the empirical findings showed that many 
learning practices are done individually or, at most, among a few actors. For 
instance, a specialized expert in a narrow domain of technology often performs 
most of incident handling practices, post-incident reflections, improvement 
projects, and even managing outsourced learning. Even practices like open-
seminars that were designed to be done collectively, gradually turned into 
individual tasks of documenting lessons or ceremonial meetings among a limited 
number of experts. 
The analysis showed that such individual pattern is mostly due to the high-level of 
specialization that stems from the technical and modular nature of IT systems. 
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This creates situations that only one or a few experts are related to learning 
practices. In fact, the involvement of other actors in learning practices is often 
irrelevant. Therefore, the individual pattern of learning practices is not an 
indication of organizations’ failure in progressing towards organizational learning. 
Instead, it reflects the very specialized, and predominantly outsourced nature IS 
activities. 
The prevalence of outsourcing IT services, and particularly outsourced learning 
practices, contributes to this pattern. Most of the interactions in learning process 
pertain to interactions between (single) experts and the associated specialized 
provider. In fact, the relevant domain of learning process is not the whole 
organization; rather it is the single expert plus the specialized provider. 
Such individual learning pattern, however, involves the risk of losing learned 
capabilities in case the specialized expert leaves the organization. However, the 
organizations were relying on their providers through their outsourced learning 
mode to alleviate such a risk. For them, maintaining relations with specialized 
providers who are actively learning from incidents of their clients has been as 
important as keeping their experts. This is because the strategy has been not 
engaging in learning about so many technical domains. In addition, learning 
through material replacement contributes to this pattern since the internal 
experts can simply learn how to replace faulty parts (which is not a specialized 
task), when some domain experts are absent.  
The fact that organizational learning is pursued through individual learning 
practices seems contradictory with the overall intuition of OL literature that 
suggests learning process is incomplete if it is confined to the individual level. The 
findings of this study suggest that such intuition should be revised by changing the 
unit of analysis from the whole organization to a system of actors that involves 
(few) internal experts and the specialized providers. In other words, the 
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meaningful unit of analysis for examining whether an organization has learned 
from its ISRIs or not should include the specialized providers. Thus, the traditional 
boundaries of organizations do not make much sense for defining and studying 
organizational learning, since outsourced learning is a dominant learning mode.  
 
Chapter summary: The chapter discussed how the articulation of various learning 
modes advances our understanding of OL process in relation with the 
characteristics of ISRIs. I discussed how insights from various learning modes help 
us rethink the temporal aspects of OL process, the role of materiality in the 
learning process, the politics of learning process, the governance system through 
which learning process is organized, and the organizational aspects of learning. 
Table 7.1 summarizes the findings of the empirical study, the related learning 
modes, the involved characteristics of ISRIs, and implications for research and 
theory. 
More specifically, transversal learning mode questions the dominant view that 
learning process takes place either during or right after incidents. It broadens our 
perspective by showing important learning practices that take place long after 
several related incidents. Learning through material replacement points to the 
importance of open windows of materiality, besides open windows of policies. The 
findings also show how the characteristics of ISRIs, such as their technical nature, 
allow organizations neutralize those incidents, while avoiding their normalization, 
during incident handling process and right after that. In addition, the articulation 
of transversal learning mode allows us to observe and explain how organizations 
dramatize on their past incidents, while avoiding the rationalization of incidents. 
Outsourced learning mode unravels the tendency of organizations to avoid 
learning practices related to specialized, rapidly changing technologies. 
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Finally, our analysis shows that the technical and specialized nature of 
heterogeneous ISRIs leads to the prevalence of individual learning practices, even 
when organizational learning outcomes are intended. This pattern, thus, invites 
rethinking the appropriate unit of analysis from the whole organization to a 
specialized system of actors across the organization and its specialized providers.  
224 | Page 
 
Table ‎7.1: Summary of discussion points and implications for research 
Empirical finding Related learning 
mode 
Contributing ISRI 
characteristics  
Implications for research 
Learning process might 
take place with a 
significant temporal 
distance with associated 
incidents, in a proper 
learning moment 
Transversal 
learning 
Rapid changes in 
technology 
We need to think beyond the 
established dichotomy that implies 
learning either takes place during 
or (right) after incident handling 
process. 
Semi-empty articles help 
seeding learning efforts 
and planting knowledge 
about emergent themes 
Transversal 
learning; Post-
incident reflection 
Changes in 
technology 
It is important to pay attention to 
the emergent and evolutionary 
nature of knowing, with regards to 
the social aspects of learning 
communities; attentions should 
also be paid to the demand for 
learning. 
Modularity and malleability 
of IT systems and open 
windows of materiality 
pave the way for various 
material learning practices 
Transversal 
learning; learning 
through material 
replacement  
Specialized 
nature of ISRIs 
and their 
underlying 
technologies; 
modularity of 
information 
technologies 
Understanding the materiality of 
learning also requires looking at 
periods and processes through 
with objects are changed and 
modified; Different regimes of 
materiality can influence learning 
practices. 
Neutralizing incidents 
through tickets and 
material objects helps 
avoiding political tensions 
and normalizing them 
Learning through 
incident handling  
Technical nature 
of ISRIs 
Mechanisms such as neutralizing 
can prevent identity-threatening 
mechanisms from the very 
beginning. 
Dramatizing on a series of 
past incidents helps 
mounting political pressure 
that is needed for driving 
learning process 
Transversal 
learning 
Technical nature 
of ISRIs 
Although during and right after 
incident handling process 
organizations might rationalize 
their incidents, dramatizing can 
help in rejuvenating the pains of 
incidents long after. 
Outsourced learning mode 
shows the importance of 
considering the 
governance system 
through which learning 
practices are pushed 
outside the boundaries of 
organizations 
Outsourced 
learning 
Heterogeneity of 
ISRIs; Technical 
nature of ISRIs; 
Rapid changes in 
ISRIs 
Outsourced learning questions the 
established dichotomy of learning 
governance –i.e., intra versus 
inter-organizational learning. 
The prevalence of 
individual learning 
practices in the process of 
learning from ISRIs shows 
limited relevant actors in 
the learning process 
Learning through 
incident handling; 
Post-incident 
reflection; 
Transversal 
learning; 
outsourced 
learning 
Technical nature 
of ISRIs; 
Specialization of 
ISRIs; Outsourced 
IT services 
The proper unit of analysis for 
judging about the organizational 
level of learning is not the whole 
organization; instead, it is a system 
of actors that include the few 
internal experts and the 
specialized providers. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
This chapter summarizes the findings of the study and their implications for theory 
and research. It follows by commenting on the limitations and suggestions for 
future research. Finally, I comment on some potential implications for 
management practice. 
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8.1 Summary of findings 
The research aimed at understanding “how does organizational learning process 
from major, internal ISRIs unfold?” Through a qualitative multiple case study, I 
examined the practices that four IT organizations adopted to leverage the 
experience of their major ISRIs. The results of the empirical study showed that the 
organizations adopted a wide range of practices during incident handling process –
i.e., handling incidents through ticketing system, interactions with specialized 
providers, and doing Triage- and after that –i.e., post-incident reflections and 
laboratory incident analysis. It also showed that the organizations adopted several 
practices –i.e., using Wiki systems, executing improvement projects, and 
performing upgrades- that allowed them to leverage the experience of several 
incidents through specific improvement initiatives. 
Analyzing these learning practices resulted in articulating five learning modes: (1) 
learning through incident handling process; (2) post-incident reflection; (3) 
transversal learning (TL); (4) outsourced learning; (5) learning through material 
replacement. The articulation of these learning modes helped examining how the 
characteristics of ISRIs can influence learning process.  
As for the first two learning modes, the study showed that the technical nature of 
ISRIs implies that the organizations mostly act individually or in small, specialized 
groups when they are learning from their major ISRIs. The specialization of 
technology, linked with its modularity, makes it unnecessary for many actors to 
take part in most of learning practices. The fact that ISRIs change frequently, due 
to technology changes, makes the organizations be cautious in performing the 
expected learning practices, such as post-incident reflection, and even further, 
attempt to avoid such practices (learning abstinence). In addition, the emergent 
and changing nature of ISRIs might require organizations to learn in an 
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evolutionary way, across various incidents over time (learning by seeding), rather 
than relying on definitive lesson drawing approaches. 
In addition, the characteristics of ISRIs such as their technical and changing nature 
can lead organizations to adopt other learning modes rather than learning through 
incident handling process and post-incident reflection. More specifically, the 
findings of this study showed that transversal learning from a series of incidents is 
a very common pattern that allows organizations to learn fundamentally from 
various incidents over time. In addition, by relying on outsourced learning and 
learning through material replacement, the organizations can still benefit from 
their incidents’ experience, while they do not engage in knowing the causes of 
incidents and how they can fix them. In other words, the organizations can bypass 
the cognitive process that is often assumed in traditional learning theories. 
8.2 Implications for theory and research 
The analysis of learning practices shows that the characteristics of ISRIs –i.e., 
technical nature, heterogeneity of technologies and actors involved, the 
modularity of the technology, and rapid technological changes- create a situation 
in which organizations not only engage in traditional learning modes (learning 
through incident handling and post-incident reflection), but also actively embark 
on other learning modes such as transversal learning, outsourced learning, and 
learning through material replacement. 
The findings suggest that learning from ISRIs might not be necessarily triggered by 
incidents. They can take place with a temporal distance, and in parallel, with a 
series of incidents, in a proper moment of learning. This indicates that we need to 
look beyond the established dichotomy in the literature that suggests learning 
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practices take place either during or (right) after major incidents. This becomes 
particularly important in cases like ISRIs that the underlying technologies change 
rapidly. Therefore, organizations need to construct stable patterns across 
incidents by bypassing technical noises for formulating fundamental learning 
initiatives. They can also mount enough political pressure by leveraging (e.g., 
through dramatizing on) a wide range of related incidents. 
The findings also show that the underlying material regime can influence the 
learning practices. More specifically, the findings indicate that ISRIs rely on a 
modular, changing material regime, which allows for adopting local, fast technical 
improvements, through replacements and upgrades. This pattern can contrast 
with integrated, stable material regimes in which learning from major incidents 
would be implemented through basic design changes. 
The articulation of transversal learning mode, vis-à-vis the two traditional learning 
modes also reveals how blame-game (that often occurs due to the proximity to 
the incident time) can be reduced by introducing temporal distance between 
learning practices and the incidents, and through disguising the relations between 
incidents and the learning practices. In addition, transversal learning surfaces the 
role of dramatizing as a political dynamic through which learning agents can add 
to the political pressure for driving learning initiatives, by leveraging the ignorance 
of influential actors. 
Finally, the results show that in situations like ISRIs that organizations deal with a 
wide range of heterogeneous, and rapidly changing technologies, the learning 
process might be outsourced to specialized providers. Thus, organizations might 
not engage in internal learning process and through interactions with external 
partners. However, this learning governance requires that contractual relations 
between organizations and their providers be set in a way that allows them to 
accrue the results of fast, specialized learning efforts performed by providers. 
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8.3 Limitations and future studies 
The study is an initial step for understanding how learning from technical incidents 
occurs. There are several limitations that call for future studies. First, the findings 
are limited to the specific empirical setting, namely IT organizations. The fact that 
the studied organizations were specialized in IT domain might have resulted in the 
emergence of several patterns. For instance, it is possible that the studied 
organizations embarked on various improvement projects internally due to their 
knowledge about IT domain. Therefore, the organizations that are not in IT 
industry (e.g., pharmaceutical companies), might lack internal IT capabilities to 
involve in such learning practices from ISRIs. This way, they might rely more on 
outsourced learning mode and learning through material replacement.  
Second, being the first study, the attention has been mostly paid to exploring the 
patterns of learning practices (learning modes) and examining how the 
characteristics of ISRIs might influence them. Thus, capturing the heterogeneity 
and contingency of learning from ISRIs has been beyond the scope of this study. 
Thus, further studies are needed to examine the differences between various 
types of organizations (e.g., large versus small), in different industries (e.g., IT 
intensive versus non-IT-intensive), in different contexts (e.g., public versus 
private), and based on different organizational cultures. Previous studies have 
shown that these factors, among many can influence the way in which 
organizations learn from their incidents.  
Third, and in this line, it is important to compare between learning from two main 
categories of ISRIs: 1) system failures and 2) security and privacy incidents. IS 
literature has shown some basic differences between these two categories of 
incidents. For instance, security incidents (P. Chen, Kataria, & Krishnan, 2011; 
Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Eriksson, 2001; Zafar & Clark, 2009) are often 
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intentionally created by attackers. This way, security incidents are more dynamic 
and emergent than system failures, since the attackers might change their 
strategies as they foresee how their targets (e.g., the affected organizations) might 
learn from those incidents.  
Although our empirical setting allowed for studied both types of incidents, we did 
not intend to make such a specific comparison between the two categories of 
incidents. It was because the aim of the study was to openly explore the learning 
practices with regard to the general characteristics of ISRIs. However, in our 
analysis, we could capture the emergent nature of security incidents when 
organizations were considering the changing nature of incidents in their learning 
abstinence and in adopting transversal learning. Future studies might explore such 
differences through comparative studies. A proper design can be focusing on 
organizations that suffer from both types of incidents at the same time, then, 
comparing the process of learning between the two categories of incidents. Such 
comparative study can help identifying conditions in which some learning modes 
are more relevant than other ones.  
Fourth, the study intended to examine organizational learning practices, namely 
practices that individuals and collectives adopt to avoid recurrence of incidents 
and reduce their impacts, from the view of the organizations. The study openly 
explored various learning practices and specifically sought to see how individual 
learning is then transformed into collective practices and is institutionalized into 
organizational elements. However, the technical nature of specialized 
technologies revealed a strong individual pattern across various learning practices. 
Hence, it showed that the relevant learning actors inside the organizations are 
limited to single or few experts, though they are interacting with other experts 
inside their providers. Although this pattern was captured through outsourced 
learning mode, the locus of study was on the central organization. Further studies 
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can look at this mode from an industry-level perspective. More specifically, it is 
interesting to know how a division of labor is shaped among IT companies and 
their clients in terms of learning practices, how IT companies learn across their 
clients, and how IT organizations act as specialized learning centers for other 
industries. 
8.4 Implications for practice 
8.4.1 Beyond traditional learning modes 
As for managerial implications, the findings of this study show that there are 
ample learning opportunities for organizations beyond the two traditional modes. 
More specifically, learning efforts of the organizations do not confine to their 
practices during and right after each incident. The organizations can also engage in 
learning process when they learn transversally from a series of incidents, to 
materialize a specific solution. Furthermore, the findings suggest that transversal 
learning can provide more chances for organizations to focus on specific solutions, 
and engage in a process through which they build a local understanding of the 
concerned solution and put it into practice by developing political pressure and 
available socio-technical elements. This way, organizations can bridge their 
knowing-doing gap. Some learning initiatives that might not be identified and be 
feasible during and right after each incident, might be more justifiable and feasible 
when organizations reflect on a series of incidents and integrate political pressure 
and mobilize resources to put them into practice. 
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This suggestion becomes important particularly when we notice that the 
practitioner-based literature focuses on learning from incident as a stage that 
should be done right after incident handling, through the analysis of the causes of 
incident and drawing lessons. This suggestion, though might be useful in some 
situations that the incident is stable and repetitive, can be misleading if it is 
considered as the only or the best learning practice. Particularly, our empirical 
findings showed that in cases like ISRIs that incidents are changing, an 
overemphasis on post-incident analysis can make organizations waste their 
resources on drawing lessons that would become obsolete quickly. In addition, 
organizations might run the risk of applying obsolete lessons to future incidents. 
8.4.2 Embracing new learning governances 
In line with the previous implication, the study shows that learning process does 
not necessarily confine to acquiring more knowledge about the incidents and their 
causes, through either internal practices or external interactions. In fact, the very 
context of ISRIs showed that organizations might find it even more effective if they 
rely on learning practices that take place inside their providers. Furthermore, the 
organizations might intentionally avoid internalizing learning activities due to the 
technical nature of incidents that changes quickly. The dominant trend of 
outsourcing IT incident management (Jopson, 2013) resonates with the tendency 
among both IT and non-IT companies to outsource their learning practices as well.  
However, this can bring about risks in situations that the relation between the 
organization and its provider does not create enough incentives for deep, timely 
learning by the providers. In this line, it is critical for managers to set up their 
contractual relations in a way that supports outsourced learning mode. In fact, 
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learning how to contract would be an agenda for managers when they realize that 
internalizing learning practices is not a viable solution anymore. 
8.4.3 Neutralizing incidents through ticketing system 
The empirical findings show that ticketing system can help organizations neutralize 
their incidents by transforming them into tickets. This way, organizations can 
prevent blame-game and other political and social tensions that can negatively 
influence the learning process. Although this practice seems to be prevalent in IT 
industry, organizations in other industries can adopt the same approach. 
Ticketing system is different from some traditional documentation and filing 
systems that passively store information about the incident. Ticket can be used as 
a live, impersonal entity that objectifies incidents. Therefore, actors act on ticket, 
as an important task, rather than a sign of failure or defect. In addition, tickets 
reduce the efforts needed for documenting information during incident handling 
process. This is particularly important since organizational actors are often very 
busy during incident handling process. Hence, documentation of incident during 
incident handling through traditional systems is often incomplete and requires 
extra efforts.  
8.4.4 Incident mining  
The study showed that ticketing system is an established working tool in incident 
handling process. The organizations use it not only to organize their incident 
handling process, but also to keep a detailed, contextual history of their incident 
experiences. They even put efforts to make sure that all possibly useful 
information about incident handling process is stored in tickets.  
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Surprisingly, the study found that the organizations rarely went back to this rich 
source of information and analyzed them. Although they have explicitly 
announced their need for identifying patterns of incidents by analyzing a large 
number of accumulated tickets, they do not perform such analysis. Most of 
incident reporting activities are confined to incident counting for the sake of 
measuring the amount of hours spent on tickets of one type of another.  
There seems to be several reasons for this situation. First, the managers and 
experts are often too busy to spare time for doing such transversal analysis on the 
tickets from various specialized domains. Second, for doing such analysis, they 
need to develop and implement analytical tools that help them search for 
meaningful patterns. Third, they need to spend a good amount of time in 
analyzing qualitatively the tickets, their differences and their similarities, in 
addition to plane overall patterns.  
This shows an important opportunity for providing incident-mining services to the 
companies. Incident mining aims at analyzing both quantitatively and qualitatively 
the tickets of the organizations over a long period to identify meaningful patterns 
of incidents, analyze their causes, and suggest potential solutions. Incident mining 
provides the opportunity of identifying and analyzing patterns of incidents that are 
not easily detectable through reflections on single or a few incidents (like trying to 
see jungle beyond the daily observation of trees). Incident mining is not simply a 
large-scale data analysis. It is specialized in terms of incident elements, namely 
chains of events and impacts, the potential underlying causes, the effect of various 
solutions, and the patterns of secondary incidents that might appear 
subsequently.  
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Appendix 1: Interview protocol 
All interviews were based on a customized interview protocol that was derived 
from the overall case study protocol. The general interview protocol that was used 
for customization is presented bellow. 
 
Interview Protocol / Report 
Date Time Place Org. / Department  Case 
     
Interviewee(s):  
Name & Family Position / Role Tel Number Email Mobile 
     
Interviewer: 
1- Check points before the interview  
 Thanks for having time. 
 Introducing myself 
 Why this study 
 Who is the beneficiary 
 History of work 
 Why you? 
 Confidentiality  
 Recording? 
 Your introduction 
o What is your specialty? 
o How many years and months in present position? _____years _____months 
o How many years experience with this company? _____years _____months 
o Your position 
o Your functions / tasks 
 
2- Initiating the meeting 
a. Introducing the topic and project (3 minutes presentation) 
i. Academic study on how organizations learn from incidents that happen 
to there is 
ii. We are not interested in the incident itself, but mainly in how 
organizations learned from it 
iii. Learning = any change in order to reduce the possibility or impact of 
such incident or other incidents in future 
iv. All data will be confidential, anonymous, and fully checked by you and 
the company’s managers 
1. As we arranged, we record the session, only to be able to 
analyze the data accurately and focus better in the session on 
the questions  
2. All these records will be destroyed after the project and will be 
kept meanwhile fully confidential 
3. But at any point if you preferred that we pause recording, 
please just let us know 
b. Identifying/Specifying the case 
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i. We are now focusing on the case [name of the case] 
ii. We are interested in what really happened in this case, regardless of 
the formal procedures of the project 
iii. We have studied the documents that you sent us about this case 
1. [Saying a bit about the case to clarify what is exactly the case 
that are focusing on] 
c. Introducing yourself in relation to this case 
i. Before starting to ask our questions, do you want to say a bit about  
1. What is your background? 
2. What is your position and role in the company? 
3. What is/was your role in this case? 
ii. Before asking the questions, do you want to mention any general point? 
 
3- Extracting the overall story of incident management 
a. Exploring the narrative story  
i. (let them talk freely) 
ii. Start 
1. When it started? 
2. How did it start? 
3. Why the company decided to do so? 
iii. Process 
1. What happened afterwards 
iv. End 
1. What is the situation now? 
2. What are now in place in this regards? 
4- The learning process (overall story) 
a. What did the company after the incident 
b. What did it afterwards? 
c. Which kind of changes took place 
 
d. Mapping on the Timeline 
Events: 
- Incidents 
- (Dis)Approvals 
- Decisions 
- Bold actions 
- Unexpected happenings 
- Oppositions 
- Changes 
Actions 
- (to emphasize more the intentional actions) 
- By managers 
- By employees 
- By consultants 
- By IT-experts 
Actors (who were active (affecting / be affected) actors) 
- Internal 
o Managers 
o Employees (users) 
o IT experts 
o Elites (key but informally important) 
o Departments 
o Other roles that might be defined during the project / case 
- External 
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o Suppliers 
o Customers 
o Other actors 
Artifacts 
- Information systems 
- Products 
- Other technologies 
- Facilities 
- Layouts / locations / positions  
Discourse 
- Formal assertions 
- Informal assertions 
- Hearings (gossips) 
- Wonders / doubts 
Coalitions 
- Main positions around the case 
- Proponents (in favor of the change) 
- Opponents (against the change) 
- Reasons / rationales /  
- Interactions 
Conflicts 
- Major cases of conflict 
- Who were involved 
- How it happened 
Interventions 
- What was not expectable to be done 
- Someone who was not expectable to intervene 
Inactions 
- What was supposed to be done, but never happened 
- What were decided and planned, but not executed 
- What suddenly terminated or stopped 
 
e. Dimensions of change in learning process 
i. Systems / Technologies 
1. What did they do to the systems? 
2. How did they change the existing technology 
3. Did they change anything about the  
a. Software? 
b. Hardware? 
ii. Procedures / processes 
1. Did any change happened to the processes? 
iii. People 
1. Who were involved? 
2. Who were not involved? 
3. Who did what? 
4. Any changes in people? (hiring, firing)? 
5. Any changes to the HR activities / policies? 
iv. Structures 
1. Any departmental changes? 
2. Creating any new team / committee / …? 
3. Merging? 
4. Removing? 
v. Training 
1. Any new training activities? 
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2. Internal vs. external? 
vi. R&D 
1. Any research project? 
2. Any new exploration? 
vii. Communication  
1. How did they communicate about this issue? 
2. During the incident? 
3. After the incident? 
4. External vs. internal? 
5. To the top managers? 
6. To the technical experts? 
7. To those who were not involved? 
viii. Physical changes 
1. Any change in locations? (location of servers …) 
2. Any change in hardware? 
3. Any change in the arrangements and settings? 
4. Any change in the design? 
f. Any other changes / activities? 
1.  
2.  
 
5- Specific Questions 
 [to be added here] 
 
6- Complementary resources 
a. Other informants 
i. ………………………….. 
ii. ………………………….. 
iii. ………………………….. 
b. Reports 
i. ………………………….. 
ii. ………………………….. 
iii. ………………………….. 
c. Websites 
i. ………………………….. 
ii. ………………………….. 
iii. ………………………….. 
d. Memos 
i. ………………………….. 
ii. ………………………….. 
iii. ………………………….. 
e. Films 
i. ………………………….. 
ii. ………………………….. 
iii. ………………………….. 
f. News 
i. ………………………….. 
ii. ………………………….. 
iii. ………………………….. 
g. Other sources 
i. ………………………….. 
ii. ………………………….. 
iii. ………………………….. 
7- To do List 
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a. ….………………………….. 
b. ….………………………….. 
c. ….………………………….. 
 
8- Post-Interview Actions 
 Thanks for your time 
 How to contact you 
o Email 
o Mobile 
o Fixed 
 Time of next meeting 
 How to follow up issues 
o directly 
o Secretary 
o colleague 
 Thanks again, 
 
 
9- Transcript of the Interview  
10- Analysis after the session 
a. Impressions 
b. Contradictions  
c. Disagreements (with others) 
d. Supports for assertions 
 
11- Appendixes  
 
12- Links to Support Documents  
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